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ABSTRACT	  
MEDIATION IN LITERACY: LANGUAGE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MODALITY 
Hem Paudel 
July 28, 2015 
The issue of difference in writing, both in terms of language diversity and 
modalities, has received increasing attention in the context of new developments in 
technologies, increasing global migration, and intensified intersections of cultural and 
linguistic practices accompanying these changes. Theories of language and modality are 
trying separately to develop ways to best respond to the challenges and opportunities 
brought about by these changes. Responding to scholars’ recent calls for bridging the gap 
between studies of multilingualism and those of multimodality, this dissertation offers an 
approach that, instead of separating the study of modality and languages, questions such a 
tendency to not only create dichotomies between these two, but also to assume the 
stability and discrete character of various modes and languages. I argue that dominant, 
additive models of multimodality and multilingualism deemphasize understandings of 
languages, modalities, and technologies as material social practices in a complex 
communicative ecology, thereby implying what Brian Street calls “an autonomous” 
model of multimodality and multilingualism. Going beyond the abstract notions of 
language and modality as stable and discrete, this dissertation urges us to see the 
material-social practice of language as always already multimodal, while also being part 
of the ecology of multimodal semiotic practices.
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 This dissertation has been divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces 
issues of multilingualism and multimodality and provides a brief theoretical background 
to analyze dominant assumptions about language and modality. Chapter Two interrogates 
social theories of agency and mediation, both humanist and anti-humanist and develops 
an alternative understanding of mediation based on cultural materialist theories of 
practice and new materialism. I discuss how theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, and 
Pennycook help us see seemingly isolated acts as parts of a nexus of sedimented 
practices, whereas Latour’s call to pay attention to non-human agents and mediation as 
translation makes us see how durability and change in practices do not depend only on 
human agents and social structures, but equally on the “missing masses.” Chapter Three 
and Chapter Four take up the theoretical insights from the previous chapters, arguing that 
major theories of multilingualism and multimodality retain some residues of 
monolingualism and monomodality either in assuming the discrete and stable character of 
languages and modes or in assuming individual users as stable and free-floating agents. 
In an attempt to overcome these monolingualist and monomodalist tendencies, these two 
chapters call for paying attention to the full panoply of (f)actors affecting semiotic 
negotiations of our students rather than romanticizing the agency of users in an attempt to 
debunk monolinugualist/monomodalist ideology. Chapter Five develops an alternative, 
integrated way of viewing translingual and transmodal relations. This chapter ends with a 
demonstration of how shifting our theoretical orientation challenges not only the norm of 
existing pedagogical practices of segregating codes (linguistic or other semiotic), but also 
revises some of the multilingual and multimodal pedagogies advocated in recent studies.
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CHAPTER 1 
STUDIES OF LANGUAGE RELATIONS AND MODALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though the word “composition” is a bit too long and windy, what is nice is that it underlines that 
things have to be put together (Latin componere) while retaining their heterogeneity. Also, it is connected 
with composure; it has clear roots in art, painting, music, theatre, dance, and thus is associated with 
choreography and scenography; it is not too far from “compromise” and “compromising,” retaining a 
certain diplomatic and prudential flavor. Speaking of flavor, it carries with it the pungent but ecologically 
correct smell of “compost,” itself due to the active “de-composition” of many invisible agents. (Latour, 
“Attempts” 473-74)  
 
We are witnessing an increasingly diverse landscape of writing with the 
developments of new forms of communication technologies, intersections of people 
across cultural and geo-political borders, and increasing exchanges of ideas, symbols, and 
linguistic practices. As a result, the world, as Arjun Appadurai, Walter Mignolo, and 
Immanuel Wallerstein argue, does not remain as pockets of discrete, homogeneous 
cultures and values. Rather, every aspect of our culture is becoming more and more 
unstable, fluid, and interdependent. Such cultural changes and the new developments in 
media technologies have made a significant impact on how we communicate within and 
across cultures, and what resources are available for transmodal, transcultural, and 
translingual practices and how those resources mediate and are mediated by existing 
practices. Writing theories and pedagogical approaches have started responding to such 
existing and emerging situations, semiotic practices, and their representations, especially 
in terms of two major phenomena: the effects and roles of the rise of digital technologies
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and the increasing traffic of languages and semiotic practices accompanying and 
contributed by those new developments in technologies. In this emerging context, several 
writing and communication scholars such as Kathleen Blake Yancey, Gunther Kress, and 
Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis have called us to rethink about what 
writing/communication is and how we can “develop new models of writing” (Yancey 1). 
The possibility and ease with which large number of people can produce, distribute, and 
use writings, tapping into multisemiotic and multilingual resources, makes us rethink 
how we view the notion of writing, technology and its relation to writing, and what role 
language relations play into that web of interactions.  
However, the dominant conception of composition and pedagogical approaches to 
it are still limited to what Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge call SL/MN ideology 
(Single/Standard Language and Modality). In other words, despite various attempts at 
exposing the problematic assumptions about language and modality, composition 
teaching largely remains dictated by monolingual and monomodal ideologies, 
considering “Standard Edited English” as the only language appropriate for formal, 
academic writing and writing as the only mode appropriate for serious thought in 
composition (see Diana George, “Visual” and Selfe, “Aurality”). Such narrow 
conceptualizations of language and modality have severely affected many students, 
especially those from linguistic, racial, ethnic, and cultural minority backgrounds. 
Actually, these limited and often problematic conceptualizations about language and 
modality also affect mainstream students as they need to navigate through diverse 
linguistic practices in everyday practice.  
As a response to the dominance of SL/MN ideology and the massive diversity in 
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writing practices, both inside the academy and beyond, in recent times, our discipline has 
paid a lot of attention to the potential effects of these new developments on writing and 
communication. In fields like applied linguistics and writing studies, scholars like 
Alastair Pennycook, Claire Kramsch, Suresh Canagarajah, Bruce Horner, and Christiane 
Donahue, among many others, have called for a multilingual (plurilingual/translingual) 
approach to language difference in this new context. Similarly, in new media studies, 
scholars like Gunther Kress, Cynthia Selfe, and Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis, have 
called for a multimodal/multiliteracies approach to writing and communication to better 
understand how the nature of communication has changed due to the emergence of new 
forms of writing in digital spaces, leading to changed roles of writers, readers, and texts. 
However, as Bruce Horner, Cynthia Selfe, and Timothy Lockridge rightly claim, “despite 
their common points of origination, discussions of modality have remained largely 
separate from discussions of translingulaity, to the impoverishment of both.” In other 
words, the major concern of multimodal and multilingual studies have been largely 
similar, calling for the recognition and promotion of language practices and modalities 
different from ‘Standard’ Edited American English (or British English) and the mode of 
writing in theorizing and teaching of composition. But, as they claim, there have been 
very few attempts at bridging that gap and exploring intersections, overlaps, and 
divergences between the two so that they can interanimate and enrich each other. In 
composition and literacy scholarship, only a few studies have started looking at these two 
phenomena together, examining the intersections of translingual and multimodal 
practices (See Michael Apple and Steven Fraiberg). Furthermore, this area still needs to 
be explored more as most of the existing studies are often limited in their interpretation 
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and understanding of language practices and modalities due to their assumptions about 
languages and modalities as discrete and stable and the mediation of such practices 
theorized largely in terms of broader abstracted notions associated with economy, culture, 
or ideologies, rather than looking at what practice theory1 scholars and new materialists 
like Anthony Giddens, Alastair Pennycook, and Bruno Latour would call the “practices” 
themselves in their material social ecology.  
In other words, while offering alternative perspectives or advocating for 
alternative modalities and language practices, we tend to leave the problematic 
conceptualizations uninterrogated, often unwittingly accepting the terms of value of 
modes and languages that dominant understanding assigns them. Similarly, in most of the 
theorizations of language and modality, the theory of mediation remains largely limited, 
often understood in terms of determination, whether it is by what we call the “social,” 
“human” agency, or the materiality of the technologies, or taken in various combinations, 
including the notion of overdetermination. It is important to see people’s use of 
technologies (including languages) as being shaped by and also shaping not only the 
larger social contexts like geopolitical relations, but also the seemingly insignificant 
material ecology beyond the “social,” taking mediation as such as translation and 
transformation of the assumed affordances and goals of such technologies, thereby 
transforming the users themselves. Therefore, in this project, I’ll particularly focus on 1) 
how mediation works in the intersection between new forms of technologies and 
translingual practices, 2) what a user’s communicative practices tell us about material 
                                                
1 Pierre Bourdieu and Alastair Pennycook self-identify themselves as theorists of practice whereas 
Raymond Williams and Anthony Giddens do not. Following Theodore R. Schatzki’s definition of practices 
as “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity,” mediating agency and structure, I include 
social theorists like Williams and Giddens under practice theory for their rejection of agency/structure 
dualism and their focus on human activities and processes as units of social analysis. 
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social resources and constraints enabling or/and restricting translingual and transmodal 
potentials, and 3) what implication our understanding of such practices can have on how 
we teach composition inside our college classrooms. 
A Brief Literature Review: Language Relations and Multimodality  
We have seen two major approaches in analyzing texts in this newly emerging 
context: multimodal and multilingual/translingual2. A typical multimodal approach would 
often focus on the increased agency of the writer due to the affordances of multiple 
modes and the participatory nature of digital tools (see Cope and Kalantzis; Kress). 
Similarly, a typical multilingual approach highlights the metalinguistic awareness of the 
writer and her multilingual competence in “shuttling” across discourses (see Jessner; 
Moore and Gajo; Canagarajah and other plurilingual theorists). Some recent writings that 
have started blending multimodal and multilingual scholarship (see Freiberg; Apple; 
Athon) often emphasize the affordances of new technologies and multimodality to 
promote multilingual activities. These scholars have examined the issue of difference 
both in language and modality studies. They have shown how allowing languages other 
than “standard” English and modes other than print in writing practices can empower not 
only minority students of different types but also those from dominant cultures (see 
Canagarajah; Selfe; Wysocki; etc.). These scholars have cautioned us towards the 
possible consequences of myopic notions of language standards and marginalization of 
modes of expression and representations other than print/writing. As a result, we now see 
                                                
2 There definitely are several others that talk about technology and writing. But, I’m particularly focusing 
on those that analyze composing practices in terms of differences pertaining to language variety and 
modalities.  
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an increased focus on these issues in scholarship (journal publications, scholarly books, 
awards, conferences, etc) and pedagogical theories and practices. 
Studies of Language Relations 
Despite continuous transformations of languages, including English(es) due to the 
intersections  of language practices, English monolinguality is still dominant within the 
academy and beyond, not only in the US, but all across the world. It is the tendency to 
abstract languages from their lived practices and their history and to assign them fixed 
and stable character. In the context of the increasing diversity in language practices and 
the persistence of monolingual beliefs, the issue of language difference has been 
extensively discussed in sociolinguistics and in composition studies.  
Most of the early language theories in Applied Linguistics, from which 
Composition has drawn several insights, ignore how individual language activities are 
often mediated by, and therefore transformed by, the micro-macro contexts, while, 
simultaneously also transforming those contexts. As Alastair Pennycook says in his 
article “English as a Language Always in Translation” and his recent book Language as a 
Local Practice, many language approaches, such as, World Englishes, English as a 
Lingua Franca, and Language Fortification, retain the tendency of taking languages as 
discrete and stable entities, highlighting how new forms and structures have emerged in 
localized varieties (see Braj Kachru’s Asian Englishes; Yamuna Kachru and Cecil 
Nelson’s World Englishes), or proposing to develop a common core of English language 
across all varieties (see Jennifer Jenkins’ Phonology of Language; Andy Kirkpatrick’s 
“Which Model of English”; Barbara Seidlhofar’s “English as Lingua Franca”), or 
defending national language against the hegemonic influence of English (see Phillipson’s 
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English Only Europe and “English for Globalization”, and Joseph and Ramani’s “English 
in the World.”)3. As Suresh Canagarajah, in “Plurilingual Tradition,” Pennycook in 
“Translation,” and Kramsch in “Privilege” argue, they seem to ignore the fact that 
languages and cultures transform and are transformed by their interactions with other 
language practices due to various factors associated with language, including rhetorical 
and epistemological diversities. Similarly, while focusing on structural differences, they 
also ignore the role of individual practices in transforming language structures. Thus, 
they retain the traditional tendency of viewing languages as primarily governed by 
preexisting system or structures, thereby retaining the assumption about language fixity 
even when talking about language diversity.  
Even the dominant notion of multilingualism suffers from the same problem. 
Though the dominant model of multilingualism, unlike monolingualism, does 
acknowledge the importance of different languages and cultures, in many cases, the 
general understanding of multilingualism is used to refer to separate competencies in two 
or more languages, as Canagarajah, Monica Heller, Pennycook, and Claire Kramsch, 
along with many other French, European and Asian plurilingual scholars, such as Moore 
and Gajo and Lachman Khubchandani, have said. In other words, languages are taken as 
discrete systems where the “the ultimate goal for language learning was to become, feel, 
and speak like an idealized native speaker” (Moore and Gajo 139). Hence, bilingualism 
and multilingualism become nothing more than the pluralization of monoligualism 
(Pennycook, LLP 10). Thus, the dominant notion of multilingualism, ignoring mediations 
                                                
3 Similar critique can be found in Bruce Horner and Min-Zhan Lu’s “Resisting monolingualism in 
‘English’: reading and writing the politics of language.” Here, they argue that in all the three existing 
models—eradicationist, accomodationist, and SLA—they retain monolingual tradition of taking languages 
as separate and fixed.   
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across languages, adopts the same logic of instrumentalism as monolingualism, taking 
language as a set of decontextualized skills to fulfill certain ends. Therefore, this 
numerical version of multilingualism/bilingualism retains the dominant tendency to view 
languages as discrete and formal systems. In other words, additive multilingualism 
ignores the inevitability of “traffic” within, amongst, and between the artificial 
ideological boundaries separating languages, cultures and peoples.  
In order to avoid monolingual assumptions of the traditional version of 
multilingualism, many linguistics such as Daniel Coste and Diana-Lee Simon, and 
Danièle Moore replace multilingualism with the notion of plurilingualism, where they 
argue that “the language competence of bilinguals should not be regarded as the simple 
sum of two monolingual competences, but should rather be appreciated in conjunction 
with the user’s repertoire of total linguistic resources” (Moore and Gajo 139). In contrast 
to an additive model of multilingualism where multilingualism merely means two or 
more separate monolingualisms, plurilingualism “allows for the interaction and mutual 
influence of the language in a more dynamic way (Canagarajah “Multilingual Strategies”, 
7). The plurilinguals take the difference built into the linguistic habitus as resources.  
However, with its overemphasis on resources, in an attempt to counter monolingual 
hegemony, this approach “concentrates on the individual rather than the community as its 
angle of vision” (Moore and Gajo 141) and places more emphasis on the individual as a 
“social actor, with agency and choice” (150).  
Their static view of resources, their focus on individual choice and purpose, and 
their emphasis on metalinguistic awareness go quite well with their human-centric view 
of agency where agency is taken as the capacity to employ resources with deliberate 
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intention and an understanding of kairotic moment (static notion of context). Such a 
tendency of locating competence in individuals and identifying some individuals as 
specifically “translinguals” illustrates the tendency of taking language away from practice 
as understood in a broader perspective of material ecology. The tendency to advocate 
code-meshing as a special ability of some multilinguals/translinguals, that is, the 
tendency of fetishizing specific strategies, abstracts language from everyday practice. It 
seems that plurilingual theorists’ concern to debunk monolingualist ideology risks 
making code-meshing/shuttling between languages a specific competence for 
multilingual speakers, a competence that multilingual speakers need and want to 
transform and hone all the time.4 
Technology, Writing, and Multimodality 
English composition started discussing the role of digital technology in writing 
practices since the 1980s. With the developments in communication technologies and the 
need for people to communicate across culturs and geopolitical locations, increasing 
number of people have started producing texts combining a variety of modes. As a result, 
composing practices are becoming increasingly transmodal/multimodal. However, the 
dominant ideology within the academy and beyond is still monomodal. Similarly, an 
instrumentalist understanding is equally dominant, downplaying human aspects of 
technology: “Although institutions are investing in technology infrastructure and support 
at an astonishing rate… these investments are often driven by logics that fail to make 
                                                
4 Even as Canagarajah critiques the Chomskian model of natural competence, he seems to have fallen 
victim to a similar model by assuming the expertise of multilingual speakers as a natural competence to be 
“honed by actual interaction.” It is quite different to think of a language repertoire as resources for 
multilingual speakers to tap into in confronting difficult communicative situations and to think of it as part 
of a natural competence applicable to all situations.  
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humanistic perspectives a central concern” (Selber 1).  Monomodal ideology and 
instrumental views in a way go together with an ahistorical and asocial view of 
technology and modes. 
To counter an instrumental view of technology and monomodal belief of literacy, 
scholars have developed critical (postcritical) and multimodal/multiliteracies approaches 
to composing practices. As Selfe and Selfe and Stuart Selber contend, an instrumentalist 
perspective, while eulogizing the “democratic” potential of technology, which Hawisher 
and Selfe call “rhetoric of technology,” ignores how it is embeded in social and 
ideological belief systems and can perpetuate and support “monoculturalism, capitalism, 
and pathologic thinking” (Selfe and Selfe 486). Instead, these scholars take technologies 
as “cultural artifacts embodying society’s values” (Hawisher and Selfe, “Rhetoric of 
Technology” 55).  
 Similar to Selfe and Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe, Christina Haas, in her book 
Writing Technology and many other articles, also critiques instrumentalist and 
deterministic views of technology and contends: “An instrumentalist view of technology 
carries with it all the dangers of an autonomous theory of language” (21). Haas equates 
autonomous/apolitical views of language with instrumentalist views of technology.  
 To question and go beyond instrumentalist views of technology, these cultural 
critics of technology often emphasize the role of a “critical perspective” or “critical 
reflection” (see Hawisher and Selfe, and Selfe and Selfe) or “metacognition” (see Cope 
and Kalantzis) in order to demystify the ideological nature of computer interfaces and 
technological designs.  
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 The problems of instrumental view of technology raised by critical literacy 
theorists are very real and significant. That taking technology merely as a neutral tool that 
in itself can liberate us can, as Cynthia Selfe says, “actually contribute to the ongoing 
problems of racism, sexism, poverty, and illiteracy” (referenced in Selber 12). However, 
taking technology as cultural artifacts embodying dominant ideological values without 
attending to how those dominant values are produced and reproduced, thereby 
transforming them, both by human and non-human agents, falls into the trap of another 
form of determinism, as practice theorists and Latour point out. 
There is another, perhaps equally influential, and in many ways quite similar, 
tendency in computer and composition scholarship that critiques the ideology of 
monomodality and advocates the promotion of multimodal literacy/multiliteracies (see 
The New London Group; Kress and Van Leeuwen; Kress; Selfe; etc.). Gunther Kress, 
whose ideas have massive influence in discussions of digital literacy practices in 
composition, has developed a sophisticated theory of multimodality and calls for a “turn 
to the visual” (see “English in the Crossroad”). His major focus on multimodal literacy 
lies in his notion of distinct affordances of different modes depending on their internal 
materialities:  
One of the present tasks of a social semiotic approach to multimodality is 
to describe the potentials and limitations for meaning which inhere [italics 
mine] in different modes. For that, it is essential to consider the materiality 
of modes. Speech uses the material of (human) sound; writing uses the 
material of graphic substance. There are things you can do with sound that 
you cannot do with graphic substance, either easily or at all; not even 
imitate all that successfully graphically.  (“Reading Images” 112) 
 
In other words, according to Kress, writing and image have their own unique affordances, 
and since our culture is becoming more and more visually dominated due to the rise of 
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digital technologies, it is necessary for us to think about what specific goals these 
different modes can accomplish better than the dominant mode of writing. In 
distinguishing print literacy from visual literacy, Kress and Theo van Leeuwen even go as 
far as developing a “grammar of visual design,” echoing the structuralist notion of 
language.  
Similar to Kress, many other scholars like Diana George, Cynthia Selfe, and Bill 
Cope and Kalantzis emphasize encouraging and allowing students to use various modes 
in addition to writing. We can find a similar additive logic in Cope and Kalantzis’s notion 
that multimodality gives more agency and freedom to users as more modes offer greater 
potentials.  
Despite greater potential of helping many students who practice alternative 
literacies, this dominant understanding of modality (and multimodality) risks iterating 
what Brian Street calls “autonomous model of multimodality,” taking modes as fixed and 
stable and assigning specific affordances to specific modes (“Future of ‘Social 
Literacies’” 32). Such a perspective abstracts one feature from a mode, for instance, 
spoken language, leaving out the ways in which, e.g., facial expressions and gestures, and 
the social positioning of the speakers/listeners, contribute to the meaning of the speech.  
Both in critical literacy and multimodal literacies, mode is taken as discrete and 
stable. When we argue for an addition to or replacement of one mode by the other, we 
tend to accept the value attached to the mode by dominant beliefs, e.g., writing with 
linear argument or with verbal mode, while, in reality, it does have many dimensions and 
possibilities depending on the dispositions of the users and the material ecology. While a 
materialist focus on multimodal theory reifies modes from practices, critical literacy 
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reifies technology from practices by taking them as the by-product of dominant 
ideologies.  
Both the theories of modality and that of language relations show some 
fundamental problems that are closely linked with mediation and agency. This 
dissertation will develop an alternative understanding of mediation based on cultural 
materialist theories and new materialist understandings of mediation. The insights from 
these theories will help us address the problems in theories of language relations and 
multimodality.  
Theoretical Background 
The notion of mediation, as it is defined in recent philosophical accounts and 
social theories, undercuts the idea of reflection, the correspondence theory of language, 
or instrumentalist notions of technology/techniques. Among the theories that question 
functionalist, structuralist, and positivist notions of language, technology, and reality, I 
find practice theory(ies) particularly useful in describing the nature of mediation of 
human actions, including our writing practices. Therefore, I’ll here briefly discuss some 
important ideas from practice theory scholars like Raymond Williams, Pierre Bourdieu, 
Anthony Giddens, and Alastair Pennycook. I will also discuss Bruno Latour’s actor 
network theory and ecopsychological theories of affordances to expand a practice theory 
notion of mediation and to incorporate material ecology into the equation. In other words, 
the new materialism of Latour and ecological theories of affordances can complement the 
theorization of micro-macro relations in practice theory. This theorization of mediation 
will help me offer an alternative way to rethink the relationships between language and 
technology in our current situation, which will redirect our attention to various social-
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materiality of translingual and transmodal practices and linguistic and technological 
aspects of our writing practices.  
Cultural Materialist Theory of Practice 
Raymond Williams both extends and critiques the materialist5 understanding of 
orthodox Marxism. His major contribution lies in his rejection of abstraction and 
reductionism in both vulgar Marxism and other positivist theories of language and reality. 
He replaces the notion of reflection (whether used in Marxism or in realist/naturalist 
accounts) with mediation, drawing our attention from a static notion of reality to the 
dynamic relationship between human actions and socio-material processes. For him, 
mediation is an “active and substantial process,” and therefore, less abstracted than the 
idea of “reflection” (Marxism and Literature 99). Mediation, as such, transforms both 
social conditions and human actors. Another important concept that Williams 
complicates regarding mediation is determination, in a line similar to his critique of the 
notion of reflection.  
He critiques the reductionism of orthodox Marxist ideas of determination where 
every human activity is a “direct or indirect expression of some preceding and controlling 
economic content” ( Marxism and Literature 83) by redefining determination as “setting 
of limits” and “the exertion of pressures” (87). In other words, he takes determination 
also as enabling actions, thereby taking human “act of will and purpose” into account. 
However, such acts and purposes are limited by the existing and emerging socio-material 
conditions.  
                                                
5 Here, I’m using the term materialist to refer to the Marxist focus on economic aspects of reality and their 
reversal of the relationship between mind and matter, ideas and socio-economic reality.  
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Social theorists Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens expand Raymond 
Williams’ critique of positivist theories of language and reality and his focus on “the 
material life processes as human activity,” as well as Williams’ rejection of reductioinist 
orthodox Marxist notion of determination (96). In their case, their theories come as a 
response to the humanist notions of agency and the structuralist and poststructuralist 
emphasis on structural and discursive power. They focus on the dynamic interplay 
between agency and structure, where individual actions and social structures mutually 
presuppose, form, and transform each other.  
Bourdieu questions the binary between subjectivism and objectivism, both the 
theories that “treat practice as mechanical reaction, directly determined by the antecedent 
conditions” and those that characterize practice as the product of “the conscious and 
deliberate intentions of their authors” (OTP 73) by redefining the relations between 
agency and structure through his notion of habitus: “The structures constitutive of a 
particular type of environment . . . produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures….” 
(OTP 72). His definition shows that habitus is largely stable or durable; it is structured by 
and, at the same time, structures the social practices. Furthermore, it does not presuppose 
deliberate intention of the actors.  
Bourdieu introduces his notion of capital and field to further connect the 
individual with the social and to characterize the nature of social practices. These 
practices, in Bourdieu, are reproduced (and transformed) through the interplay between 
habitus, objective social structures of the fields, and individuals’ access to the various 
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kinds of capital. What I found important in his practice theory is his emphasis on the 
embodied nature of beliefs and his consideration of spatial and temporal dimensions of 
practices. Similarly, his notion of habitus provides some insight into understanding the 
durability of dispositions about linguistic and other semiotic practices.  
Anthony Giddens, similar to Bourdieu, critiques functionalists and structuralists 
for their overemphasis on objective structures at the cost of individual agents. His 
replacement of structure with the notion of structuration, which proposes the notion of 
“duality of structure,” helps him counter structuralist determinism: “the structural 
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they 
recursively organize” (Constitution of Society 25). Similar to Williams, he emphasizes 
process rather than stable state and views individuals as knowledgeable actors, though 
such knowledge and reflexivity largely remain within the structural properties of a 
system, thereby taking part in the reproduction of the system.  
As in Bourdieu, in Giddens too, the possibilities for transformations are shown to 
be minimal, only, during special circumstances such as conflict or breakdown or the 
incompatibilities between interdependent systems of practices. At the micro level, 
Giddens sees possible transformations due to the unexpected effects of material 
conditions. Similarly, the tensions between interconnected practices can produce 
disjuncture and fissures in structural principles, with a potential to bring about large 
systemic changes. 
Both Bourdieu and Giddens seem to have developed their theories with reference 
to more or less closed societies. Therefore, critics like Michel de Certeau and Arjun 
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Appadurai critique Bourdieu’s habitus and Giddens’ structuration. For de Certeau, the 
practice theories of Bourdieu and Giddens, similar to Foucault’s theory of discourse, fail 
to see the possibilities of micro tactics of resistance. Arjun Appadurai also found theories 
of habitus and structuration problematic, especially in the context of the flow of semiotic 
resources, cultural texts, symbols, and people in a globalized context that “move[s] the 
glacial forces of habitus into the quickened beat of improvisations for large groups of 
people” (Appadurai 6). However, we should be very aware that diversifications in 
practices and improvisations in human activities do not necessarily mean equally 
diversifying and transforming experiences in one’s habituses. Therefore, despite being 
partly problematic, Bourdieu and Giddens’ notions of habitus and structuration still 
provide us important insights into the durability of beliefs despite transformations in 
practices.   
Alastair Pennycook can be taken as an extension of the practice theories of 
Bourdieu and Giddens to the field of sociolinguistics with special attention to the 
processes of globalization.  For him, language is a local practice where practice means 
the “meso-political space” “between the local and the global” (Language as a Local 
Practice  23).  His major contribution lies in his theorization of agency in terms of 
relocalization of language use by individual agents where language becomes a 
“sedimented discourse” (46). His idea of language as a sedimented discourse and his 
notion that every repetition is different, or, in his words, “repetition is an act of 
difference” (36) helps us redefine creativity not merely in terms of deliberate acts of 
deviation from norms, but as a result of everyday acts of relocalization of language 
practices. Therefore, Pennycook helps us see language practices not as micro acts or the 
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results of macro forces, but as an activity mediating these two on a mesopolitical level. 
Similarly, it also helps us see creative language acts beyond abstracted notions of code-
meshing or code mixing, in everyday language practice.  
New Materialist Theory of Bruno Latour  
Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook challenge humanism and structuralism, 
questioning the idea that either one of them determines the other. Bruno Latour can be 
taken as extending this trend by adding in the role of things/techniques/technology, or 
what he calls “missing masses,” in shaping our actions (see “Missing Masses), thereby 
redefining the notion of the social. Second, he contributes to practice theory by replacing 
determination with translation (see“Technical Mediation”).  
Latour rejects the notion of the social as stable and homogeneous and redefines it 
as an assembly, collective, or a network of associations, thereby urging us to recognize 
the heterogeneities within what we often call social, whether in sociolinguistic, socio-
economics, socio-cultural, etc:  
In the alternative view, ‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything 
including what the other glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by 
many other type of connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, 
socio-linguistists, social psyschologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the 
given that could send some light on residual aspects of economics, 
linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on 
the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by 
the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, 
law, management, etc. (Reassembling 5) 
So, despite Latour rejecting practice theory, he does extend and complement the practice 
theory notion of the social as the interplay between the individual and structure, but by 
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showing that structure actually is just an assembly of a heterogeneous mix of humans and 
non-human agents, contributing to the mediation of what we call social practices.  
 Similarly, in his accounts of mediation, he rejects materialist6, humanist, and 
social determinisms, and takes mediation as translation, that is, transformation of the 
goals of our actions in a complex ecology of human and non-human mediators.  The full 
force of his theory comes with the combination of these two tenets, his redefinition of the 
social and his replacement of determination with translation. This can be seen in his 
description of his new materialist theory with what he calls ANT, but which, for him, 
suggests, not so much actor network theory, but more as an ant, ant in its slow, laborious, 
muddy walk, exploring the every traces of the agents, both obvious and missing, rather 
than a “bird’s eye view” of the social where we take account of larger social aspects like 
political history or economic condition.   
Eco-Psychological Theory of Affordances 
While talking about technology and languages, many multimodal theorists as well 
as some language researchers have used the notion of affordances. But as I’ll show later, 
almost all of them use it in what Latour calls a materialist way, i.e., taking affordances as 
properties of the objects/environment (in our case, modes/technologies/languages). I find 
it useful to draw from eco-psychological theories that have extensively discussed the 
notion of affordances to relate the notion of affordances to technologies, including 
languages.  
                                                
6 Here, materialist refers to the tendency of assigning the agency behind any change solely to the 
materiality of technique or tool. It is different from cultural materialism where material expands to include 
socio-economic conditions shaping cultural practices.  
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Gibson was the first theorist who defined affordances. He defined affordances of 
an environment as “what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill. . . . I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal 
in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the 
environment” (127). Gibson’s definition accounts for the animal-relative nature of the 
affordances of the environment. With a slight revision, later eco-psychologists such as T. 
Stoffregen regard affordances as “emergent” dispositional properties of an animal-
environment system: “I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment 
system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the 
environment or the animal” (Stofferegen 115).  
Anthony Chemero slightly advances Stofferegen’s definition of affordances by 
rejecting his notion of affordances as property. Chemero asserts: “I argue that affordances 
are not properties of the environment; indeed, they are not even properties. Affordances, I 
argue, are relations between particular aspects of animals and particular aspects of 
situations” (184). He further says that “affordances are features of the whole situations” 
(185). Though Stofferegen’s and Chemero’s definitions seem quite similar in that both 
assume affordances as emergent and both reject it to be a property of any single 
component in animal-environment unit. However, Chemero’s use of the term “features,” 
rather than “properties,” his notion of affordances as relations, and his use of the term 
“situations” in place of a “system” mark a clear break from Stofferegen’s view. Though 
Chemero does not clearly state that he includes factors other than animal and 
environment in what he calls situations, we can extend it to mean not only the perceiver 
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and the object or the environment, but also their relationships with other things both 
physically present and absent in the situations. 
 Here, the point that I’m trying to highlight is that affordances are not the inherent 
properties of an object or the environment. First, it is relative to the perceiver, especially 
in terms of what Bourdieu would call habitus that tells her to take the object/environment 
as something, not something else, thereby also co-constituting the individual observer 
herself. Second, it depends on the whole situation, where it includes not only the object 
(mode, medium, etc.) and the perceiver (readers/viewers), but also the overall situation 
where the action or the perception takes place. From this point of view, affordances of 
images or words depend not only on the features of them, but also on the relations of 
them with other objects/things around them and the viewer/reader. As it is relative to the 
audience/readers/viewers, the affordance of something can be quite different at various 
situations. It often depends on the dispositions of the perceiver, his/her habitus that 
comes from the sedimentation of his reading and writing patterns.  
Problem Area 
From the brief review of literature on multimodal literacies and 
multilingual/plurilingual approaches, we can see that literacy studies is also moving in a 
direction quite similar to language studies, whether in applied linguistics or in 
composition: they both question hierarchization of languages or modes and highlight the 
importance of seeing our students as “designers” and critics of meaning making rather 
than mere imitators of conventions. However, while critiquing the dominant ideologies, 
many multimodal and multilingual studies often ignore the constructed nature of modes 
and languages. Similarly, in both multilingual and multimodal accounts, we still seem to 
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adopt an additive model, focusing on “multiple” rather than exploring the transactions 
across various modes, as we have started seeing in translingual studies. Such additive 
models, as Yasemin Yildiz contends about the postmonolingual condition, unwittingly 
perpetuate monolingual and monomodal beliefs despite their attempts to resist such 
ideologies. The central question then is: how can we overcome such problematic 
characterizations of linguistic and other semiotic practices?  
Similarly, as composition is and has become more and more interdisciplinary, we 
may need to explore more what we can learn from the insights from both 
multimodal/transmodal studies and multilingual/translingual studies. The exigency of 
such research and practice is becoming more prominent in the context of the rising 
interactions across languages not only in writing and speech but also in various modes. 
Similarly, the WPA outcome statement’s focus on encouraging use of different modes 
and the Council of Europe’s explicit policy of plurilingualism also mark the importance 
of this kind of research in our field. In exploring the issues of multimodality and 
multilingualism, instead of separating the study of language from that of modality, or 
vice versa, it is important to study them as aspects of the same writing/communication 
ecology, examining the transactions across various modes and/or languages and 
translations of meanings. Similarly, it is also equally important to examine why certain 
modes/languages are associated with specific functions/purposes (writing with verbal or 
visual or temporal; images as visual as opposed to verbal, etc) and how we could also 
encourage alternative potentials of those modalities.7 
                                                
7 I’m using modality and language as separate only as they have been used that way. But in reality, 
language has several modal dimensions, while, at the same time, it is part of the multimodal 
communication practices.  
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Towards that direction, I attempt to bridge the gap between discussions of 
multimodality and multilingualism/translingualism in composition scholarship by 
examining multilingual and multimodal relations and theorizing them in terms of 
mediation in general and socio-technical mediation in particular. The project involves a 
selective study and critique of the ways in which multimodality and language relations 
have been discussed and theorized in composition and other allied fields. Based on my 
reading of the literature, I argue that the current body of literature on multimodality rests 
on a few problematic assumptions: a) modes/technologies/languages have some inherent 
affordances, b) they are separate, stable, and fixed with discrete potentials, c) users have a 
control over what they want to do with multimodal or multilingual resources (thus their 
focus on metacognition, metadiscursive or metalinguistic awareness). Similarly, there are 
a few assumptions that require careful scrutiny in theories of language relations: a) it 
often abstracts language from practices and makes generalizations without paying 
sufficient attention to micro-macro agents of mediation, b) it romanticizes the agency of 
multilingual users, ignoring the constraints they often have to struggle against, c) its 
notion of resources is static.  
Responding to the calls by Horner, Lockridge, and Selfe and by many other 
language and literacy theorists for exploring ways to bridge the gap between multimodal 
and translingual scholarship, I will try to show that reconceptualizing mediation from the 
perspectives of a cultural materialist theory of practice and new materialist theory, where 
mediation is not limited to human agents and social structure, but is understood in terms 
of the complex material ecology of practice, can help us go beyond narrow divisions 
between different modalities and between language and modality.  
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An Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter One: This chapter introduces my topic and the discussions around issues of 
multilingualism and multimodality. It provides a brief overview of the literature on both 
studies of language relations and that of multimodality. Then, it summarizes the major 
theoretical approaches on mediation, especially from cultural materialist and new 
materialist perspectives that I will be using throughout the dissertation, including the 
practice theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook, and new materialism of Bruno 
Latour. The chapter will end with a brief overview of the problem statement.  
Chapter Two: This chapter reviews theories of mediation in detail, which will be used for 
the analysis of language practices in Chapter Three and multimodality in Chapter Four. 
Here, I present cultural materialist theories of materialism and phenomenological theories 
of materialism, moving at the end to the possible ways to bring them together for the 
better understanding of communicative practices.  
Chapter Three: This chapter examines theories of language relations and offers an 
alternative approach to understand negotiation of language difference. In examining 
different language models, it particularly focuses on how monolingual tenets persist even 
in theories that came as a reaction to and call for resisting monolingual ideology. After 
critiquing models such as ELF, World Englishes, multilingualism, and plurilingualism, 
this chapter offers what I call a mesodiscursive approach to language difference. 
Chapter Four: I examine and critique theories of multimodality and technology in 
composition and other related fields and offer alternative ways of viewing multimodality. 
After providing a background to the discussions of technological mediation and 
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multimodality, this chapter examines some important views on multimodal composition 
and their problematic assumptions about various modes and their affordances.  
Chapter Five: I’ll develop an alternative way of viewing translingual and transmodal 
relations in an integrated way. After exploring overlaps and divergences, I will develop a 
perspective for better understanding of such overlaps. This chapter ends with the 
discussion of some pedagogical implications of rethinking linguistic and other semiotic 
practices from a new materialist theory of practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRACTICE THEORIES OF MEDIATION: OVERCOMING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
CULTURAL MATERIALISM AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL MATERIALISM 
 
No place dominates enough to be global and no place is self-contained enough to be 
local. As long as we try to use either local interaction or structure, or some compromise 
between the two, there is no chance to trace social connections—and the cleverer the 
compromise, the worse it would be, since we would simply extend the lease of two non-
existing sites. On the contrary, I am trying here to be as dumb as possible and multiply 
the clamps to make sure we resist the temptation to cut away in two boxes—global and 
local—what actors are doing, interrupting at once the deployment of their many fragile 
and sometimes bizarre itineraries.  (Latour, Reassembling 204) 
 
The nature of writing is changing as a result of a variety of factors including new 
developments in digital technologies and cross-linguistic practices. How do we 
understand those differences in writing practices and continuation of what Horner, Selfe, 
and Lockridge call SL/MN ideology in the way writing is understood in the academy and 
outside? Many of us and our students today participate in writing practices, either as 
writers or readers, that go beyond traditional notion of writing as print-based and 
monolingual. Scholars in composition have developed theories of multimodality and 
multilingualism separately, but there have been very few attempts at studying the recent 
changes in writing comprehensively and learning from each other. One fundamental 
reason behind that could be a limited theorization of the notion of mediation. Therefore, 
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in this chapter, I look into how materialist theories of mediation, both old and new, can 
provide us some ways to rethink our writing practices and pedagogical methods, 
especially in abstracting languages and modalities, treating them as stable categories, and 
ignoring material social factors affecting their use. I am using the theoretical lens of 
mediation to approach both the obvious differences and underlying intersections between 
studies of multimodality and those of multilingualism because I see that the long-standing 
gap between these two fields and their characterization of languages and modalities as 
discrete and stable seem to have their basis in their limited and problematic theoretical 
assumptions about agency and mediation.  
The word mediation has come to mean several things, from an act of reconciling 
two opposite sides, acting as a tool for transfer of meaning or message, dividing things 
into two equal halves, to an act of reflection (Williams, Key Words 204). It has been 
problematic ever since we started deliberating on human actions and the factors shaping 
such actions, far before philosophers we have come to know discussed the relationships 
between language, authorship, work of art, and the world (Plato, Aristotle, and Panini). In 
our modern history, we see variations of two major trends that have remained in place in 
different forms: a) assuming human actions as solely shaped or determined by the 
intention and will of the actor and b) seeing social systems (taken as stable and 
homogeneous) as the determiner of all human actions, turning individuals to mere pawns. 
Despite these two trends being two completely opposed perspectives, they do share a 
fundamental problem, i.e., taking mediation as a linear phenomenon. And various 
manifestations of such tendencies are dominant in our field of rhetoric and composition 
even today. In most of these, the major problem is that of abstraction, either separating 
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composition as a product and composition as an activity from everything else, or 
separating the context from the messy relationships within and outside, thereby reducing 
the inherent heterogeneities and disjunctions into a homogeneous entity. Such tendencies 
can be seen in studies of language relation in their treatment of one language from its 
material social practice, thereby taking languages as discrete systems, free from the 
individual language acts. A similar tendency can be found in the studies of 
multimodality; that is the tendency not only to separate and reify modalities, but also to 
separate various modes from the complex interrelationships with what we traditionally 
call mode of writing or speech. To avoid such problems, we need to expand our notion of 
mediation to develop a more nuanced alternative, especially the one that tries to explore 
any act, of writing or communication, in its complex ecology of relations and material 
social practices. Here, I will discuss notion of mediation from materialist perspectives, 
the refinement of which can offer us productive ways to address differences in writing 
practices. I will particularly focus on expanding materialist theories of practice, both 
Marxist and phenomenological, with special attention to theorists like Raymond 
Williams, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and Alastair Pennycook on the one hand, 
and Martin Heidegger and Bruno Latour, on the other.  
Though the roots of practice theory go at least as far back as to Aristotle’s 
discussion of praxis and techne, in modern times, it is often referenced back to Karl 
Marx’s overturning of idealist metaphysics, especially as he challenged “centuries of 
Western rationalist and mentalist tradition” and established the legitimacy of “real 
activity, what ‘sensuous’ people actually do in their everyday life, as an object of 
consideration and as an explanatory category in social sciences” (Nicolini 29). It was the 
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materialist trajectory that Marx gave to intellectualist traditions of the West that set up a 
ground for understanding human actions based on their life in the world, not in their mind 
alone: “[the various aspects of law] assert themselves without entering the consciousness 
of the participants and can themselves be abstracted from daily practice only through 
laborious, theoretical investigation” (qtd. in Nicolini 32). Similar to the Marxist line of 
thought, phenomenological tradition, beginning with Martin Heidegger (or some say 
Friedrich Nietzsche), also challenged idealist notions of language and reality and focused 
on the role of embodiment and the embeddedness of human work. So, in this chapter, I 
will trace these two trajectories in terms of their focus on practice and material processes 
and see if we could find productive ways to utilize the strengths of both.  
Cultural Materialism and Practice Theory 
Despite initiating the materialist understanding of human actions, orthodox 
Marxism remained largely reductive. As Raymond Williams claims in Marxism and 
Literature, “the usual consequence of the base-superstructure formula, with its 
specialized and limited interpretations of productive forces and of the process of 
determination, is a description—even at times a theory—of art and thought as 
‘reflection’” (95). Therefore, what is problematic in orthodox Marxism (what Williams 
calls mechanical materialism), similar to the intellectual tradition it came to counter, is its 
tendency to characterize art/literature/language/writing/work as reflection, truthful or 
distorted, echoing idealist theory of mimesis (Platonic tradition/Romantic tradition, etc.) 
and the nineteenth and twentieth century positivist theories of language and reality. To 
avoid that problem, Williams replaces the term reflection with mediation, thereby 
replacing the tendency of seeing the “world as object” and “excluding activity, with that 
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of “seeing the material life process as human activity” (96). Mediation here was intended 
to describe an active process:  
To the extent that it indicates an active and substantial process, 
‘mediation’ is always the less alienated concept. In its modern 
development it approaches the sense of inherent constitutive 
consciousness, and is in any case important as an alternative to simple 
reductionism, in which every real act or work is methodically reduced 
back to an assumed primary category, usually specified (self-specified) as 
‘concrete reality’. (Marxism and Literature 99) 
 
In other words, replacement of reflection with mediation might help us overcome the 
reductive tendency in orthodox Marxism and recognize the co-constitutive role of the act 
of mediation and the processes and conditions it mediates. However, he is also aware 
about the possible complication in using the term mediation:  
But when the process of mediation is seen as positive and substantial, as a 
necessary process of the making of meanings and values, in the necessary 
form of the general social process of signification and communication, it is 
really only a hindrance to describe it as ‘mediation’ at all. For the 
metaphor takes us back to the very concept of the ‘intermediacy’, which, 
at its best, this constitutive and constituting sense rejects. (Marxism and 
Literature 99-100) 
 
Williams is complicating the term mediation so that it overcomes the problematic 
meaning it tends to suggest despite it replacing the term reflection. Mediation, by its very 
name, seems to suggest the very duality it wanted to avoid. But its positive and 
constitutive sense, as Williams claims, largely rejects that customary meaning by 
reminding us how such mediating activity not only transforms the possible consequences, 
but also what it intended to mediate, thereby blurring the boundaries between the activity 
of mediation, objective reality and its processes, and the product of mediation.  
Williams extends his discussion of mediation with his reconceptualization of the 
Marxist notion of determination. Orthodox Marxism is generally reductive, seeing every 
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cultural activity as “a direct or indirect expression of some preceding and controlling 
economic content, or of a political content determined by an economic position or 
situation” (Williams, Marxism and Literature 83). In other words, they took 
determination to mean “setting of limits,” the limits of a particular mode of production, 
with a clear suggestion that social change is possible only through a complete overhaul of 
the existing economic and social structures. Williams expands the notion of 
determination to include not only “setting of limits” but also “the exertion of pressures,” 
where to determine also means “to do something [as] an act of will and purpose” (87). 
Here, what individuals do are, however, “always social acts” (87). Therefore, for 
Williams,  
‘society’ is then never only the dead husk which limits social and 
individual fulfillment. It is always also a constitutive process with very 
powerful pressures which are both expressed in political, economic, and 
cultural formations and, to take the full weight of ‘constitutive’, are 
internalized and become ‘individual wills’. Determination of this whole 
kind—a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures—is in 
the whole social process itself and nowhere else: not in an abstracted 
‘mode of production’ nor in an abstracted ‘psychology’. Any abstraction 
of determinism, based on the isolation of autonomous categories, which 
are seen as controlling or which can be used for prediction, is then a 
mystification of the specific and always related determinants which are the 
real social process—an active and conscious as well as, by default, a 
passive and objectified historical experience. (88) 
 
Though Williams does not elaborate his constitutive notion of determination that much, it 
somewhat resembles a more systematic discussion of the dynamic relationship between 
agency and structure in Bourdieu and Giddens’s practice theory. In Williams, society no 
more remains a static, “dead” structure, but is rather a dynamic and complex process, 
both setting limits and enabling actions. Furthermore, his notion of determination, as with 
his notion of mediation, rejects abstraction and isolation whether of human action (art/ 
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writing/languaging) or social reality. What orthodox Marxists call “objective social 
structures,” for Williams, therefore, shape and are shaped by social processes, which 
presuppose individual actions. The tendency of creating autonomous categories, with 
fixed self-governing internal rules, is nothing but mystification.  
In the same vein, Williams also counters structural Marxist ideas of 
overdetermination despite its complication of the notion of determination by 
acknowledging the role of multiple factors determining human actions. He does agree 
that overdetermination avoids the Marxist tendency of reducing everything to base and 
superstructure where base structure is again reduced to relations and means of 
production. But at the same time, it maintains relatively autonomous character of 
practices: “As with ‘determination’, so ‘overdetermination’ can be abstracted to a 
structure (symptom), which then, if in complex ways, ‘develops’ …by the laws of its 
internal structural relations. As a form of analysis this is often effective, but in its 
isolation of the structure it can shift attention from the real location of all practice and 
practical consciousness: ‘the practical activity…the practical process of development of 
men’” (Williams, Marxism and Literature 88). Their continued focus on internal 
structures and their isolation of such structures from fluid and ever changing practices 
make them fall victim to the same economism that they tried to avoid. As he hints at, we 
often tend to sacrifice complexity for the sake of analytical effectiveness and efficiency.  
What we find most useful in Williams is his opposition to the tendency of 
abstraction: abstracting structures from practices, taking categories in their isolation, and 
therefore, failing to see the continuous processes of change despite durability of social 
formations in some forms. This focus on practices and his challenge to the tendency of 
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creating a dichotomy between structures and human actions is similar to Pierre Bourdieu 
and Anthony Giddens’ critique of functionalism and structuralism in their dissolution of 
such binaries.  
Practice theory, in its initial phase, is often associated primarily with Anthony 
Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. Their social theory is often called social praxeology, which 
assumes social life as contingent and ever changing. Their study of social phenomena 
centers around the dynamic relationship between social structures and practices. Similar 
to Raymond Williams, Bourdieu and Giddens make everyday human actions and social 
and economic pressures that shape such actions their main subject of study.  
Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu respond to humanist notions of agency and 
the structuralist and poststructuralist emphasis on structural and discursive power 
subjecting individuals to its norms by emphasizing the dynamic interplay between agency 
and structure. In their accounts, human activities, including our language practices, are 
mediated by the dynamic relationship between individual agency and social structure, 
where individual actions and social structures mutually presuppose, form, and transform 
each other, as interdependent and co-constitutive. 
 Bourdieu’s materialist theory of praxis combines a phenomenological 
understanding of human actions with social and economic considerations from Marxist 
thought. In his attempt to counter existing dualisms, between agency and 
structure/individual and society, he develops a robust theory of praxis where his notions 
of habitus, capital, and fields8 play central roles.  
                                                
8 While Bourdieu’s connection of habitus with the field is very important to show how seemingly 
individual is inherently social. But his notion of field itself is abstracted in its obliteration of the concrete 
materiality of the field and the heterogeneities within it.  
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He rejects all theories that “treat practice as mechanical reaction, directly 
determined by the antecedent conditions and entirely reducible to the mechanical 
functioning of pre-established assemblies, ‘models’ or ‘roles”’ and also those theories 
that characterize practice as the product of “the conscious and deliberate intentions of 
their authors” (OTP 73). He does so by redefining structure not as a set of preexisting 
“rules,” or “system,” or all-encompassing Discourse governing every human activity, but 
as patterns or regularities emerging out of constant interaction between objective social 
structures and habitus. He defines habitus thus: 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment . . . produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles of the generation and structuring of practices and 
representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” 
without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively 
adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or 
an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being 
all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
orchestrating action of a conductor. (OTP 72)  
 
Here are a few things from his definition of habitus: that it is largely stable or durable; it 
is structured by and structures the social practices; it regulates and is regulated by the 
regular patterns of actions and behaviors; and it does not presuppose conscious intention 
of the actors or the conductors. He thus humanizes and historicizes structure while also 
socializing agency. Similarly, his concept of habitus is “capable of connecting recursively 
the individual/subjective and intuitional/objective dimensions” (Nicolini 55).  
 With the habitus, Bourdieu dissolves mind/body dichotomy as, for him, habitus 
refers to “a set of mental dispositions, bodily schemas, and know-how operating at a pre-
conscious level, that once activated by events, fields generate practice” (Nicolini 55). In 
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other words, habitus is a form of knowing in practice, something like a feel of the game. 
The development of habitus occurs through our daily repetitive activities without our 
conscious thought. In this sense, Bourdieu’s conception of habitus is similar to what 
Polanyi calls tacit knowledge or Merleau Ponty calls embodied knowledge.  
 However, Bourdieu’s theory is different from Merleau-Ponty’s, Polanyi’s, and 
other phenomenological theories of tacit knowledge because of his strong focus on social 
and material dimensions. Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, unlike otherwise similar 
phenomenological constructs, is in a co-constitutive relationship with the social structure 
representing specific material conditions of existence that characterize a class or social 
group. This way, the habitus links individual conduct with a particular milieu, making 
seemingly individual activity inherently social. Individuals engage in the practices that 
continuously reproduce social conditions. This focus on material condition and specific 
social class is what clearly distinguishes him from phenomenological theorists.  
In connecting the social to the individual, Bourdieu, as stated earlier, introduces 
two other forces—capital and field.  And habitus produces practice through its interaction 
with various types of capital and field. With his focus on these forces, he becomes able to 
account for the role of power relations and structural properties of specific fields in 
generating practice and affecting the habitus of the individuals in recursive manner.  
 It is therefore important to see the interactions between these three forces (habitus, 
capital, and field) to understand the nature of actual practice.  
 For Bourdieu, fields are partially autonomous and are governed by their own 
internal norms, values, and recognitions. But it works in recursive relation with the 
habitus. That means, individuals’ participation in a field shapes the habitus, which, after 
  36 
being activated, reproduces the field. It is also equally important to consider how 
individual’s actions are shaped by habitus, which “only operates in relation with the state 
of the field and on the basis of the possibilities of action granted by the capital associated 
with the position” (Nicolini 60). And capital for Bourdieu goes beyond mere economic 
resources: “A general science of the economy of practices that does not artificially limit 
itself to those practices that are socially recognized as economic must endeavor to grasp 
capital, that ‘energy of social physics’… in all of its different forms…I have shown that 
capital presents itself under three fundamental species (each with its own subtypes), 
namely, economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital” (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 118-119). Because of the interaction of these three forces, actions of 
individuals are mostly similar to, while also being different, from the members of the 
same class. 
Such an understanding of habitus means that it is a group or class phenomenon 
that in some way harmonizes the practices of those in the same class or group without 
their conscious awareness:  
The practice of the members of the same group or, in a differentiated 
society, the same class, is always more and better harmonized than the 
agents know or wish because, as Leibniz says, following only (his) own 
laws, each nonetheless agrees with each other. The habitus…inscribed in 
bodies by identical histories…is the precondition not only for the co-
ordination of practices but also for practices of co-ordination. (Bourdieu, 
Le Sens Pratique 59, qtd. in Nicolini 60) 
 
However, due to the variations in the accumulation of capital and its value, habitus never 
produces the exact same practice; each individual develops a recognizably different 
trajectory. In Wittgenstein’s words, their habituses have family resemblance.   
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 The dynamics between variation and conformity leads to whether individuals act 
consciously and deliberately, making their own choices out of various options available 
or creating their own trajectory. For Bourdieu, people are both conscious and not so 
conscious, making “moves and acting strategically,” but “unaware that their motives, 
goals and aspirations are not spontaneous or natural, but are given to them through 
habitus” (Webb and Schirato 58). In other words, what they think as their conscious 
choice is but their “misrecognition” (Bourdieu, Logic 106). However, Bourdieu does see 
some possibility of conscious actions that can go beyond the strong boundaries set by 
their own habitus, but only during times of crisis and social breakdown. 
 Bourdieu does offer a systematic theory of the relationship between social 
practices that people participate in and the objective structures of the field(s), theorizing 
the persistence of traditional values and systems of domination. However, his theory, as 
De Certeau and Arjun Appadurai claim, seems to find it hard to overcome the charge of 
determinism for its overemphasis on the powerful constraints habitus poses on the 
possibilities of conscious and strategic human actions. He does see some space for 
conscious choice, but only during times of “exceptional crisis …when rules are in flux” 
(Burawoy 201). As Burawoy claims, ground reality can often contradict with “palpable 
transparency of exploitation” (201). In other words, a perfect match between habitus and 
material reality in the field might be a little unrealistic.  
 Bourdieu theorizes practices primarily in terms of a class-based and relatively 
more closed society than ours today; and therefore, his theory still looks somewhat 
deterministic in a certain sense. However, he does talk about overlapping fields and the 
resultant recognitions and misrecognitions, leading to social transformations. We can 
  38 
extend his theory in our context to try to match it with the more fractured and disjunctive 
societies today, going beyond his notion of class to include other issues including 
geopolitical difference, gender, race, nationality etc.  
 Similar to Bourdieu, the major contribution of Anthony Giddens lies in his theory 
of structuration, through which he sought to overcome the binary of structure and agency. 
He maintains that functionalists like Parsons and structuralists like Saussure and Levi-
Strauss had put overemphasis on objective structures at the cost of individual agents, 
whereas the humanists did the opposite, undermining the role of structure and 
overestimating the place of individual agents. In order to counter structuralist 
determinism, Giddens proposes the notion of “duality of structure,” by which he means 
that “the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the 
practices they recursively organize” (Constitution of Society 25). Here structure and 
agency presuppose and constitute each other rather than being opposed to each other. In 
other words, he combines “two traditionally opposed sensitivities: the attention for the 
intentional and meaningful conduct of human actors, and a consideration of the 
constraints that limit the possibility of action” (Nicolini 44). Similar to Williams, Giddens 
is also both drawing on, expanding, and problematizing Marx’s famous dictum that 
human beings make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing (Giddens, 
Constitution of Society 7).  
Giddens tries to overcome the traditional boundaries between subjectivist and 
objectivist tendencies by developing a social theory of structuration, “a theory of 
recursive production and reproduction of society as praxis, in which the question of what 
comes first becomes meaningless and dissolves” (Nicolini 45). His use of a neologism, 
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“structuration,” implying the use of an intransitive verb in place of a noun, suggests that, 
in his account, structure is not a stable state but a continuous process.  
By emphasizing process, with his replacement of structure with structuration, and 
by making knowledgeable actors necessary part of perpetuating and transforming 
structures that organize practices, Giddens tries to avoid possibility of being seen as 
deterministic, turning agents into structural dupes. However, at the same time, agents’ 
reflexivity is part of their practical consciousness, the knowledge with which they draw 
resources from the structural properties of a system and contribute towards its 
reproduction.  
Therefore, structures for him are not dead husks, they have both a virtual and 
actual existence; that it is both non-temporal and non-spatial: “According to the theory of 
structuration, an understanding of social systems as situated in time-space can be effected 
by regarding structure as non-temporal and non-spatial, as a virtual order of differences 
produced and reproduced in social interaction as its medium and outcome” (Giddens, 
Central Problems 3). Here, structure is not something that is out there existing at a 
particular time and space; rather it is a memory trace that develops through sedimentation 
across time and in relation to different spaces. Giddens says, “Structures do not exist in 
time-space, except in the moments of the constitution of social systems. But we can 
analyze how ‘deeply-layered’ structures are in terms of the historical duration of practices 
they recursively organize, and the spatial ‘breadth’ of those practices: how widespread 
they are across a range of interactions. The most deeply layered practices constitutive of 
social systems in each of these senses are institutions” (65). 
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 Referring to a common practice of talking about structure in terms of the rules of 
chess as isolated from context, Giddens says, “Nowhere in the philosophical literature, to 
my knowledge, are either the history of chess (which has its origin in warfare), or actual 
games of chess, made the focus of study” (Central Problems 65). The most important 
thing that we can draw from his discussion of structure is that we can never talk about 
rules isolated from layers of history and their real practices. So, structure is an emergent 
property of action as much as action presupposes structure. The actuality of structure lies 
only in its instantiation in action. Like what Bourdieu says about the transposability of 
habitus, for Giddens, structures can be conceived as generalizable and transposable to 
other situations.  
In Giddens, one important aspect of structure is that it involves not only rules but 
also resources, both human and non-human (authoritative and allocative, resembling 
Bourdieu’s division of capital). And it is because of the combination of rules and 
resources that individuals can “make a difference” or “intervene in the world, or to 
refrain from such intervention” (The Constitution of Society 14). 
Giddens brings the issue of power through his notion of resources. For him, 
practices are “regularized types of acts” (Constitution of Society 75), where they are 
“produced by knowledgeable actors who draw on rules (codes and norms) and resources 
(material and symbolic)” (Nicolini 46). Here “resources are the main medium through 
which power manifests itself and is exercised. Paying tribute to his Weberian legacy, 
Giddens interprets power as the capacity of mobilizing people and things in the efforts of 
producing some effect in the world: power is the capacity to make a difference” (Nicolini 
46). Resources include both authoritative and allocative, the former akin to Bourdieu’s 
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notion of social capital whereas the latter aligns with economic capital. In his non-
orthodox use of the notion of power, he takes into account the capacity of individuals 
accorded to them by material and symbolic resources. However, these resources are 
mobilized in conjunction with the rules of the game. In other words, while rules and 
resources make certain kinds of actions and practices possible, and certain others 
remotely so, Giddens does see plenty of space for agents to act strategically in 
accordance with their desires and interests. However, such actions are also limited in 
some ways by the possibilities and alternatives afforded by the system (Giddens, Central 
Problems 166).   
In Giddens’ account of social practices, to some extent similar to Bourdieu, 
agents’ discursive understanding of their material and social condition and the possibility 
of acting beyond the limitations of the system or against them seem very hard. There are 
two possible conditions: one, during special circumstances such as conflict or breakdown; 
two incompatibilities between interdependent systems of practices often working in 
tandem. As Nicolini says,  
The interconnection among practices thus becomes the source of both 
stability and change, so that practices are at the same time the locus of 
ordering and reproduction and the locus of disordering and mis-
production. Conceiving human beings as knowledgeable actors who draw 
on rules and resources for the carrying out of their activity and 
achievement of their aims implies that necessary feature of action is its 
partial indeterminacy. (48)  
 
Thus, Giddens sees the sources of changes in the micro level, i.e., in the context in which 
practices are reproduced, with a possible transformation due to the unexpected effects of 
materials conditions. Similarly, the tensions between interconnected practices can 
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produce disjuncture and fissures in structural principles, with a potential to bring about 
large systemic changes.  
In theorizing agency and structure to understand social practices, Giddens is 
slightly different from Bourdieu. Giddens says, “every social actor knows a great deal 
about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member” (5). 
He also distinguishes this practical consciousness from discursive consciousness:  
More significant for the arguments developed in this book are differences 
between practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which 
actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and what I call 
‘discursive consciousness’, involving knowledge which actors are able to 
express on the level of discourse. All actors have some degree of 
discursive penetration of the social systems to whose constitution they 
contribute. (Central Problems 5)   
 
But he believes that actors can have such discursive consciousness only at some critical 
moments. However, it is for the same reason, several critics like Callinicos find Giddens, 
in an attempt to challenge structuralist and fuctionalist reduction of human agents into 
structural dupes, moving more towards “the pole of agency” (144).  
However, it is for the reason almost contrary to the one used to critique Giddens, 
that some critics find Bourdieu’s theory still largely deterministic. Though it seems that 
Giddens’s and Bourdieu’s redefinition of structure as made up of both rules (for 
Bourdieu, strategies) and resources avoids both material and ideal determinisms, 
Bourdieu’s habitus, for many, tends to (Giddens’ structure is less so) “retain[s] precisely 
the agent-proof quality that the concept of the duality of structure is supposed to 
overcome” (Swell 15). As Bourdieu says, “As an acquired system of generative schemes 
objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus 
engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those 
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conditions and no others (OTP 95). In Bourdieu’s scheme, social transformation seems 
quite remote. Giddens, due to the different levels of access to and different amount of the 
accumulation of resources by agents, theorizes recursive repetition of structure as 
transformation. However, he also does not envision a society as more fractured and 
consisting of complexly intersecting and conflicting layers of ideologies and practices.  In 
other words, both of them seem to have developed their theories with reference to more 
or less closed societies (even in seemingly closed societies there are different sets of 
discourses). 
It is for a similar reason that Michel de Certeau finds Bourdieu’s habitus and 
Giddens’ structuration problematic. For him, the practice theories of Bourdieu and 
Giddens, similar to Foucault’s theory of discourse, fail to see the possibilities of micro 
tactics of resistance. For Bourdieu, practices are largely driven by habitus, whereas for 
Certeau, human beings are conscious agents who can “navigate among the rules, play 
with all the possibilities offered by traditions, make use of one tradition rather than 
another, compensate for one by means of another.” They are capable of “taking 
advantage of the flexible surface which covers up the hard core, they create their own 
relevance in this network” (Certeau 54). The societies that Bourdieu studied did go 
through serious upheavals, where Certeau could see many instances of conscious and 
tactical practices of resistances that local people were engaged in, where as Bourdieu, 
perhaps due to the habitus he developed through his own theory and research, and partly 
due to the overwhelming presence of colonial ideology influencing the local people in 
Algerian society, did not see those acts as displaying inventiveness and strategic 
awareness beyond what their habitus allowed them.  
  44 
In a similar line, Arjun Appadurai also questioned theories of habitus and tacit 
knowledge, especially in the context of the effects of globalization on individual 
habituses. Appadurai thinks that the flow of semiotic resources, cultural texts, symbols, 
and people in a globalized context works to “move the glacial forces of habitus into the 
quickened beat of improvisations for large groups of people” (Appadurai 6). Appadurai 
analyzes the global circulation of texts and discourses to argue that people mix and mesh 
available resources to produce hybrid texts and identities. The possibility of instantly 
sharing knowledge, information, and resources in the world today perhaps supports what 
Appadurai says about the process of glocalization. However, we should be very aware 
that diversifications in practices and improvisations in human activities do not necessarily 
mean equally diversifying and transforming experiences in one’s habituses. In other 
words, one problem that Arjun Appadurai and many language theorists as well make is to 
see a synergy between practices and habituses/perceptions9. Therefore, despite being 
partly problematic, Bourdieu and Giddens’ notions of habitus and structurations have not 
lost their relevance and importance even in the present context.  
Alastair Pennycook extends the practice theories of Bourdieu and Giddens in light 
of recent developments. In other words, Pennycook tries to develop a practice theory of 
language considering what Appadurai calls glocalization. His Language as a Local 
Practice comes out of the application of the theory of practice to language. In other 
words, he develops a linguistic theory of practice where he defines language not as a 
system but as a practice. By practice he means “bundles of activities that are organized 
into coherent ways of doing things” (25). In this view structure emerges as a coherent 
                                                
9 I will elaborate this in the discussions of language theories and theories of modalities in the following 
chapters.  
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ways of acting through repeated activities. This view of language echoes what Bourdieu 
and Giddens say about structure, which is nothing but the product of the continual 
interplay between habitus and social practices. The central tenet in Pennycook, similar to 
what Bourdieu and Giddens think, is that language/social structure is a dynamic thing that 
perpetuates through repetitive activities of language users. Then the question is how does 
he account for agency in this repetitive nature of language practice?  
For Pennycook, human agents are neither completely determined nor fully free. It 
is these individuals who give continuity to language practices mediating between the 
macro space of, in Bourdieu’s terms, “objective structures,” and the micro space of 
individual actions. Language practices that individuals engage in are “in a sense, the new 
discourse, the new way of describing that level of mediating social activity where we do 
things both because we want to and along lines laid down by habit, propriety, cultural 
norms or political dictates.  It is therefore useful to explore the meso-political space of 
practice that lies between the local and the global” (emphasis added, 23).  In other words, 
he is using practice as a middle term between big-D Discourse (invoking J. P. Gee’s 
distinction), meaning “abstraction of world view,” and little-d discourse, 
implying  “everyday language use” and “asks how they connect, how this meso-political 
level organizes local activity in relation to broader social, cultural or historical 
organization” (123). In this meso level, individual language practices are both similar and 
different; their repetition involves newness despite it iterating the past usage. In this 
sense, Pennycook theorizes agency in terms of relocalization of language use by 
individual agents where language becomes a “sedimented discourse” (46).  
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Pennycook’s notion of relocalization and sedimentation with regards to language 
practices are central to his revision of past theories of practice. His conceptualization of 
language retains the temporal and geographical sense of context that Giddens and 
Bourdieu use. In other words, every language use should be seen in terms of the history 
of its use (movement for Pennycook) and the spatial contexts it is used in. Every 
language use occurs in a different time and place, repeating the same activity but in a 
different spatio-temporal locality. This idea of repeating an activity in a new context 
echoes Bourdieu’s notion of transposability of (linguistic) habitus or generalizability of 
structure in Giddens. Though Bourdieu sees little scope for change in such regular 
practices, Pennycook believes that every repetition is different, or, in his words, 
“repetition is an act of difference” (36). 
This is where Pennycook extends practice theory to, in a sense, its logical end. In 
other words, it is a logical extension of Bourdieu’s idea that “habitus never produces the 
same practices twice and, in fact, each individual develops a personal trajectory” 
(Nicolini 61). The difference between the two is that Pennycook sees such repetition as 
new and different whereas Bourdieu sees it as a variation of the same practices within the 
limits posed by the habitus.  
So, Pennycook proposes a new way of defining creativity, not as “newness, 
difference, divergence from what has gone before” (35). Here, every local use of 
language is “as much about change as it is about staying the same” (36). In this way 
Pennycook overcomes the tension in language studies, especially in structuralism, 
between the individual and language as system. In structuralist accounts, newness can be 
a break or deviation from grammar or structure. But Pennycook, drawing on Giddens’ 
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theory of structuration and Calvet’s theory of language ecology, regards grammar not as a 
preexisting set of norms but as an emergent set of patterns that are restructured by their 
interaction with individual practices. In other words, Pennycook views structure as the 
effect of sedimented repetition.  
In this process of sedimentation, Pennycook sees individuals as having agency, 
though limited:  
How does difference happen? In two ways: humans are, of course, capable 
of changing things, though often much less than we like to think. By and 
large, we go on doing more or less the same thing over and over. But we 
can make intentional changes to what we do, and these changes may 
become sedimented over time. There are also small, unintentional 
slippages, changes to the ways we do and say things, and these too may 
start to be repeated and become sedimented practices. And, as I have 
argued in this chapter, what appears to be the same may in fact also be 
already different. (49) 
 
This notion of sedimentation offers a new dimension to the understanding of practice as 
repetitive activity. Every contribution to sedimentation constitutes change: that is, 
reiterating sedimented practices contributes to their sedimentation, making them more 
sedimented while also recontextualizing those practices.  In this sense iteration of the 
same contributes to difference and is different. Thus Pennycook sees linguistic activities 
in terms of both individual choice and unintended consequences.  
 While Pennycook adds an important dimension to practice theory that can be very 
useful in understanding students’ writing practices, his theorization of language as a local 
practice, despite its use of Bourdieu, Giddens, and similar other theorists who view social 
practices as situated in relations of power, does not seriously consider power differentials 
in the relationships between various language practices. Similarly, his theory is focused 
more on what happens than on how we think of language practices. In other words, his 
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focus is more on practices than on perceptions even though these two are, as Louis-Jean 
Calvet contends, always in some sort of co-constitutive relations (8).  
Phenomenological Tradition and New Materialism: Heidegger and Latour 
These practice-based, materialist theories with Marxist orientation in some form 
complicate and explicate the relationships between agency, objective social structures, 
and practices very well. However, as Bruno Latour claims, they leave out important 
components of social practices: that is, the things in the material world around us that in 
some way play significant roles in the mediation of our actions and practices. In other 
words, we also need to consider what Latour calls the “missing masses” or the “mundane 
artifacts” (“Missing Masses” 225).  
Another tradition that will be useful in understanding writing as a socio-material 
practice is phenomenological materialism, especially the strand that begins roughly with 
Heidegger and continues in various forms in the present in works of new materialists like 
Bruno Latour and Thomas Rickert. While Marxist/socialist materialism challenged the 
relationship between structure (social) and agency (human), phenomenological 
materialism challenged the relationship between human agents and the material world, 
trying to understand the structure of human consciousness in its initial phase, but to 
develop into a more nuanced theory of the relationship between our subjective experience 
and objective reality (understood very differently from Bourdieu and Giddens’ 
understanding of objective structures). In a way these two materialisms highlight the 
embeddedness of our experience and embodiment of our understandings. And if we can 
recover the Marxist ethos, embeddedness goes beyond considering simple connectedness 
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to consider issues of power and how it circulates and is exercised. Similarly, by bringing 
power into the understanding of materials, we start seeing how materials themselves also 
exercise power, though in a very different way, making us reconsider how we define and 
understand agency and mediation. 
Phenomenology, in its early years, especially in Husserl, focused on the “structure 
of consciousness” and human perception of things. Intentionality and subjective 
experience were central to the investigation into the nature of phenomena. As Taylor 
Carman claims, “Husserl wanted phenomenology to be a pure presuppositionless, 
systematic scientific description of consciousness…Husserlian phenomenology is thus a 
description of subjectivity, not of the objective world, but it is emphatically not empirical 
psychology…” (XVII). Husserl is highly reductive, advocating bracketing the actual 
existence of ourselves and that of things. His phenomenology is “the systematic scientific 
description of the ideal essences belonging to pure, transcendental subjectivity” (Carman 
XVII).  
Heidegger, on the other hand, takes phenomenology away from the subject-object 
dichotomy and concentrates more not on the “things-in-themselves” but on things as they 
are in everyday practice. Heidegger, in his classic work, Being and Time, puts forward a 
strong critique of the subjectivist phenomenological tradition and offers his own theory of 
phenomena as things in the world or being in the world. The following description of 
Heidegger’s theory clarifies his distinction from Husserl and many others who see the 
world in terms of abstracted categories or essences:  
So, for instance, whereas traditional ontology regarded all entities as 
objects, or substances with properties, Heidegger points out that ordinary 
things in our daily environment—tables and chairs, hammers and nails, 
doors and doorknobs, automobiles and street signs—do not show up in 
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which we first see as an object with properties and then interpret or judge 
to be useful for hammering; it is first of all, and above all, something to 
grab, something for hammering. So, too, a doorway is not just a 
rectangular aperture in a wall but something to go through. Such things 
are not occurent or “present-at-hand” … but available or “ready-to-
hand”…. Even less is a human being a mere object with mental properties 
added on, but a doer and a sufferer, an agent and a patient, not a what but a 
who, not something with extra psychological features in addition but 
someone living a life, emerging from a history and plunging into a future. 
(XV) 
 
Here, Heidegger’s attention to objects (actually things) is not an attention to the 
essence/substance of them or to their objective features. It also is not a focus on objects in 
terms of what they can do for us. Rather, his focus is not on the hammer as an object or 
hammer in terms of its features, nor on how we conceive of the hammer or how we make 
sense of it in terms of its use to us, but on hammering, the thing in use or process rather 
than the thing in itself. Similar to Raymond Williams, Anthony Giddens, and Pierre 
Bourdieu, in some sense, Heidegger is trying to walk a fine line between objectivism and 
subjectivism, or to avoid both altogether. Similarly, his focus on objects in use or action, 
in what we might call practice, in the act of hammering, makes him do what the other 
theorists in practice theory did in terms of social structure and agency. 
For Heidegger, being in the world is always being with the others, but not with 
what Giddens and Bourdieu would call the “social.” Rather, being is considered always 
in relation to the environment, taken as a differentiated state of relationships and 
existence among a variety of beings. This is what relates Heidegger to social theorists and 
what also at the same time distinguishes him from them.  
The example of hammering also connects Heidegger with practice theorists in his 
emphasis on human acts as preconscious:  
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The carpenter does not need to ‘think a hammer’ in order to drive a nail. 
His or her capacity to act depends upon the familiarity with the act of 
hammering. His/her use of the practical item ‘hammer’ is its significance 
to him/her in the setting ‘hammering’ and ‘carpentry’. When the carpenter 
is unimpeded in his/her hammering, the hammer with its properties does 
not exist as an entity: in the usable environment, the understanding of 
situations is pre-reflexive, and the world of objects thus becomes ‘simply 
present.’ (Nicolini 34) 
 
The hammer acquires a separate existence only when it stops working or when it breaks 
down. Our conscious understanding, which is not the understanding of hammer as such, 
comes into play only when there is a breakdown. Again, in a different way, this is what 
Bourdieu and Giddens said about the possibility of having discursive 
awareness/conscious in the times of conflict and social breakdown. The act of coming to 
consciousness makes the object unusable in Heidegger whereas, such coming to a 
discursive consciousness in Bourdieu and Giddens makes it possible to see the workings 
of ideology and make strategic decisions about resistance or change. What Heidegger is 
contributing to our understanding of our acts is the need to consider things in their actual 
use, not in the sense of resources, but in their own right.  
 Heidegger’s later insistence on the primacy of discursive practice, practice in 
language, and his hint that the possibility of thinking differently lies only in our ability to 
question our own language practice draws him closer to practice theorists:  
Later in his career Heidegger affirmed that language is the ‘house of 
being’, arguing that although we have language at our disposal in a way 
we are also at the disposal of our language. Language and language 
practices are therefore a critical aspect of everydayness, and only by 
questioning our language practices can we open a clearing through which 
we can experience potentially different ways of experiencing and acting in 
the world. (Nicolini 38)  
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Heidegger’s emphasis on practice and his treatment of things in relation to other aspects 
in the environment have set a good ground for later new materialist theorists to develop 
their robust theories of materialism.  
 However, it’s not clear from Heidegger what role things play in our social life. In 
other words, since he is concerned more with being than with human actions and 
consequences, it is not clear how he would think of the role of objects/things in mediating 
our actions in the world.  
Heidegger’s focus on everyday practice, specifically in his rejection of the 
division between subject and object, has been extended in certain ways in works of new 
materialists such as Bruno Latour in their treatment of objects as agents and their 
consideration of the ecology of mediators. Though Heidegger did not consider things and 
technologies in terms of their agency, his rejection of instrumental and humanistic 
understanding of things and technologies offers some new grounds for new materialists to 
develop their nuanced understanding of the role of things and technologies in social 
practices.  
Bruno Latour critiques humanists, materialists, and critical theorists for their 
tendency of ignoring how what they normally take as tools/objects change or transform 
the goals of action or programs that human actors try to accomplish. He claims that the 
whole history of the Western social and philosophical theories has left “objects” or 
techniques, the “missing masses,” out of its accounts. He thus focuses his attention on 
those missing masses and how recovering them from their silence makes us rethink our 
customary notions of agency, structure, and practices.   
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Latour is also dealing with the same issue that has bogged down many theorists 
we discussed so far: agency and determinism. His is an attempt to resolve the 
“technological determinism/social constructivism dichotomy” (“Missing Masses” 225). 
The answer to the question of determinism for Latour is not how much we are free or 
whether we are free, it is rather to acknowledge how we are not the only actors:  
To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our exclusive 
attention away from humans and look also at nonhumans. Here they are, 
the hidden and despised social masses who make up our morality. They 
knock at the door of sociology, requesting a place in the accounts of 
society as stubbornly as the human masses did in the nineteenth century. 
What our ancestors, the founders of sociology, did a century ago to house 
the human masses in the fabric of social theory, we should do now to find 
a place in a new social theory for the non-human masses that beg us for 
understanding. (227) 
 
Latour agrees with the social theorists that social systems are developed and maintained 
through interactions and negotiations between people, institutions, and organizations. But 
he claims that artifacts are also part of such negotiations. He does not mean that machines 
and things also have conscious awareness and intention. But he does mean that they play 
an important part in retaining or transforming social order.  
Latour’s treatment of objects is similar to practice theorists’ treatment of structure 
in terms of how objects/structures limit and at the same time enable certain actions while 
making other actions difficult. Latour neither falls victim to social constructivism nor to 
instrumentalism or materialism10. But he takes the role of artifacts/things differently, 
taking them as one of the mediators in the assembly of mediators, thus playing an 
agentive role as do other mediators like human actors.  
                                                
10 Here I’m using it in Latourian sense in which materialism means the tendency to explain the 
consequences of human actions solely in terms of the essence of the material technology used.  
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 In terms of discussing the role of artifacts or technologies, his notion of mediation 
as translation is central to distinguish him from other social theorists. To illustrate the 
difference between how he takes artifacts and how their role is understood by other 
traditions, I found two examples Latour uses to discuss very appropriate. In his essay “On 
Technical Mediation,” he uses the Dedaelian analogy to relate technical mediation to the 
strategies Dedaelus used to outwit others. What I find useful is his notion that technical 
mediation is not a “straight line”; it is circuitous, curved, or contrived. And this is so 
because he introduces “objects” or “techniques” between “actor” and “goals,” which 
distorts the straight line between the actors and their intended goals, changing the nature 
and/or the course of intended outcomes: 
In the myth of Dedalus, all things deviate from the straight line. The direct 
path of reason and scientific knowledge—episteme—is not the path of 
every Greek. The clever technical know-how of Dedalus is an instance of 
metis, of strategy, of the sort of intelligence for which Odysseus (of whom 
the Illiad says that he is polymetis, a bag of tricks) is most famed. No 
unmediated action is possible once we enter the realm of engineers and 
craftsmen. A Daedalion, in Greek, is something curved, veering from the 
straight line, artful but fake, beautiful and contrived. (29)  
 
Latour critiques materialist,11 humanist,12 and social constructivist notions of technology, 
all of which tend to be determinist in some ways, and therefore assume a straight line 
between the doer and the done, thereby developing a linear theory of mediation. He uses 
the example of the gun debate in the US to make his point. An extreme position of the 
supporters of gun control is that “guns kill people,” whereas, on the contrary, the NRA 
                                                
11 Latour is using this term not in a Marxist sense. By materialist perspective, he means to refer to the 
tendency to assign every responsibility to the object or technology for whatever the result or the end is. 
12 Heidegger uses the term “anthropological” to refer to what Latour calls “humanist.” Heidegger uses this 
term to mean technology as human activity. What Heidegger is doing is critiquing the tendency to think of 
technology in terms of things external to technology itself rather than in terms of its “essence” or “being.”   
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claims that “People kill people, not guns” (30, 31). Latour calls these two positions 
“materialist” and sociological/moralist respectively:  
In the materialist account, everything: an innocent citizen becomes a 
criminal by virtue of the gun in her hand. The gun enables of course, but 
also instructs, directs, even pulls the trigger…. Each artifact has its script, 
its ‘affordance,’ its potential to take hold of passerby and force them to 
play roles in its story. By contrast, the sociological version of the NRA 
renders the gun a neutral carrier of will that adds nothing to the action, 
playing the role of an electrical conductor, good and evil flowing through 
it effortlessly. (31)  
 
For materialists, “we are what we have—what we have in our hands, at least” (31), 
whereas, for what Latour calls sociologists or moralists, “the Neutral Tool” is “under 
complete human control” (32). Latour sees a third, more common, possibility: “the 
creation of a new goal that corresponds to neither agent’s program of action…. I call this 
uncertainty about goals translation” (32). By translation, Latour means “displacement, 
drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some 
degree modifies two elements or agents” (32). For him, “the twin mistake of the 
materialists and the sociologists is to start with essences, those of subjects or those of 
objects. That starting point renders impossible our measurement of the mediating role of 
techniques. Neither subject nor object (nor their goals) is fixed” (33). In other words, the 
tendency to being either with individual intention or with social ideology/context clouds 
possible understanding of events and practices.  
For Latour, it is through use that both humans and nonhumans display their 
agency and engage in what he calls the “swapping of properties” (46). He believes that 
the responsibility of actions should be shared by/distributed not solely to human agents, 
but also to nonhuman participants: “Purposeful action and intentionality may not be 
properties of objects, but they are not properties of humans either. They are the properties 
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of institutions, dispositifs. Only corporate bodies are able to absorb the proliferation of 
mediators, to regulate their expression, to redistribute skills, to require boxes to blacken 
and close. Boeing-747s do not fly, airlines fly” (46). He believes that when humans 
engage in any practice, they engage with nonhumans in what he calls “the swapping of 
properties” (46).  
Latour’s focus on materials is not only an addition of one more mediator in social 
relations. That addition destabilizes the notion of social formation based on the 
dichotomy between an individual and the social. Therefore, Latour questions the notion 
of the social or structure as theorized in structuralist account and critical sociology. He 
replaces the social with the term collective or assembly, actually recovering the original 
meaning of the “thing,” which comes from “ding,” designating not an object but a 
“certain type of archaic assembly” (“Dingpolitik” 12).   
He is actually against the tendency of explaining away differences in our practices 
by invoking the “social” or “ideology” or “discourse” as if they are the root causes where 
everything else are mere instruments. In his view,  
‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything including what the other 
glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by many other types of 
connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, socio-linguists, 
social psychologists, etc ) take social aggregates as the given that could 
shed some light on residual aspects of economics, on the contrary, 
consider social aggregates as what should be explained by the specific 
associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, law, 
management, etc. (Reassembling 5) 
 
For what Latour calls sociology of translation or association, social is not something 
homogeneous. Rather, it is a site of mobile associations and connections. That is why he 
critiques not only orthodox Marxism and structural theories of culture and language, he 
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also questions the notion of habitus/structuration//field in practice theory as all of these 
assume a uniformity of norms: 
It is a commonplace, in critical theory, to say that techniques are social 
because they have been socially constructed. But this pronouncement is 
vacuous if the meanings of mediation and social are not made precise. To 
say that social relations are “inscribed” in technology, such that when we 
are confronted with an artifact, we are confronted, in effect, with social 
relations, is to assert a tautology, a very implausible one. If artifacts are 
social relations, then why must society work through them to inscribe 
itself in something else? Why not inscribe itself directly, since artifacts 
count for nothing? By working through the medium of artefacts, 
domination and exclusion hide themselves under the guise of natural and 
objective forces: critical theory thus deploys tautology—social relation are 
nothing but social relations—then it adds to it a conspiracy theory—
society is hiding behind the fetish of techniques. But techniques are not 
fetishes, they are unpredictable, not means but mediators, means and ends 
at the same time; and that is why they bear on the social fabric. (51) 
 
Thus, for Latour, treating artifacts merely as embodiments of cultural values is ignoring 
both human and nonhuman agency.  
Similarly, despite their claim of materialism, their version of materialism falls 
short because everything material becomes nothing more than either resources or values 
(field): “To be sure, the distinction between material infrastructure and symbolic 
superstructure has been useful to remind social theory of the importance of non-humans, 
but it is very inaccurate portrayal of their mobilization and engagement inside social 
links” (Latour, “Durable” 103). Their reduction of material agents to resources and 
capital takes materialism away from the consideration of materials in their concrete forms 
to things in the possession of humans. Thus things lose their agency and the social loses 
its heterogeneity.  
Now, if the social is an assemblage, associations and displacements of an array of 
mediators, both what we call local and global or micro and macro, how do we account for 
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them? How do we study and understand social phenomena like writing (which is itself a 
mediator) if we do not take resort to “Context,” ideology, or discourse? Latour wants us 
to discard such all-encompassing and stabilizing notions and just retrace the connections 
by following the actors/mediators:  
The aim of this second part is to practice a sort of corrective calisthenics. I will 
proceed in three steps: we will first relocate the global so as to break down the 
automatism that leads from interaction to ‘Context’; we will then redistribute the 
local so as to understand why interaction is such an abstraction; and finally, we 
will connect the sites revealed by the two former moves, highlighting various 
vehicles that make up the definition of the social understood as association. 
(Reassembling 172) 
 
In other words, he suggests we “render the social world as flat as possible” so that we can 
view every new link. This flattening rescues social theory from the tendency of 
mystification. He wants us to open the mysterious package called “the social” for 
inspection. Instead of looking at reality from a macro view (traditional sociology, socio-
linguistics, …), or micro perspective (ethnomethodology); global or local; we should see 
them as local/micro that have their tentacles stretching wide and far as much as they are 
situated in the here and now. As Latour says, “An action in the distant past, in a faraway 
place, by actors now absent, can still be present, on condition that it be shifted, translated, 
delegated, or displaced to other types of actants, those I have been calling nonhumans. 
My Word Processor, your copy of Common Knowledge, Oxford University Press, the 
International Postal Union, all of them organize, shape, and limit our interactions” (50). 
Both the tendencies of forgetting micro by focusing on the macro or considering every 
event or activity as purely local are problematic. When we consider every thing or event 
as in itself a part of an assembly and linked with other mediators (institutions, objects, 
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humans, perceptions, languages, etc.), potentially both “local” and “global,” through 
translation and delegation, creating a micro and macro does not hold strong.  
In short, Bruno Latour can also be taken as extending the practice theory trend of 
challenging humanism and structuralism by adding in the role of artifacts/technology in 
shaping our actions. He, like Giddens and Bourdieu, questions the binary between 
subjectivism and objectivism, but by highlighting the need to consider the role of 
“objects” in mediating actions, which, however, destabilizes practice theory notions of 
the “social,” “habitus,” or “field” as these were largely considered stable despite their 
criticism of humanist or structuralist determinisms.  
Though practices are not the primary units of analysis in Latourian sociology of 
associations, his theory does enrich the notion of practice by extending both cultural 
materialist notions of practice and phenomenological materialist ideas of practice. The 
active and full participation of mundane artifacts makes us rethink not only the things, 
but also the sources of durability and change of social systems. With Latour the notion of 
mediation becomes diversified.  
Conclusion 
Two materialist theories of mediation and practice I’ve reviewed here provide 
some important insights into the nature of human actions and their relations to the socio-
material world, not reduced to abstracted categories, but in their concrete material forms. 
I see the cultural materialist theory of practice and the phenomenological materialist 
theory of practice complementing each other, drawing our attention to both the 
relationship between agency and structure on the one hand, and agency and the material 
world on the other. While Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook’s focus on practice helps 
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us see seemingly isolated acts as part of a nexus of sedimented practices, Latour’s call to 
pay attention to the agency of missing masses makes us see how durability and change in 
practices do not merely depend on human agents and social structures, but equally on a 
network of actors, both human and non-human, both present and present in their seeming 
absence. In reality, practice theory can show how discussion of human and non-human 
agents in the absence of the nexus of practices can look as abstracted as practice theory 
itself theorizing practice without paying attention to the agency of artefacts and 
technologies. For instance, Bourdieu’s notion of field lacks the materiality of field in its 
abstraction as values or norms whereas Latour’s guns become abstracted from the 
practices of gun use in the US.  
New materialist notions of agency as distributed and mediation as translation 
makes us rethink the linear theories of mediation we have been accustomed to, whether it 
is unidirectional or bidirectional. Practice theory (both cultural materialist and 
phenomenological) challenged humanist and structural unidirectional theories of 
mediation by viewing agency and structure as co-constitutive through recursive relations 
between practices, agency, and structure. But models of that co-constitutive relation 
remained largely limited to social structure and human agents, thereby making it hard to 
account for the agentive roles of things excluded in that economy of mediation. More 
ecological perspectives, like that of Thomas Rickert (ambient rhetoric) and Latour (actor-
network) provide us ways to account for agents of mediation beyond stable and 
abstracted notions of the social and the individual. In other words, we talk about 
relationship between technology and culture (ideology) or individual and technology, but 
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do not often consider how our abstracted notions of technology, language, and modality 
can be construed as part of a wider network of agents and practices.  
Another important insight these theories offer is that practices and habitus shape 
each other. Though new materialism rejects the notion of habitus the way it is used in 
practice theory, it does not ignore the role of ideologies as one among the various 
mediators, often dissembling the notion of ideology into various agents partaking in its 
operation. Though practices and perceptions (representations) shape each other, we 
should not understand that to mean a complete harmony between the two. It is possible, 
and often realistic, to see the discrepancy between practices and 
perceptions/thinking/ideologies. And this is very important when we analyze people’s 
linguistic and multimodal practices because conflating the two gives us a mistaken 
understanding of the linguistic situation and the potential of interventions. 
Similarly, as human agents’ understanding and awareness changes depending on 
their relationships with other actors in the ecology of mediation, the distinction between 
discursive (in later theories, metadiscursive) vs. practical consciousness becomes 
problematic. Going beyond thinking of human consciousness in relation to habitus and 
doxa, new understanding of agency as distributed across networks of mediators and a 
nexus of practices makes it hard to think of “reflexive”, “discursive” or “metadiscursive” 
consciousness independent of such connections. However, no situation, whether those of 
social breakdown or conflict, or constant intersections of cultural and linguistic practices 
due to globalization, can make us free-floating agents capable of going beyond the links 
we participate in. It is only a matter of delinking (from a set of network, often due to an 
introduction of a new agent) and relinking (to a transformed network). And complete 
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delinking often does not happen. That is why we see a discrepancy between practices and 
dispositions.  
In our current context, the nature of writing and its relation to writers and readers 
have gone through some significant changes. In that context, it is important to understand 
those changes not only in terms of variations in modalities and languages, or by 
connecting them with larger forces alone like ideology or culture; but, rather, in a more 
comprehensive way, trying to follow all the potential agents affecting our communicative 
practices. Similarly, this rethinking of mediation also requires us to go beyond the 
tendencies of abstracting practices and stabilizing discrete categories.  
We can do so if we attend to the original meaning of the word composition from 
its Latin root “composicion,” which meant an act of “putting together, connecting, 
arranging” (Online Etymology Dictionary). Besides the two things this definition 
suggests, composition as an “act” and an action of assembling things together, Latour 
also reminds us to see the word “composition’s” close affinity with the word “compost,” 
suggesting the explicit and implicit flavor a work of composition carries, often “due to 
the active ‘de-composition’ of many invisible agents” (“Attempts” 474). Therefore, when 
we think about composition/writing, we should pay attention to the panoply of (f)actors 
that affect the act and the product of composition, rather than theorizing and analyzing 
composition abstracted from these connections/invisible agents.  
There are a few implications of thinking of composition this way. First, similar to 
the implicit argument this whole chapter is making, this notion of composition reminds us 
to discard the tendency of abstracting composition, whether it is from the materiality of 
the text in a broader sense (technologies, languages in their material forms, and material 
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conditions shaping and being shaped by such texts) or the history and network of 
practices they participate in. Therefore, the dictum “follow the things13,” or follow the 
traces of the actors captures the spirit of an ecological approach this chapter is 
advocating.  
The next two chapters show how dominant theories and studies of language 
relations and composition and those of modality and technologies adopt problematic 
tendencies of abstracting composition from practices due to the underlying linear theories 
of mediation that they uphold.  In the third chapter, I will critique additive models of 
language ecology where languages are taken as fixed and stable, rather than viewing 
them as material social practice always in translation due to the constant processes of 
sedimentations. After the review of such tendencies, I will develop what I call a 
mesodiscursive theory of language relations where I focus on relations and intersections 
across language practices and their material social conditions, rather than the customary 
focus on language structures or creative innovations in language use. In other words, I’ll 
examine theories of language relations in terms of distributed mediation and demonstrate 
how the tendencies of taking languages as discrete entities reifies language practices and 
ignores the material social constraints affecting language use.
                                                
13 The term “things” is understood here as an “assembly.” So, things do not mean only the material objects, 
but their histories, their role in specific practices they participate, and their material potentials and 
limitations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MEDIATION OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENCE AND COMPOSITION 
 
Schools and workplaces in the US and all around the world are facing a 
tremendous pressure to address the issue of language difference (see David Martins’ 
Transnational Writing Program Administration, Darin Payne and Daphne Desser’s 
Teaching Writing in Globalization, etc.). Our classrooms are becoming more and more 
multilingual and multidiscoursal (Matsuda; Canagarajah) with the constantly expanding 
trend of globalization facilitated by the advancements in digital technologies, rapidly 
increasing trend of immigration, and the rise in global commerce and trade. In the United 
States, as Paul K. Matsuda and A. M. Preto-Bay and Kristine Hansen have said, the 
number of multilingual students has grown exponentially in recent times. Data released 
by the United States Department of Education shows that “while the population of five to 
twenty-four-years-olds grew by 6% between 1979 and 1999, the number who spoke a 
language other than English at home increased in the same period by 111%” (referenced 
in Preto-Bay and Hansen 38). The report predicts that “by 2015, 30% of the school-aged 
children will be children of immigrants, either first or second generation” (Preto-Bay and
Hansen 39). This data does not even include international students. In the global context, 
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‘non-native’ speakers of English far outnumber its ‘native’ speakers (Crystal; Leung).14 
As English is used in different discursive and material contexts, here in the U.S. and 
beyond, it has been widely diversified by its interaction with various other language 
practices. Then the central question that many of us are asking today is how can we 
address the differences in language use in writing inside and outside classrooms? This 
chapter tries to briefly assess some of the existing trends in language theories and offer an 
alternative way to address the issue raised above. 
Let me present an anecdote before moving to a discussion of the theories of 
language difference and some inherent problems in them. In my recent conversation, a 
colleague from my program recounted her experience working with a student in her 
composition class. When she found several grammatical errors in his writing, e.g., wrong 
use of article, clumsy and long sentences, she immediately thought of sending him to 
writing center so that a ‘multilingual’ TA could solve his problem. She assumed that he 
must have been an ESL student with a distinct kind of language. But the next day when 
she met the student after her class and inquired about his background, she realized that he 
actually was from what we normally call the mainstream community. She was genuine in 
trying to understand his problem and helping him solve it. However, it is this tendency of 
abstracting language from its use and making handy generalizations that indirectly does a 
disservice to teachers’ genuine attempts at helping out students who desire and are also 
forced to struggle to adapt to the abstract notion of standard language. Somewhat similar 
to what Walter Mignolo says, it is important to question the tendency to link a particular 
                                                
14 The notion of native speaker norm has come under challenge, as several linguists such as Paikeday 
contend that the native speaker is “merely an ideal or a convenient linguistic fiction - myth, shibboleth, 
sacred cow - an etherlike concept with no objective reality to it, albeit embodied in a quasi-privileged class 
of speakers of each language” (p.21). Therefore, I am using the terms like “native” and “non-native” just 
for convenience.  
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group with a specific kind of language and culture, e.g., in this case, assuming that all 
multilingual TAs can handle the issue of language diversity better than ‘monolingual’ 
TAs and that all ESL students have similar problems:  
In other words, what the current stage of globalization is enacting is 
(unconsciously) the uncoupling of the ‘natural’ link between languages 
and nations, languages and national memories, languages and national 
literatures. Thus it is creating the condition for and enacting the relocation 
of languages and the fracture of cultures. Indeed, the very concept of 
culture (and civilization in Huntington’s perspective) is difficult to sustain 
as homogeneous spaces for people of common interests, goals, memories, 
languages, and beliefs. (42)  
 
As Mignolo contends, there lies a serious problem in such conceptions of language (or 
culture or place): that certain kind of people use a certain kind of language, associating 
language with place or people, with an assumption that languages and cultures are 
separate and stable categories. As Louis-Jean Calvet says, the notion of language as such 
is a mere abstraction from practices, especially in moving from the actual language use to 
a handy notion of language as a stable category: “From these practices, which are very 
concrete, linguists have extracted an abstraction, language ...” (6). And he further 
contends that language as such does not exist in practice though it does exist in our belief: 
“Here we come up against a paradox: there is something which does not exist, which 
nobody can point to …, and which yet does exist in the eyes of everyone” (6). In other 
words, when we think of language use inside or outside our classrooms, we need to think 
of it not as mere abstraction, e.g., standard English or standard Indian English (suggesting 
the uniformity of language use based on stable forms/norms), but as a material practice, 
shaped by and shaping our dominant perception (representation) of it (abstract notion of 
language), actual language use, and the accompanying modes, media, and artifacts 
affecting the goals of language users. However, when we analyze notions of language or 
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linguistic models often used in composition scholarship and outside this field, and also in 
our teaching practices, we find an explicit or implicit presence of monolingual 
assumptions. 
 In general, monolingualism refers to the tendency of taking only one language as 
the norm. However, more specifically, it is, as Yasemin Yildiz defines, “much more than 
a simple quantitative term designating the presence of just one language. Instead, it 
constitutes a key structuring principle that organizes the entire range of modern social 
life, from the construction of individuals and their proper subjectivities to the formation 
of disciplines and institutions, as well as of imagined collectivities such as cultures and 
nations” (2). In her analysis, the present condition, which she calls the postmonolingual 
condition, marks the “field of tension in which the monolingual paradigm continues to 
assert itself and multilingual practices persist or reemerge” (5). So, she urges us to 
understand the present language practices and politics in the West as multilingual 
attempts to resist the monolingual paradigm, though with the persistence of monolingual 
assumptions even in many multilingual works. Her example of the conceptual artwork 
Wordsearch, in which the artist uses one word each from 250 languages spoken in New 
York, and translates them in all these languages shows how seemingly multilingual work 
can uphold the monolingual paradigm. Despite it being multilingual in the sense that it 
uses multiple languages, it “fits within a monolingual framework by identifying the 
contributing individuals in terms of one language only” (Horner, “Review of The 
Postmonolingual Condition 355).  
 This monolingual tendency of identifying one language with one ethnicity, nation, 
culture, and writing tradition assumes “languages as discrete, stable, internally uniform, 
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and linked indelibly to what is held to be each writer’s likewise stable and uniform 
location and social identity” (Lu and Horner, “Matters of Agency” 583). This belief 
appears in several forms. As Yildiz contends, even in our own attempt to resist 
monolingualism and its consequences, as in her example of Wordsearch, we end up 
retaining some of the assumptions of monolingualism, sometimes pluralizing 
monolingualism in an attempt to promote multilingualism, whereas sometimes 
overemphasizing the agency of the users of certain linguistic background, thereby 
locating agency in individuals than in the interplay between a variety of (f)actors and 
nexus of practices.  
 In this chapter, I will analyze some of the dominant language models that, despite 
their attempt at resisting monolingualism, retain some of its assumptions, and offer an 
alternative approach to language use and language relations in an attempt to go beyond 
such assumptions and limited theorization of language mediation. The problematic nature 
of these language models has become increasingly apparent as a consequence of recent 
demographic and other social changes—e.g., global immigration patterns, increasing 
intersections of language practices, and facilitations of such intersections by new forms 
of technologies.  
I will develop a theory of language relations that, first, seeks to go beyond the 
paradigms of the dominant language theories that regard languages as discrete and stable 
entities and, second, also critiques the romanticized version of multilingual agency where 
multilinguals are represented as naturally capable of shuttling across languages. 
Therefore, I argue that we need to go beyond the focus either on stable language 
structures or on the free-floating agency of individual language users, and locate 
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language use in specific practice in its spatio-temporal contexts. In doing so, we need to 
pay attention to the mesodiscursive relations where language practices, their 
representations, and the network of actors shape, interact, and co-construct each other.  
When we consider language structurations and agency in this mesodiscursive way, the 
focus shifts from limited considerations of agency and ideology to account for (f)actors 
that contribute to the production of difference/sameness in communicative acts.  
Major Language Models 
English monolingualism is still dominant in our teaching practices even if it has 
been challenged in recent scholarship on language both within writing studies and 
beyond. It is the tendency to take languages in their abstraction, removing them from 
their lived practices and their history. It “fails to recognize the actual heterogeneities of 
language practices” in specific situations (Horner and Lu, “Resisting” 141). Many 
alternative models such as World Englishes, English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), Defense 
of National Language (DNL), Multilingualism, and Plurilingualism15 have been 
developed to counter and to go beyond monolingual assumptions. However, despite these 
models’ appreciation of the value of diversity in languages and cultures, they still retain 
some of the fundamental assumptions of monolingual ideology, especially in their 
reification of language practices. In other words, all these language models end up being 
different permutations of the same monolingualist ideology in assuming language 
competence as stable or in locating language ability in individual language users. Even if 
some accounts, e.g., the recently developed translingual approach, do overcome 
                                                
15 These terms have been used with a variety of meanings. I’m here considering the dominant 
understandings of these models and how they are problematic.  
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monolingual tendency, as Juan Guerra contends, they fall short in treating language as 
practice in its entirety, often limiting themselves to the interplay between individual 
language users and language ideologies. In the next section, I present how language 
theories, both in applied linguistics and composition, fail to treat language as a lived 
practice mediating and mediated by an array of (f)actors both present and present in their 
absence in any semiotic activity. I contend, following Latour, Calvet, and Pennycook that 
any analyses and assessment of language use should observe the complex network of 
mediations affecting and shaping language activities, including student writing. I argue 
that this approach to language differences, which I call mesodiscursive, may help some 
teachers avoid not only the tendency to take languages as stable and discrete systems and 
contrarily the tendency to romanticize the competence of multilingual users, but also that 
of limiting discussions of language difference to broad categories like language ideology, 
social context or to abstracted language strategies like code-meshing or code-switching, 
thereby ignoring the heterogeneities and complexities immanent in any communicative 
situations. 
In applied linguistics, as Alastair Pennycook says in his article “English as a 
Language Always in Translation,” approaches like WE, ELF16, and DNL give more focus 
to “form” rather than practice by either highlighting how new forms and structures have 
                                                
16 Some writers also use the term EIL (English as an International Language) somewhat similarly and with 
similar larger logic. As Barbara Seidlhofer states, “ELF is part of the more general phenomenon of ‘English 
as an International Language’ (“English Lingua Franca,” 339). The basic assumption of EIL that English is 
a global language where as other languages are local is deeply flawed and also serves the hegemonic 
interest by ignoring how many other languages are also used in international contexts. Similarly, the 
general EIL tendency to equate English with opportunity and upward mobility also marks abstraction of 
language from its complex roles and uses.  
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emerged in localized varieties, 17 or by proposing to develop a common core of English 
language across all varieties,18 or defending national language against the hegemonic 
influence of English.19 In all these models, Pennycook maintains, despite variations in 
their focuses, languages are taken in terms of abstract rules and forms, ignoring how 
languages actually work and develop through practice. 
There are some linguists even within ELF studies who question the tendency of 
taking ELF as a stable variety. They rather view ELF as function. For instance, Patricia 
Friedrich and Aya Matsuda, drawing on others who view ELF as function and critiquing 
those who view it as a variety, contend:  
We use the expression ELF as an umbrella term to describe functions of 
English within the broadest spectrum and context of English use 
possible…. We posit that in contexts where English is used as a lingua 
franca, each speaker uses a linguistic variety that he or she happens to 
know and then employs various communicative strategies to carry out 
successful interactions …. Using a framework that conceptualizes ELF as 
a function, rather than a linguistic variety, captures the dynamic nature of 
situation-based linguistic choices, recognizes the importance of 
nonlinguistic factors … in communication, and allows us to study the ELF 
phenomenon multidimensionally and holistically. (22). 
 
Friedrich and Matsuda, similar to Canagarajah in many of his publications20, do question 
dominant ELF theory in their focus on fluidity of English use in specific lingua franca 
contexts. However, they still do assume that speakers in such contexts do bring their 
language variety, while employing a variety of linguistic and extra-linguistic strategies to 
successfully communicate. Their approach, while focusing on the function of English 
                                                
17 Braj Kachru’s (2005) Asian Englishes and Yamuna Kachru and Cecil Nelson’s (2006) World Englishes 
are good examples of the World Englishes model.  
18 See Jennifer Jenkins’ Phonology of Language and Andy Kirkpatrick’s “Which Model of English”; 
Barbara Seidlhofer’s “English as Lingua Franca” as examples of the English as Lingua Franca approach.  
19 Phillipson’s English Only Europe and his  “English for Globalization”, and Michael Joseph and Esther 
Ramani’s  “English in the World” represent the DNL approach to the hegemony of English language in 
global scale.  
20 See, for instance, Canagarajah’s “Lingua Franca English.” 
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language in ELF situations, does retain a monolingual tendency present in dominant ELF 
and WE approaches in their inability to see how even the varieties that such users use are 
never stable in non-ELF situations too.  
In short, all these approaches assume languages as having separate and stable 
cores and seem to ignore the fact that languages transform and are transformed by their 
interactions with other language practices due to various factors associated with 
language, including diverse rhetorical and epistemological differences, shifts in the 
demography of language users, and changing roles and positions of them in constantly 
changing language ecologies. In other words, they don't locate language in practice, as a 
"local practice," in Pennycook's phrase, but as something that exists prior to and separate 
from practice, which is then put into practice.  
Similarly, while focusing on structural differences, they also ignore the role of 
individual practices in transforming language structures. In other words, these approaches 
do acknowledge transformations in the nature of English language due to various broader 
socio-historical changes. However, they tend to fall victim to the same logic of stability 
of language norms that they critique in advocating for or believing in the new set of 
norms as standards. They thereby not only gloss over the role of individual agency in 
negotiating and transforming both local and global, micro and macro structures, but also 
homogenize the heterogeneities in every local use of language and discount the agentive 
role of several non-human actants. Thus, they retain the traditional tendency of viewing 
languages as primarily governed by preexisting systems or structures, thereby retaining 
the assumption about language fixity even when talking about language diversity.  
  73 
Another permutation of the monolingual ideology appears in the monolingual 
version of bilingualism/multilingualism. The dominant model of multilingualism, unlike 
general notions of monolingualism, does acknowledge the value of different languages 
and cultures. However, in many cases, the general and dominant understanding of 
multilingualism suffers from the same problem that the other approaches such as WE, 
ELF, and DNL suffer. In this additive model of multilingualism, multilingualism is used 
to refer to separate competencies in two or more languages. In other words, languages are 
taken as discrete systems where “the ultimate goal for language learning was to become, 
feel, and speak like an idealized native speaker” (Moore and Gajo 139). In such cases, 
bilingualism becomes “double monolingualism” (Heller 48) and multilingualism “little 
more than pluralization of monolingualism” (Pennycook,  Language as a Local Practice 
10). As in the monolingual tradition, language competence is measured in terms of native 
speaker norms of separate languages. Such an additive model of multilingualism is based 
on the assumptions of the discreteness and internal uniformity of all languages. In this 
version, what counts is monolingual representation of multilingualism rather than 
questioning such representation based on the complexity of language practices on the 
ground. They completely negate translingual mediations and resultant transformations. In 
other words, though this form of multilingualism goes beyond an “English Only” form of 
monolingualism in terms of recognizing the importance of appreciating the value of 
different languages, it fails to see languages as mediated by material social practices 
while themselves shaping them in turn. In this model, the sole focus is on generalized 
formalistic notions of language and language competence. Thus multilingualism does not 
serve the broader purposes of enhancing understanding and critical awareness about 
  74 
different discourse practices and fighting the monolingual tendency of demanding perfect 
use of a language, free from any traces of the influence of other language. Rather, as 
Pennycook says, “the struggle over diversity as numerical plurality …. this focus on 
glossodiversity at the expense of semiodiversity…obscures the potential role of language 
education in the production of diversity” (“Translation” 34).  And additive 
multilingualism ignores the inevitability of “traffic” within, amongst, and between the 
artificial ideological boundaries separating languages, cultures, and peoples.  
In order to avoid monolingual assumptions of the traditional version of 
multilingualism, many language theorists have offered alternative ways of rethinking 
about multilingualism. European linguists, such as Daniel Coste and Diana-Lee Simon, 
and Danièle Moore, have put forward their notion of plurilingualism and suggest that “the 
language competence of bilinguals should not be regarded as the simple sum of two 
monolingual competences, but should rather be appreciated in conjunction with the user’s 
repertoire of total linguistic resources” (Moore and Gajo 139). In contrast to additive 
model of multilingualism where multilingualism merely means two or more separate 
monolingualisms (Canagarajah; Heller; Pennycook), plurilingualism “allows for the 
interaction and mutual influence of the language in a more dynamic way” (Canagarajah, 
“Multilingual Strategies” 7). In short, a plurilingual approach considers linguistic 
differences that multilinguals bring with them in language negotiations not as a problem 
or a deficit but as a resource, thereby rejecting the major tendency of monolingual policy 
to keep languages separate and advocate mastery in one, idealized form of dominant 
language. I will extend this notion, however, with an equal emphasis that the differences 
in linguistic traditions and cultural values, and the dominance of the monolingual 
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ideology even in multilingual individuals, can work as constraint in working across 
cultures and languages. Thinking of language competence in terms of resources and 
repertoires, first, goes against the notion of language as practice; second, it places 
competence in individuals’ ability to collect such resources and use them critically as 
they desire. In other words, I will also problematize the notion of resources as used in 
plurilingualism where it suggests language features as entities that users can pick and 
choose, rather than viewing them as language potentials that users can utilize based on 
their history of that language use in specific situations, however, with an awareness that 
they may not acquire the result they desire.   
With its overemphasis on resources and individual competence, plurilingualism 
often undermines constraints, leading towards romanticization of the agency of 
multilingual language users, which, by placing competence on individual users, retains a 
monolingual tendency in plurilingual guise. In an attempt to counter monolingual 
hegemony, this approach, as in the case of Moore and Gajo, “concentrates on the 
individual rather than the community as its angle of vision” (141) and places more 
emphasis on the individual as a “social actor, with agency and choice” (150). The idea of 
romanticization becomes further substantiated by the fact that plurilingual theorists try to 
highlight their idea that multilingual individuals, due to their multilingual resources, 
exercise metalinguistic and metadiscursive awareness (Jesner; Moore). As Moore and 
Gajo claim: “Heightened awareness has been described as one key asset available to 
bi/plurilinguals, which can be explained by a salient difference regarding the arbitrariness 
of signs, and is dependent on the number of languages involved” (147). It is true that 
multilingual practices can potentially enable multilingual language users to become more 
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conscious about their language use. However, these theorists’ characterizations of 
multilingual people’s experiences as a “‘plurilingual strategic tool-box’—or ‘plurilingual 
asset’” and their focus on individual competence rather than linguistic practice(s), push 
them towards what Latourians would probably call the humanistic fallacy (Moore and 
Gajo 147).  
In emphasizing metadiscursive awareness, the plurilingualists tend to 
underestimate how social relations, material limitations, and the force of dominant belief 
can pose powerful constraints to individuals. Therefore, this trend of overemphasizing 
agency and metadiscursive awareness pushes multilingualism towards its potential 
romanticization. Suresh Canagarajah’s notion of plurilingual competence and his theory 
of shuttling between languages offer us an apt example of such romanticization of 
multilingualism. 
His account of shuttling between languages presents multilingual writers as if 
they can easily hop on and hop off languages due to their membership in local 
multilingual communities: “the LFE [Lingua Franca English] speakers come with the 
competence in many respects, more advanced than that of the child because of the 
multilingual practice enjoyed in their local communities—which is then honed through 
actual interaction” (2006, “Place of World Englishes” 928). It is perhaps true that some 
multilinguals develop a more open and tolerant attitude towards language difference due 
to their exposure to diverse linguistic and semiotic practices. But the problem with this 
plurilingual notion is that it tends to assume competence as already ingrained in 
individuals, whether multilingual or monolingual. Canagarajah does acknowledge that 
competence is emergent and that it needs to be sharpened through interaction. However, 
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he at the same time believes that LFE speakers “come with” or bring with them a more 
advanced level of competence than monolingual users as if it were something that they 
would carry with them and take out and use when necessary, thus suggesting the stability 
of multilingual expertise. This is similar to the “tool-box” notion of multilingual 
resources/experiences that we just saw in Moore and Gajo.  
Similarly, in discussing multilingual competence, it is important to distinguish 
between users’ fluency in different languages and the kind of ideology they believe in. In 
other words, it is important to understand the relationship between orientation/disposition 
and practices and to distinguish between the two. For instance, a student may have some 
experiences of working across languages in particular settings and some fluency in many 
languages--say, Hindi, English, Nepali, and Newari--while at the same time believing in 
monolingual ideology that we should use or strive to use only one language, in its purest 
form, in writings (or speaking). It does not mean that they are not developing multilingual 
competence; it rather means that there sometimes is a big chasm between what such 
students practice and what they believe in. However, at the same time, it is equally 
necessary to see whether the discrepancy between practices and perceptions transform 
perceptions. And this discrepancy between lived practices and abstracted representations 
of such practices in policies and ideologies makes language negotiations of multilinguals 
even more difficult and frustrating. However, plurilingual theorists, in an effort to counter 
the debilitating effects of the dominance of monolingualism in the academy and outside, 
tend to ignore such difficulties and labor, and rather end up romanticizing multilingual 
competence.  
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Additionally, the habitus built through the multilingual experiences in local 
communities may also pose constraints in negotiating language difference in other 
situations due to the specific nature of the habitus. First, the nature of communication 
changes with the changes in the participants in new situations, transforming the same 
language user into a different individual due to the constant shifts she needs to make in 
her linguistic and extralinguistic strategies depending on who the other participants are 
and their language beliefs and practices. Second, this account will be incomplete, and 
therefore misleading, if we assume only the human participants as in control of 
communicative acts, deliberately and freely picking, discarding, and manipulating the 
other elements of a communicative ecology. For instance, when we assess or analyze any 
writing of a composition student only in terms of his/her language identity 
(multilingual/monolingual/ESL, etc) and the state of language ideology, we risk ignoring 
how that student’s specific material condition, classroom infrastructure, her/his history of 
language learning, etc, have influenced her language beliefs and practices. Therefore, we 
need to try to take account of the other agents that in any way modify or mediate 
communicative acts and its results. In doing so, as Bruno Latour believes, it will be a 
mistake to simply lump everything that affects communication or any other semiotic act 
as multilingual or monolingual identity, ‘social context’ or language ‘ideology’ in blanket 
fashion. Rather, we should try to locate each and every potential agent or delegate that 
changes the nature and goals of communicative acts as much as possible. To think of any 
semiotic act, including writing, only in terms of the writer/language user and ideology 
(monolingual/multilingual/plurilingual) and assuming every other aspect as 
manifestations of the dominant ideology or the reflection of social context (taken as 
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homogeneous) as we find in many accounts of language negotiations, is to ignore how 
things other than humans and ideologies also mediate activities of writing and 
communication.  
Let us take an example of Ramakanta Agnihotri’s study of plurilingual practices 
in India, especially his description of taxi drivers’ communicative practices toward the 
end of his essay. He presents his observation that “almost every auto-rickshaw and taxi 
driver in Bangalore is functionally competent in three or four languages” (8). He 
contends at the end of his article, based on his descriptions of multilingual practices 
similar to that of taxi drivers, that multilingualism should be practiced and promoted in 
classrooms. It is not clear, however, that first, they would do well outside their locale, 
though their prior experience might help them negotiate language practices as cab drivers 
elsewhere. This is because their language habitus is always shaped by the local context of 
their language use. Second, the plurilingual practices in informal and out-of-class 
situations may not appropriately capture the dynamic of language relations in formal 
academic situations where participants, their relations and roles, language beliefs of the 
participants, language policy as manifested in assignment prompts and course 
descriptions, etc. make the nature of language negotiation very different. The tendency of 
equating plurilingual experiences in one context, especially in out-of-class informal 
situations, with those in very different circumstances, e.g., classroom writing, succumbs 
to the tradition of abstracting language practices by arguing that the same thing happens 
in formal writings. In other words, it is important to note that despite their multilingual 
experiences, many students are governed by monolingual belief, and therefore, struggle 
to acquire an idealized monolingual competence. However, it will also be a big mistake 
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to think that all classroom situations are similar because most of the teachers and students 
are governed by monolingual ideology.   
The example of the Malayasian student that Canagarajah uses from Min-Zhan 
Lu’s study shows how he seems to have ignored the powerful presence of English 
monolingualism that shapes students in ways to make them avoid “error” as much as 
possible. In other words, this example shows how “functional competence” to shuttle 
across languages may not be enough in many classroom situations. This study clearly 
shows how difficult it is for the students to actually shuttle between languages when the 
classroom situation often makes them feel that they need to use perfect “standard” 
English. In other words, the expectations within and outside the academy, both actual and 
perceived, make them actually want to reproduce the dominant discourse. Even in such a 
highly encouraging situation, the Malaysian student in Lu’s study chose to reiterate the 
“conventions” of “standard” English. So, appreciation of deliberate acts of code-meshing 
should be complemented by our close attention to implicit traces of difference, especially 
in the use of the same language structure/vocabulary for difference in meaning. It seems 
that plurilingual theorists’ concern to debunk monolingualist ideology risks making code-
meshing/shuttling between languages a natural competence for all multilingual speakers, 
a competence that multilingual speakers want to hone all the time.21 When we focus on 
such code meshing practices, we may dismiss how a large number of people are not only 
forced to but also desire to imitate the norms of the “standard” language, which, however, 
results in the transformation of meaning even in their reiteration. My major concern is 
                                                
21 Even if Canagarajah critiques the Chomskian model of natural competence, he seems to have fallen 
victim to a similar model by assuming expertise of multilingual speakers as natural competence to be 
“honed by actual interaction.” It is quite different to think of language repertoire as resources for 
multilingual speakers to tap into in confronting difficult communicative situations and to think of it as part 
of natural competence applicable to all situations.  
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that, by focusing on some code-meshing practices of expert writers and not fully 
describing what explicit and implicit (f)actors that have made such language acts 
possible, we are dismissing the struggles that thousands of students are engaging in in 
their attempt to “master” standard English, thereby ignoring what Min-Zhan Lu calls 
“living-English” or what Calvet calls language practices.  
After all, Canagarajah and other plurilingual theorists’ contention in favor of 
code-meshing (which actually looks like code-switching), with examples of established 
writers like Geneva Smitherman and K Sivatambi, or some students like Buthaina, serves 
as another instance of the tendency of reification of language use. As Juan C. Guerra 
contends in his recent article “From Code-Segregation to Code-Switching to Code-
Meshing,” writers like Canagarajah and Vershawn Young ignore practice while focusing 
on policy (37). Guerra argues that Canagarajah and Young conflate code-switching with 
code-segregation, while I contend, they also create false sense of division between code-
switching and code-meshing:  
Despite his affinity for code-meshing, Canagarajah at times still sounds 
like an advocate for code-switching as progressive scholars conceptualize 
it: ‘Rather than developing mastery in a single ‘target language,’ he 
contends, students should strive for competence in a repertoire of codes 
and discourses. Rather than simply joining a speech community, students 
should learn to shuttle between communities in contextually relevant 
ways’. (8)  
 
Guerra disagrees with most of the translingual scholars in composition, including 
Canagarajah, Young, Horner, and Lu due to their conflating of code-segregation with 
what he calls a progressive form of code switching. It is true that such a form of code-
switching offers productive ways of countering the effects of monolingual hegemony. 
However, at the same time, by his own implicit division between progressive and what 
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we may infer as regressive forms of code-switching, it becomes clear that translingual 
scholars’ critique of accommodationist (code-switching) approach as monolingualist 
appropriation of code-switching does have an important significance. In other words, 
while Guerra is right in pointing that theorizing language difference should not ignore 
practice, translingual scholars are right in pointing out the fundamental similarities 
between what Guerra would call a progressive form of code switching and regressive 
notions of code-switching (code-segregation). Though Guerra contends that he focuses 
on practice while others focus on policy, I contend that both do tend to partially focus on 
practice, while also interrogating language policies, however ignoring to account for the 
heterogeneities of factors affecting any communicative act, and therefore, limiting 
practice to either code-meshing (Canagarajah and Young) or code switching or both 
(Guerra). When we focus on practice, we should go beyond advocating code-meshing, 
code-switching, or any other strategy, to describe and analyze a complex ecology of 
semiotic practice where we do not limit ourselves to language users and language 
ideologies. The case of the highlighting deliberate and intentional instances of 
codemeshing as creating instances of language use similar to innovative uses of language 
in modernist writers like James Joyce or accomplished writers like Geneva Smitherman 
actually reproduces the same humanist logic of agency and creativity. The point here is 
not whether our students can or cannot do so, it is rather the tendency of taking such 
instances as isolated from practice. Even the often cited examples of linguistic 
inventiveness are part of practices. While the example of “can able to” and Buthaina’s 
use of Arabic script in Canagarajah’s study are explicit instances of codemeshing, the 
Malaysian student’s seeming reiteration of the “norm” of the SWE, in her use of “may be 
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able to,” in place of “can able to” does create difference in meaning. However, these 
different instances should not be equated as intentional uses of creative code-meshing 
afforded to multilingual users due to their plurilingual “tool-box/assets.” Rather, different 
ecologies of mediation in these different cases shape the way English was used (with 
Arabic script or without any apparent difference). Our focus should be on what socio-
material conditions and what nexus of linguistic and other social practices enables or 
constrains students’ varying uses of language.  
In summing up the discussion of the romanticization of multilingualism, we can 
say that some plurilingual theorists regard multilinguals as “free-floating” individuals 
boosted by their history of language use and unrestrained by the actual contexts in which 
their negotiating expertise needs to be constantly relocalized through transformative 
meaning making. By highlighting individual competence or lack thereof, these 
plurilingual theorists contribute to the tendency of the false stabilization of such 
expertise, rather than seeing it as always emergent, shaped by and shaping specific local 
contexts. They seem to have ignored how changing configurations of the range of power 
relations and the power differential ratio in each relation, in addition to the varying 
degree of availability and the role of material artifacts, can affect communication. In the 
context of the still persisting monolingual tradition in US composition, we need to pay 
attention to how and whether students forge difference in meaning even in reproducing 
standard discourse conventions. The singular focus on code-meshing can risk 
encouraging teachers to only look for obvious differences and ignore the meaning 
potentials of seemingly repetitive, imitative acts. Unfortunately, such a tendency, as 
Theresa Lillis and Carolyn McKinney contend in their brief comment on current 
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language theories, disregards practice in favor of simplistic notions of rhetorical 
appropriateness and awareness (427). 
Mesodiscursive Approach and Language Use 
As discussed so far, the three major tendencies that I find problematic in terms of 
theorization of language use are, first, reconstructing a stable linguistic core, thereby 
ignoring both local heterogeneities and historical changes (WE, ELF and DNL); second, 
pluralizing monolingualism (additive multilingualism); and third, romanticizing 
multilingual competence (plurilingualism). In essence, all three categories are 
manifestations of an underlying monolingualist ideology locating language ability in 
individuals and marking their identity as fixed and tied to language use, whether 
multilingual, plurilingual, or monolingual. All three also treat language use or practice as 
fixed, though in different ways. Going against the two former tendencies and 
complicating the third, this paper proposes, based on Pennycook’s theory of language as 
a local practice, Calvet’s notion of language ecology, and Latour’s idea of sociology of 
translation, what I call a mesodiscursive approach to language diversity, which focuses 
on practice, however, without excluding policies and ideologies. In calling this practice 
theory approach to language difference “mesodiscursive,” I am trying to go beyond a 
limited notion of practice in the social theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook to 
synthesize their notion of practice with Latour’s notion of mediation in what is generally 
called actor-network theory. By using the term mesodiscursive, I intend to focus not on 
something between micro level activity and macro forces (e.g., ideology), but on the need 
to always observe and analyze how a specific way of language use mediates and is 
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mediated by a network of (f)actors, both human and non-human, both materially present 
and absent, in a particular moment of that language use.  
Alastair Pennycook has developed a theory of language based on the practice theories of Bourdieu 
and Giddens, among many others. His theory highlights the always local nature of language use, however, 
with a recognition that it gets somewhat predictable due to the sedimented patterns emerging out of 
repetitive nature of language use. He conceives practice as a midway between little “d” discourse and big 
“D” discourse, thereby offering a way to avoid both the stability of language norms and a romanticized 
theory of multilingual agency implicated in other approaches discussed above. Here, language structure is 
conceived, unlike in structuralism, as the sedimented patterns emerging from its repetitive use in a 
particular local space (Pennycook, Language as a Local Practice 9). In defining language as a local 
practice, Pennycook first seeks to go beyond the traditional notion of “context” and takes local to mean the 
particular space as related to other terms like “regional, national, global, universal .  .  .,” where it is not 
opposed to what is global, but can also be constitutive of and constituted by such things as global (4). And 
he gets out of the tendencies of taking language as a mere instrument of a larger Discourse on one hand and 
taking it as always contingent and fluid. Therefore, he calls language a practice that goes midway between 
the little “d” discourse and the big “D” Discourse (as in Gee).  
He derives his theory of practice from, among others, Bourdieu and Giddens, who 
use the term “practice” and “habitus” to “steer a course between the grand and seemingly 
deterministic theories of critical social science, where human action is a by-product of 
larger social structures, and the voluntaristic views of humanism” (Pennycook 27). In this 
sense, instead of focusing on abstract system and pre-existing standards, we need rather 
to highlight how structural patterns emerge and evolve over time through language users’ 
reiterations of patterns of language use in specific locations.  
Pennycook’s adoption of practice from social theorists like Bourdieu and Giddens 
gives a richer dimension to the existing notion of language practice where practice is 
taken merely as an application, similar to the notion of a specific use. His sense of 
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historicity (the temporal dimension of language practice) in his use of the term practice 
and his sense of spatiality in his use of the term local offer us a way to view language 
neither merely in terms of its origin and development nor merely in terms of ahistorical 
structure or norms.  
In his account, the interplay between the individual use and the shared habitus 
during a particular instance of exchange makes both the assumptions of radical 
contingency and stabilty unrealistic. Here, individual language use and social 
structurations of language are co-dependent and co-constitutive. Therefore, as Pennycook 
says, every individual language practice is a “mediating social activity where we do 
things both because we want to and along lines laid down by habit, propriety, cultural 
norms or political dictates.  It is therefore useful to explore the meso-political space of 
practice that lies between the local and the global” (Emphasis mine; LLP 23). 
It is important here to mark how Pennycook departs from language and literacy 
scholars like J P Gee who have adopted Foucault’s notion of discourse as all-
encompassing system. Pennycook, on the contrary, views it as a mesopolitical space 
between the little ‘d’ discourse and big ‘D’ Discourse, suggesting his critique of the dual 
tendencies of taking language use apolitically as individual speech interaction and taking 
it as a part of larger system of discursive power. Pennycook, following Bourdieu and 
Giddens, brings social theory from its obsession with individual freedom and discursive 
interpellation to view these two phenomena as mutually co-constitutive.   
In other words, we need to pay attention to the meso space of relations instead of 
an over attention to the micro at the cost of ignoring the macro as we saw in plurilingual 
accounts of language negotiation or an over attention to the macro while undermining the 
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role of the micro as we saw in the other three approaches just discussed above. What 
individuals do does not depend only on what they want; it is also guided by the 
structuring forces in global-local relations of power.  
Hence, I intend to highlight the relation between language norms as perceived by 
the users and dictated by the dominant representation of such language, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, individual practices, especially the idea that they constitute and 
transform each other. Discarding the idea of language structure as preexisting system or 
individual language users as free-floating agents, I propose to view language structures 
as, in Giddens’ sense, both the “medium and the outcome” of individual language 
practices (25). So, the focus here is not on “either/or” but on the interplay: how language 
shapes an individual and how an individual transforms it.  Therefore, the meso, the in-
between position, suggests the dynamic space that is characterized by the tensions 
between individual agency and social-historical constraints often represented by forms of 
various domains of representations. In thinking about the relationships between the 
dominant discourse and individual agency we need to attend to the role dominant belief 
plays, especially how it can pose constraints to individual agency. However, at the same 
time, as I’ll discuss a little later, we also need to be careful not to think of ideology as 
affecting individuals homogeneously. 
Louis-Jean Calvet’s notion of language ecology where he emphasizes studying 
language not as abstraction but as a concrete material practice complements Pennycook’s 
theory of language as a local practice. Calvet emphasizes two things: representations and 
practices, each shaping and affecting the other. While Pennycook’s notion of practice 
adds a temporal dimension to Calvet’s more spatial/horizontal notion of practices, the 
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equal focus of Calvet on representations adds the role of power relations and ideology on 
language use, but not as sole arbiter of meanings. Similarly, Calvet urges us to see 
language in relation to other aspects of the ecology, including various other modes. 
While Pennycook and other practice theorists are right that the dichotomy 
between and a singular focus on agency and/or structure is not productive and can not 
accurately describe the dynamics of social actions, including language use, it is also 
equally necessary to expand their practice theory from the interplay between individual 
agency and social structure to recognize the heterogeneities of factors in what they 
customarily call social structure and bring them as participants as much as we focus on 
individuals. In other words, we need to recognize not only individuals and social 
ideologies, but also objects and symbols, not as carriers of human motives or social 
ideologies, but as mediators in their own right in our actions and their consequences.  
Pennycook replaces context with local to avoid the assumption of stability 
associated with context. However, similar to the social theorists he adopts, he still limits 
the scope of the mediators of any actions to individuals and the social (in the form of 
habitus, practice, etc.), thereby not exploring the full complexities of the relations of 
mediations across all potential (f)actors, both human and non-human alike. In what I see 
as an extension of practice theory, Bruno Latour problematizes the notion of social in 
fields like sociology (sociolinguistics too) and critical theory, especially to avoid the 
assumption of homogeneity and stability in the existing view of the social:  
In the alternative view, ‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything 
including what the other glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by 
many other type of connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, 
socio-linguistists, social psyschologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the 
given that could send some light on residual aspects of economics, 
linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on 
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the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by 
the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, 
law, management, etc. (Reassembling 5)  
 
To avoid the sense of fixity, he uses terms like collective and associations. In his theory, 
what we often tend to understand as social context is but a collective, meaning 
associations and relations among various (f)actors in a given situation. By emphasizing 
associations in place of social context, he is pointing to local heterogeneities in what we 
call social context, and fluidity in the relationships between various (f)actors affecting 
what we call individual actions. In some sense Latour’s notion of the collective is similar 
to Calvet’s notion of ecology though they use different terminologies.  
What I see all these three theorists as doing in terms of social theory (of language, 
technology, or any social action) is trying to focus on the relations and associations 
between and across various aspects of the ‘social’ situation. While Pennycook and other 
practice theorists focus on relations between individual agency and social structure 
through practice, Latour adds non-human actors affecting specific acts in communicative 
practices. Therefore, I’m using the term mesodiscourse and mesospace to capture these 
various notions of relations, not only between micro and macro (individual and social), 
but also across human and non-human actors. 
It is important here to mark, as Bruno Latour contends in his book Reassembling 
the Social, the importance of seeing an individual as a part of a particular network of 
actors and their constantly shifting (or not so constantly) associations. It is those 
associations with which Latour replaces the stable notion of the “social” in sociology and 
critical theory. With this shift in terminology, what he is trying to do is not to ignore the 
“social” in the discussion of individual actions, but to point to the heterogeneities within 
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the “social,” often resulting from shifting associations, emergence/introduction of new 
participants, or/and the exit of old participants, or constant transformations of these 
participants. And his notion of actor/participant incudes not only humans, but also non-
humans. What I see Latour doing here is updating practice theory by reminding us that 
any practice, including that of language, involves not only an individual and the social 
(manifested in various forms, including dominant ideologies), but also artifacts or 
objects.  
In using the term mesodiscursive relations, I am trying to expand Pennycook’s 
use of the term mesopolitical practice. His account of language as mesopolitical practice 
does help us avoid the binary between notions of discursive interpellation and individual 
freedom by making us aware that they constitute and transform each other. However, it is 
better to come out of the spatial sense of “meso” in the sense that it seems to take a 
midway between macro and micro factors. At the same time, I find the usefulness of the 
term meso in a different sense: as relations between actants in a network of complex 
mediation, rather than a midway between the micro and the macro. Similarly, I also don’t 
yet want to discard discourse here for a few reasons. First, I want to use it in one of the 
original senses: “a running to and fro” or “action” of “run[ning] about.” This sense of the 
term “discourse,” coupled with the term “meso,” does evoke the sense of network 
between a variety of actants affecting any individual act. Second, I don’t want to discard 
how ideology or discourse do partly shape our beliefs and language use. However, I don’t 
use discourse as an abstract system of norms, but as representations that operate through 
different material things, institutions, and individual practices, which in turn, transform 
discourse practices themselves. In not discarding Pennycook’s adaptation of language as 
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a discourse practice, the phrase “mesodiscursive approach” tries to acknowledge that it is 
important not to gloss over the role of dominant ideologies and power relations operating 
in our society and institutions in perpetuating dominant beliefs in certain ways. But at the 
same time, rethinking discourse from a materialist perspective offers us a way to see 
durability (or lack of) as a function not of internal workings of a system, but of material 
conditions and other (f)actors making durability or transformation possible. Viewing 
language use from a mesodiscursive perspective, therefore, helps us both to imagine 
possible ways for transforming dominant assumptions of monolingualism in terms of 
specific situations and for understanding the reasons behind the durability of 
monolingualism in different guises in our institutions. In other words, we pay attention 
not to mysterious notions of power, which have the potential to make us passive or desire 
to reproduce the idealized conventions of powerful discourse, but to the real possibilities 
of initiating change through disruptions in existing relations of mediations.  
At the same time, the focus on relations across various mediators of actions in a 
mesodiscursive approach should not assume the prior existence of any participant or 
ideological system. Rather, the focus here is on moving from the traces of difference, 
e.g., “error” in student writing, to the possible factors contributing to that difference, 
without trying to reduce heterogeneities and avoid uncertainties by taking recourse to any 
sweeping notions, e.g., ESL, multilingual, or mainstream students. 
In short, taking a mesodiscursive approach to language relations means analyzing 
language use as a material practice, which is constantly mediating and mediated by 
different other language practices, perceptions, writing technologies, artifacts, and 
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specific contexts and histories of language users. However, it is always possible that one 
or a few (f)actors might dominate others in various specific situations. For instance, in 
formal classroom situations, teachers’ language beliefs, students’ own perceptions of 
language norms, and institutional policies might play a greater role than writing 
technologies used (e.g., the use of blog or wiki or blackboard). Whereas, in informal and 
more open spaces like Facebook and blogs, the affordances of technologies and writers’ 
history of the uses of those technologies might play a greater role, it will be a mistake to 
ignore seemingly minor mediators because incremental changes in our institutions are 
more realistic than radical.  
This way of theorizing language relations and language use tends to avoid the 
tendencies of taking languages as discrete and multilinguals as free-floating agents. In a 
few examples below, I’ll try to present how plurilingual and other accounts of language 
practice are problematic and how we can reinterpret these examples alternatively and 
perhaps more productively. In presenting and analyzing these cases, I will particularly 
focus on a) the difficulty of language negotiations, often resulting from the tendency of 
assuming discreteness of different language traditions and  b) the problem of reifying 
language from its use, ignoring specific conditions and material (f)actors enabling or 
limiting translingual/multilingual practices. 
Arjuna Parakrama’s De-hegemonizing Language Standards, as the title itself 
suggests, explores ways to resist the hegemony of standard English. He also critiques the 
World Englishes model of language use and language relations for its hierarchization of 
English varieties:  
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I aim, in this manner, to show that even the most liberal and sympathetic 
of linguists—of whom Kachru is an outstanding example—cannot do 
justice to these Other Englishes as long as they remain within the 
overarching structures that these Englishes bring to crisis. To take these 
new/other Englishes seriously would require a fundamental revaluation of 
linguistic paradigms, and not merely a slight accommodation or 
adjustment. (16-17) 
 
 Besides his critique of World Englishes model, what I find interesting, perhaps more so, 
is his reflection on his own struggle to use a non-standard variety. His reflections in this 
book gives us a clear sense of how dominant ideology can restrain individuals in trying to 
negotiate across languages:  
I had wanted to write the whole of this book in forms of non-standard 
English, but it became too difficult because I am very much a product of 
these standards I wish to problematize. This task to change the way we 
have looked at language, in concrete as opposed to abstract terms, is 
hard—really hard because it has much less to do with individual ability 
than structural and discursive hegemony. (vi) 
 
What Parakrama’s example shows is the idea that when one tries to “master” a 
language/discourse, one is also nearly mastered by that discourse so that it’s difficult for 
her/him to get out of it and practice delegitimized discourses22. Parakrama’s case also 
reveals a few other things. It clearly shows how being multilingual/multidiscoursal in 
Pennycook’s sense of semiodiversity is so hard. Parakrama was a graduate student 
writing his dissertation on the issue of the standardization of English. He was clearly a 
bilingual, perhaps bilingual by birth. And he was also trying to deliberately subvert the 
dominant discourse. But he still finds it extremely difficult to shuttle between languages. 
The difficulty, however, results also from Parakrama’s own sense that language varieties 
are discrete and stable, e.g., Sri Lankan English, standard English, etc. He seems to have 
understood subversion in terms that dominant language ideology has provided for him: 
                                                
22 As I will discuss later, such a belief of Parakrama, however, is based on his false notion of discrete and 
stable varieties of any language and his belief in the Foucauldian notion of discourse as all-encompassing. 
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thus even in his attempts to subvert dominant practice, he reinforces the legitimacy and 
dominant position of that ideology. 
When considering writing practices of our students, it is extremely important to 
pay attention to the kind of difficulty Parakrama mentions.23 However, on the other hand, 
it does not mean, as he seems to suggest, that his and similar other attempts to 
problematize standardized discourse do not have any impact on language ecology. 
Moreover, his writing, with several obvious and not so obvious instances of both 
intentional and unintentional uses of what is normally considered non-standard English, 
and not only its acceptance by the university, but also its impact on himself and others 
show individuals, in the presence (or absence) of different other participants, do and can 
contribute to changing or transforming dominant conceptions of language. In other 
words, his attempt to problematize the ideology of English monolingualism, whether by 
using “non-standard” English or the “standard” one, does contribute to the changes we’ve 
seen over the years in our understanding of and thinking about language. However, to 
narrowly assign the role of making his writing successful to any single aspect, e.g., the 
attitude or the expertise of his supervisor, his multilingual background, or his use of this 
or that form of language, is to abstract his language practice and its effects from the 
ecology of its practice. His case is just an example: I cannot and should not claim that it 
is representative of any larger group of language users. I’m highlighting the difficulty and 
labor involved in such language negotiation to remind us that shuttling across language 
traditions is not as common as we tend to think based on a few instances of multilingual 
scholar’s language use. Similarly, I also want to caution us to not think of the hegemony 
                                                
23 For a similar account of the difficulty and labour-intensive nature of language negotiation, see Guillaume 
Gentil’s (2005) “Commitments to academic biliteracy.”  
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of the dominant discourse of standard English as inescapable while understanding the 
potential difficulty and labor involved in negotiating such discourse. The issue here is not 
whether multilinguals can or cannot shuttle between discourses. It is rather more 
concerned with what (f)actors contribute to different responses of language users to the 
need of language negotiation. Here, following Latour, I’m pointing to the need to go 
beyond the anthropocentric logic of many plurilingual theorists, as evidenced in the 
following text from Canagarajah:  
We would focus more on the changing contexts of communication, 
perhaps treating context as the main variable as writers switch their 
languages, discourses, and identities in response to this contextual change; 
rather than treating writers as passive, conditioned by their language and 
culture, we would treat them as agentive, shuttling creatively between 
discourses to achieve their communicative objectives. As a precondition 
for conducting this enquiry, we have to stop treating any textual difference 
as a unconscious error. We must consider it as a strategic and creative 
choice by the author to attain his or her rhetorical objectives. (“Shuttling” 
591)  
 
Here, I do agree with Canagarajah that equating individual identity and their writing with 
any culture or language is problematic. However, I also see a serious problem in his 
treatment of the agency of individuals, especially multilinguals, as independent of context 
though he considers context as the main variable. He does not see contextual (f)actors as 
modifying the objectives and consequences of individual actions; rather, he sees such 
individuals as capable of manipulating context to “attain his or her [their] rhetorical 
objectives.” This is why Theresa Lillis and Carolyn McKinney contend that current 
translingual theories disregard practice when they focus on a simplistic notion of 
rhetorical awareness. Similarly, it is equally important to see context not as 
homogeneous, but as a heterogeneous mix of various agents. Therefore, individuals’ 
language use should be understood and analyzed by dissembling the “context” as 
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relations across an array of mediators. For instance, Parakrama’s difficulty to practice 
what he considers delegitimized linguistic tradition (separate from SWE) comes partly 
from his own perception of language systems as discrete, similar to the understanding in 
the academy where he was working, and many other potential factors not explored in his 
book due to his reduction of the heterogeneous factors to ideology or hegemony of 
standard English.  
 In other words, though, for Parakrama, the difficulty of breaking away from his 
language habitus built through years of language practice is real, part of the difficulty in 
such situations also arises from the fact that he, like many other multilingual students, 
imagines that there is a distinct alternative way of writing that he should master. In other 
words, he is caught up in what the dominant has defined as alternative to the dominant.  
While Parakrama’s example shows us the difficulty resulting from one’s near-
complete entanglements into the dominant language ideology and a false conception of 
languages as discrete and distinct varieties, there lies, in some cases, another kind of 
difficulty, the difficulty to switch from the home/local discourse to the dominant, and 
often due to similar underlying reasons.24 For many students who do not have strong 
familiarity with and regular training in the dominant discourse practices, the problem 
would be, when they are asked to write in the idealized version of a dominant discursive 
tradition, that of transitioning from their familiar discourse practices to the dominant one 
both because they are not familiar with writing practices in, say, the university setting in 
the US and their own and their teachers’ misconceptions about language and writing. 
Think of students coming with experiences of different epistemological and discourse 
                                                
24 I’m referring to such a division between home/non-dominant discourse and the dominant one just to 
highlight the fact that there are different practices, but not to say that such a division is water-tight. I do 
acknowledge that no discourse remains completely unaffected by others.  
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practices and now studying in the US academy. They often need to work hard to fulfill 
the expectations of or what they perceive as the expectations of the dominant academic 
discourse. Their past experiences that shape their habitus often tend to contradict with the 
dominant discourse practices in the present. To take one example, many students who 
come from different academic and cultural traditions may find the combative nature of 
academic writing in the West as very disorienting and challenging. At the same time, they 
may also think they need to be more combative than in fact they need to be. Or, they 
might get a sense that all Western Writing is combative—that is, that Western Academic 
Writing is a uniform and stable entity to which they need to completely submit. 
Furthermore, the problem here lies not only because such students hold wrong 
conceptions about the nature of Western Academic Writing, but also because most of the 
teachers also hold similar views though they would practice writing differently. As recent 
ethnographic explorations of teachers’ perceptions and practices have shown, they often 
demand students to stick to rigid notion of standards while they themselves transform 
such standards in their own writings (see Andrea Olinger, “Instability of Disciplinary 
Style”; also Lea and Street; Monroe’s edited collection on writing disciplinarity; Thaiss 
and Zawacki). 
The case of a recent immigrant from India, Neha Shah, presented in Stephen M. 
Fishman and Lucille McCarthy’s study, can cast light on the difficulty of many students 
as discussed above. In the writing intensive Intro to Philosophy class, the instructor, 
though very sympathetic to the ESL student, thinks Neha is underprepared for his class. 
On the contrary, Neha thinks that she would easily pass the course. This mismatch 
between what the instructor and the ESL student think results not only from their 
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conflicting expectations, but also from the different assumptions and experiences that 
they had about academic writing. The instructor expects Neha to write and read in a way 
based on an ideal notion of Western argument-based writing tradition. He wants her to 
understand the argument in philosophical texts, critique the position, and take a unique 
position of her own on a particular topic. Neha first thinks that she will easily pass this 
course because she had already completed her Bachelor’s degree from India. But the way 
she would write in India was vastly different from the instructor’s expectations. She 
would not focus on producing argument-based text. Her writing, from the perspective of 
the instructor, would often meander, just making sketchy presentation of background 
information and her understanding of the assigned texts, without much thinking about 
offering an argument about the text. The other major problem for Neha is that she does 
not find the texts and the curriculum of this course exciting. And when she writes, she 
seems to blend her personal and cultural background into her interpretation of the text.  
The difficulty she goes through, as she herself says in an interview with the researcher, 
lies in the fact that her knowledge and education have not been recognized in the current 
university: “She explains that the disruption in her plans caused by this conflict between 
American and Indian systems made her feel ‘sad and sorry’ for herself. ‘[I am like] a 
traveler [who] does not know which way is correct road to get his or her place’” 
(Fishman and McCarthy 198). That is why she goes through a lot of ambivalence 
regarding the courses she is taking. This is also reflected in her apathy towards the 
philosophy course she is taking. Moreover, it’s difficult for her to connect to many of the 
intellectual and cultural values she is supposed to analyze and appreciate in the 
philosophy class:  
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By contrast, Neha, as a "traveler" between two cultures, a newcomer to 
this one, entered Steve's class with different interests and background 
knowledge--different cultural capital--than her American classmates 
(Bourdieu, 1982). As a result, she found herself, once again, experiencing 
bicultural tension, saying that course content was confusing to her, 
sometimes even upsetting. For example, she was puzzled about her 
classmates' emotional involvement in discussions of racism after they read 
Fanon, Carmichael, and hooks. (Fishman and McCarthy 200) 
Many of the things discussed in class did not make much sense to her. At the same time, 
her appropriations of course materials in her writing was not appreciated and encouraged. 
This is one major reason why the instructor finds Neha’s writing incoherent and 
disorganized. Perhaps, Neha could have done much better had the instructor opened up 
ways for Neha, and also for other students, to tap into her own cultural and language 
potentials to enhance her writing and discussion.  
 Both the instructor and Neha hold similar belief about language, that writing 
traditions are stable and distinct, and therefore, they assume, Neha has to rigidly follow 
the idealized version of Western Academic Writing (or for Neha, the instructor should 
recognize her own distinct style). In reality, Neha is engaged in the construction of the 
knowledge of philosophy based on her cultural background, academic training, and her 
changing material-social conditions. Her interpretation of the issues of racism and 
individual freedom in different Western texts through her own individual experiences of 
casteism in India could have offered new avenues for understanding social and 
philosophical issues differently, both for Neha and the whole class. 
Neha’s case, while not completely representative of all ‘non-native’ students, also 
manifests some material and other challenges many minority students face. Besides 
taking two other courses, she was working as a teaching assistant and also working 45 
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hours a week outside campus on two jobs. As many other studies have also shown, 
students like Neha have several commitments while also passionately trying to succeed 
academically for better job prospects in an “alien” world. The pressure from the 
instructors and their own concern about possible challenges due to their linguistic 
difference make students like Neha try to imitate standard discourse where there actually 
is no “standard” standard discourse. There, students often go through strong sense of 
frustration and humiliation while trying very hard to adapt to the new situation. In such 
situations, it is important for us not only to encourage code-meshing, but also to pay 
attention to the difference such students create while trying to repeat the dominant 
discourse patterns.  
What Neha’s and Parakrama’s examples show us is both the potential and risk, 
greater potential for transforming linguistic and cultural beliefs as a result of an apparent 
tension between practices and beliefs, but at the same time a great risk given the 
dominant belief about language norms in academic institutions and language users 
themselves. These two examples, in different ways, also demonstrate the labor and the 
challenges in language negotiations as a result of problematic assumptions of discreteness 
of language traditions, where they actually are always emergent, subject to continual 
reconstruction.  
What a mesodiscursive approach reminds us is we as teachers of writing should 
focus on what material-social conditions enable or facilitate developing a disposition 
towards language use that recognizes the value of difference and works against false 
assumptions about the nature and uses of language and other communicative mode. Here, 
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it is important to mark that dispositions are more than mere attitude. Formations and 
transformations of dispositions are dependent on continual reinforcements of beliefs 
through individuals’ involvement in practices and material-social conditions or changes 
or breaks in such relations between language use, practices, and material conditions. 
Therefore, our role as teachers of writing is to help develop conditions and recognize the 
value of differences to help students overcome problematic assumptions about language 
norms and to appreciate their own strength. What this mesodiscursive approach shows is 
the need to think beyond the agency/structure dichotomy in analyzing difference in 
writing and expanding our notion of practice to diversify the notion of the social and to 
include the role of agents other than humans.  
For instance, in the case of Neha, she becomes barely “successful” and that 
success has been associated with her interaction with the teacher and her peers because of 
which she could better understand the expectations of her teacher and his idealized notion 
of argumentative writing in the discipline of philosophy. However, that success actually 
fails to recognize the meaning potential that her different understanding of the issues of 
philosophy and that of writing she could contribute to the class. Moreover, we also need 
to see what other factors contributed to both the possibility for her to pass the course and 
the silencing of her voice in indirect ways. Did the readings they did in class; the racial, 
gender, and other composition of the class; the way classroom was structured, the options 
they were allowed to use (writing/speaking/other audio-visual modes, etc.), her own 
socio-material conditions (TAship, her work outside the university, the need to support 
her family that recently migrated from India, etc.) and her writing practices outside the 
classroom, etc. contribute in any way to the nature of her participation in class and her 
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writing? That particular study does not provide much information on this because its 
focus is largely on how an “ESL” student struggles to adapt to the education system in 
the US, with specific attention to the discreteness of education systems and languages. 
Therefore, it does not follow the traces of differences and explore relations between 
Neha’s use of language, the language practices she has been participating in, and 
language beliefs. It rather ends up just recognizing the role of the interactions with 
teacher and with the peers as it assumes the only purpose of Neha’s learning to write is to 
adapt to the conventions of Standard Written English.   
In other words, despite it being an excellent and systematically done case study, 
its assumptions about language use and language relations affect what it sees. It is the 
same in the case of Parakrama as he, despite questioning the ideology of English 
monolingualism, ends up being trapped in the same logic that he seeks to challenge. And 
one fundamental reason that lies behind problematic treatments of language is the limited 
notion of mediation: language use seen in terms just of ideology/hegemony rather than 
exploring how such ideologies work and what happens when ideologies become 
delegated through material social agents and practices. It is important not to reduce 
Neha’s difference in writing to a single thing like monolingual ideology, her cultural 
background, writing traditions, etc. All of these may play different roles, but they work 
differently in different situations. That is why Neha’s experience and expertise are very 
different from Buthaina’s or Parakrama’s. The tendency of labeling them as different 
manifestations of the same problem (monolingual ideology, cultural differences, etc.) 
does not take us any where than mystifying experiences of students like Neha.  
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Finally, it is also important to not abstract writing from other communicative 
practices and modes. While, as Theresa Lillis contends, sociolinguists take writing as 
completely separate from other communicative practices like speech, composition has 
customarily been relegating other modes to the margin while solely focusing on writing 
as alphabetic print composition. Similarly, development of new forms of technologies 
and the accompanying trends of globalization take us to a very different writing ecology. 
While new forms of technologies have made it easier to practice what has been called 
multimodal composition, they have also created a situation where interactions across 
linguistic practices have become more common. Therefore, there has been an increasing 
trend in composition to study the role of technology on writing. The next chapter 
addresses the issue of the relationship between writing and technology and how thinking 
of that relationship from a practice theory perspective (in a broader sense) can provide us 
more productive ways to understand the nature of writing in the present context.  
Conclusion  
In short, the focus in many language theories on stable norms or on metalinguistic 
awareness of multilinguals not only marks the problem of reification of language acts 
from actual practices, but also of, indirectly, covering up the actual problems language 
users face in negotiating differences and the potentials of transforming their own writing 
and the dominant writing practices through such negotiations. Going beyond the focus on 
stable forms or special competence of multilinguals, it is important, as Calvet and Latour 
suggest, to see practices in concrete situations and consider the ecology of 
communicative acts in terms of relations and associations between diverse mediating 
(f)actors. In short, it is the focus on the mediations occurring in the meso space of 
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relations, that is, the network of mediators, in place of micro or macro forces, that marks 
the difference of this approach from other dominant models. It is more important to look 
for incremental ways of developing translingual/multilingual dispositions both in teachers 
and students than either advocating radical subversion through the use of non-standard 
academic traditions or highlighting the special competence of multilingual students to 
shuttle across different discourses.
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPOSITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND MULTIMODALITY25 
 
 As with language interactions, developments of digital technologies have also 
affected how we compose, think about composition, and teach composition. There have 
been several calls for rethinking composition curriculum and pedagogy in recent times 
(Yancey; Dobrin; Selfe; etc.), especially with a focus on multimodality and writing in a 
digital context. This chapter explores what it means to write in a digital age, examining 
dominant views in composition about the relationship between technology, modality, and 
writing; and suggests some alternative ways of thinking about and theorizing such 
relationships in the context of recent developments in writing ecology. In particular, this 
chapter urges us to resist the tendency to limit modality to fixed properties and functions 
and to focus on their fluid nature and the interactions across them, locating them in socio-
technical practice. It argues that locating modality in practice helps us avoid exclusively 
materialist26, ideological, and humanist tendencies.  
The development of different forms of technologies affects overall aspects of our 
life, including how we read, write, and teach. But the debate is on how or in what ways.
                                                
25 This chapter is limited in its scope to the analysis of dominant literature on the relationship between 
writing and multimodality. As I’ve developed a general theory of mediation for the study of language and 
technology in Chapter 2, in this chapter, I will limit myself to reviewing dominant understanding of 
multimodality and offering alternative reading of it. 
26 Here, I’m using the term materialist in the way Bruno Latour uses it. It refers to the tendency of taking 
technologies and their effects only in terms of the material features of those technologies. This use of the 
term materialism is completely different from a cultural materialist understanding of materialism.  
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The debate in this regard covers issues such as how we define technology, its role, and 
the relationship between technology and other aspects of material-social life, including  
the users/designers, ideologies, specific materialities of different forms of technologies, 
and what Rickert calls ambience. I see the present attempts at defining multimodality and 
the role of technology in our field in a way similar to what Yildiz contends about the 
multilingual authors’ attempts to get beyond a monolingual paradigm, while at the same 
time retaining monolingualist assumptions in different forms. The dominant notion of 
multimodality in composition and literacy studies, despite focusing on multimodality, is 
still monomodal in nature. Similarly, the critique of what Raymond Williams calls 
technological determinism often takes, in some sophisticated ways, a form of ideological 
determinism. Critiquing both and expanding the cultural materialist notion of technology, 
this present chapter offers an ecological approach that urges us to avoid abstracting 
composing practices and to pay attention to both the salient and ambient aspects of 
mediation.  
Background to Technological Mediation: McLuhan and Williams 
 Bruno Latour, very similar to Raymond Williams in many ways, divides technical 
mediation into three categories: instrumentalist, materialist, and ideological27. 
Discussions of multimodality and technological mediation in composition display all 
these tendencies in various forms, while also trying to go beyond them. And the roots of 
                                                
27 Both Williams and Latour critique social and materialist determinisms. But they depart in terms of how 
they define technology and how they take determination. Latour does not distinguish between technique 
and technology where as Williams makes a clear distinction, where technique suggests mere material or 
formalistic aspect of technology where as technology represents techniques in their practice, with social 
and cultural values associated with them. While Latour does not distinguish between the two, he does see 
technique not in its materiality alone, but in terms of its relation to the network of mediators in a dynamic 
ecology of human and non-human assembly. 
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such tendencies go at least to the monumental work of Marshall McLuhan and Raymond 
Williams’ critique of McLuhan in the 1950s and 60s. Therefore, before discussing 
dominant notions of multimodality and technological mediation in composition, I will 
provide a brief background that will help us contextualize present discussions and look 
for alternative possibilities for better (of course a matter of contention) understandings of 
technological mediations and issues of multimodality in relation to composition. 
 Marshall McLuhan is similar in some ways to Martin Heidegger in his critique of 
instrumental and humanist theories of technology. Both take technology as a force 
shaping human life in profound ways. While Heidegger calls our attention to the 
“essence” of technology itself rather than how it is used or the ways it contributes 
towards “getting things done”, Marshall McLuhan critiques what he calls the “narcissistic 
hypnosis” and advocates a materialist understanding of technology28:  
In accepting an honorary degree from the University of Notre Dame a few 
years ago, General David Sarnoff made this statement: ‘We are too prone 
to make technological instruments the scapegoats for the sins of those who 
wield them. The products of modern science are not in themselves good or 
bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value.’ That is the 
voice of the current somnambulism. Suppose we were to say , ‘Apple pie 
is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the way it is used that determines 
their value.’ …. Again. ‘Firearms are in themselves neither good nor bad; 
it is the way they are used that determines their value.’ … There is simply 
nothing in the Sarnoff statement that will bear scrutiny, for it ignores the 
nature of the medium, of any and all media, in the true Narcissus style of 
one hypnotized by the amputation and extension of his own being in a new 
technical form…. It has never occurred to General Sarnoff that any 
technology could do anything but add itself on to what we already are. 
(Understanding Media 11) 
                                                
28 As I’ve mentioned in the second chapter, McLuhan’s understanding of materialism is very different from 
a cultural materialist understanding. I will discuss that when discussing Williams’ critique of McLuhan. 
McLuhan was also responding to the theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon and Warren 
Weaver in which the focus is completely on the transfer of information without any noise (of the 
materiality of the medium) in between the sender and receiver of the message. McLuhan, contrarily, 
contends that it’s the medium that determines not only the message, but also the configurations of the 
whole social and individual world.   
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His emphasis on the specific material nature of different technologies or media and their 
effects on the overall social structure and human understanding marks a clear break from 
the tendency of taking technology merely as a tool or instrument for the fulfillment of 
human intentions. In other words, his theory of media charts a new territory for the study 
of communication media and their relation to the organization of social structure and 
human understanding by drawing our attention to the medium or technology itself rather 
than the “message/content” or its relation to human use. While instrumentalist theories do 
not see any meaning in considering the differences in various technologies, McLuhan and 
his followers reverse that understanding and think that it is the specific material nature of 
different technologies that shape social life differently. Therefore, he shifts his focus from 
the instrumentality of technologies/media to their materiality or their specific forms:  
In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things 
as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, 
in operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is 
merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium—
that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is 
introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new 
technology. (Understanding Media 7) 
 
For McLuhan, every new technology has a causal effect at the social and personal level. 
For instance, he talks about a light bulb, which many of us do not think of as a medium 
because it does not seem to have any message. However, McLuhan claims that a light 
bulb changes how we live and how we structure our life around light and darkness. 
Similarly, he contends that mechanical technology and automation create two different 
patterns of human association and work; e.g., automation leads to “depth of involvement 
in their work and human association that our mechanical technology had destroyed” (7) 
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where as mechanical technology created a fragmented world with alienated individuals 
because the “technique of fragmentation … is the essence of machine technology” (8). 
McLuhan also sees how specific media have certain specific effects and 
limitations due to their unique material qualities. For instance, he divides media into 
“cool” and “hot,” which shape our perceptions differently depending on their properties. 
Their coolness or hotness does not have anything to do with human use or the content 
they carry. Rather, they are determined by the level of participation of the 
audience/viewers/readers/users they ostensibly require because of their material 
characteristics:  
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a 
cool one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool 
one like TV. A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in “high 
definition.” High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A 
photograph is, visually, high definition.” A cartoon is “low definition,” 
simply because very little visual information is provided. Telephone is a 
cool medium, or one of low definition, because the ear is given a meager 
amount of information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition, 
because so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener. 
(22) 
 
 Here, hot and cool media are distinguished in terms of how much information an 
audience needs to gather to get a complete picture. He thinks a “cool medium like 
hieroglyphic or ideogrammatic written characters has very different effects from the hot 
and explosive medium of the phonetic alphabet … The printed word with its specialist 
intensity burst the bonds of medieval corporate guilds and monasteries, creating extreme 
individualist patterns of enterprise and monopoly” (23). Thus, McLuhan theorizes 
technologies and media in terms of their internal logic and clear distinctions depending 
on their ostensibly inherent properties. Therefore, he considers technology as a language 
with a distinct grammar of its own. And that grammar and internal logic of new 
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technologies radically shift social structure and human relationships. This goes closer to 
the linguistic determinism in Whorf and the similar technological determinism in Walter 
Ong’s division between literacy and orality.  
 However, McLuhan does acknowledge that every medium contains the traces of 
another medium, e.g., internet containing the features of print. Therefore, he believes, 
quite similar to the later theory of remediation developed by David Bolter and Richard 
Grusin, that every new medium is a remediation of the old one. But, despite his critique 
of instrumentalist and humanist accounts of technology and his focus on the specificity of 
different media and their role in social relations and human understanding, his dismissal 
of social aspects of technology takes him towards technological determinism. And the 
traces of his deterministic thinking can be found in composition and literacy studies, from 
Walter Ong’s distinction between oral and written cultures to Kress’s distinctions 
between different modalities in terms of their inherent properties. McLuhan’s critique of 
the instrumentalist notion of technology, his division of media into different kinds based 
on their material properties, and his materialist formalism provide a good background to 
contextualize and make sense of current theories of technology and modality.  
Raymond Williams’ social theory of technology and his critique of technological 
(McLuhan) and social determinisms (the economism of orthodox Marxism and similar 
tendencies in some later Marxist schools of thought) provide us another way to 
understand and to relate to the dominant understandings of technology and modality in 
composition. Williams, while being positive about the possibilities of technological 
innovations, contends that such developments and their uses are shaped by the social 
relations of the world where they are introduced. In other words, he theorizes technology 
  111 
in terms of the complex relations and interactions between technical developments and 
the priorities and needs of the society, especially those of the powerful groups.  
Williams tends to agree, in his early assessment, with McLuhan’s study of media, 
especially with regard to McLuhan’s attention to specificity: “Much of the initial appeal 
of McLuhan’s work was his apparent attention to the specificity of the media: the 
differences in quality between speech, print, radio, television, and so on” (Television 
127). McLuhan does not lump all “new” technologies or media into one category and 
valorize or condemn them. Williams finds, in his early understanding, McLuhan’s 
attention to specificities of media as a move away from abstraction. Therefore, he 
appreciates him for taking into account unique material limitations and potentials of 
different media forms, which, if taken in their complexities, could have provided us with 
great insights about the complex issue of determination. However, with McLuhan’s 
continual shift towards technicist and formalistic assumptions, Williams, in his later 
works like Television, strongly criticizes McLuhan for erasing all social and historical 
contexts from discussions of technology: 
The work of McLuhan was a particular culmination of an aesthetic theory 
which became, negatively, a social theory […] It is an apparently 
sophisticated technological determinism which has the significant effect of 
indicating a social and cultural determinism […] If the medium—whether 
print or television—is the cause, of all other causes, all that men ordinarily 
see as history is at once reduced to effects. Similarly, what are elsewhere 
seen as effects, and as such subject to social, cultural, psychological and 
moral questioning, are excluded as irrelevant by comparison with the 
direct psychological and therefore ‘psychic’ effects of the media as such. 
The initial formulation—‘the medium is the message’—was a simple 
formalism. The subsequent formulation—‘the medium is the message’—is 
a direct and functioning ideology. (129-30) 
 
Williams, as the above quotation shows, rejects two tendencies in the treatment of 
technology and its relation to society and culture: determinism and formalism. First, he 
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rejects determinist logics, both in terms of the emergence of technologies and in terms of 
their effects.  
In determinist accounts, technological development is taken as an autonomous 
process whereby the inner logic of a particular technology unravels in a predictable, often 
inevitable, fashion and changes the world into which it is born. For instance, the 
discovery of the printing press is seen to have led to the Enlightenment or telegraphy 
leading to the Industrial Revolution or the Internet leading to an information age. One of 
the assumptions of deterministic thought is that “a new technology … ‘emerges’ from 
technical study and experiment. It then changes the society or sector into which it has 
‘emerged.’ ‘We’ adapt to it because it is the new modern way” (Towards 2000 129).  
Such a tendency takes McLuhan’s theory towards formalism as he assumes that 
technology emerges independent of all social and political conditions and needs. 
Williams therefore dismisses materialist formalism in McLuhan in that he “fails to factor 
in the social and historical context (and content) of technological progress” (Banita 99). 
Such accounts ignore how social power and intentions play any role and assume that a 
technology or a series of technological developments impose their own order or pattern 
over the efforts of individuals to use such technologies for specific purposes. On the 
contrary, Williams tries to bring back social context to show how “technologies are called 
into being through the needs and desires of corporations, states, groups, or individuals” 
(Freedman 427). 
It is here very important to see how Williams’s cultural materialist understanding 
of technological practices is different from McLuhan’s in terms of how they use the term 
technology and medium. The difference of Williams’ understanding of technology from 
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McLuhan’s formalist understanding can be seen in McLuhan’s conflation of medium 
(technical innovation, technique, or skills) with technology and Williams’ clear 
distinction between the two. As McLuhan isolates technology from its connection with 
social values and usage by concentrating on its formal characteristics, he does not see any 
reason to distinguish technology as skills or tool from its realization in its use in specific 
socio-material contexts. On the contrary, Williams describes the latter as “first, the body 
of knowledge appropriate to the development of such skills and applications and, second, 
a body of knowledge and conditions for the practical use and application of a range of 
devices” (Williams Towards 2000, 227). He is more interested in how a technical 
invention becomes an “available technology” rather than McLuhan’s version of a 
technique unraveling along its own internal logic. In other words, for Williams, 
technology is a relationship; it is “necessarily in complex and variable connection with 
other social relations and institutions” (qtd. in Freedman 429). He sees technology as the 
mediation between technique/medium/technical inventions and general social institutions. 
Despite his focus on social aspect of technology, he also equally critiques 
sociological determinism of all kinds, including orthodox Marxism and the Frankfurt 
school view of technology/mass media as a form of mass deception. These theorists see 
technologies merely as tools for the dominant class to exploit the masses and the 
audience/users as cultural dupes. Williams calls this tendency of abstracting technology 
from practice a symptomatic view of technology:  
The second class of opinion appears less determinist. Television, like any 
other technology, becomes available as an element or a medium in a 
process of change that is in any case occurring or about to occur. By 
contrast with pure technological determinism, this view emphasizes other 
causal factors in social change. It then considers particular technologies, or 
a complex of technologies, as symptoms of change of some other kind. 
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Any particular technology is then as it were a by-product of a social 
process that is otherwise determined. It only acquires effective status when 
it is used for purposes which are already contained in this known social 
process. (Television 13) 
 
In this view, technological developments are just symptoms of other social or economic 
changes. In technological determinism, technological innovations are the sole agents 
where as in sociological determinism, technologies are mere by-products of some other 
changes and have no agency of their own. For instance, this sociological argument would 
believe that if certain technologies were not invented, e.g., the internet, neo-liberal 
capitalism would have found some other means to maintain its control over large portions 
of the population. In other words, what technologies are used and who uses them do not 
matter much compared to the role of ideologies and economic/social structures.  
 Williams does acknowledge that both these positions, sociological and 
technological determinisms, make some important points. But both sides are equally 
hugely problematic because they, “though in different ways, [have] abstracted technology 
from society” (13). They view it “either [as] a self-acting force which creates new ways 
of life, or …[as] a self-acting force which provides materials for new ways of life” (13). 
Williams walks a fine line between these two extremes. His approach differs from  
technological determinism in that it would restore intention to the process 
of research and development. The technology would be seen, that is to 
say, as being looked for and developed with certain purposes and practices 
already in mind. At the same time the interpretation would differ from 
symptomatic technology in that these purposes and practices would be 
seen as direct; as known social needs, purposes and practices to which the 
technology is not marginal but central. (Italics in the original; Williams, 
Television 14)  
 
In Williams’ account, the developments and effects of technologies are not independent 
of social needs and purposes and those needs often reflect the interests of the dominant 
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groups and institutions in a society. As his study of the development of broadcast 
television shows, he locates causality within “known social needs” arising within broader 
social relations of production, social institutions, and the reproduction of a specific social 
order. However, he does see reciprocal relations between social needs and the potentials 
of the technological uses: “Williams’ model of technological development appears to 
suggest that innovation is contingent on periods of social change—he writes that new 
systems of communication like photography, cinema and broadcasting were ‘incentives 
and responses within a phase of general social transformation’” (Freedman 430). This 
shows that Williams does not completely discard a Marxist theory of determination. 
His general theory of determination as the “setting of limits and the exertion of 
pressures” was designed to counter what he saw as the essentialism of the vulgar Marxist 
model of base and superstructure, but keeping the important role of broader economic 
and social relations. That is why he thinks that television and radio “were the applied 
technology of a set of emphases and responses within the determining limits and 
pressures of industrial capitalist society” (27). In other words, the development of a 
particular technology is bound up with profound social changes that, in turn, would be 
affected by the performance of that technology. However, he at the same time thinks that 
there is always a moment of choice. That there is no pre-determined form or function to 
communication technologies. Eventual outcome depends on the selections and 
preferences of human actors, but definitely within the limits and pressures provided by 
existing economic and political systems. While he does believe that the choices of the 
most powerful groups in society determine the shape and the pattern of the uses of 
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technologies, he does see some possibility for individuals to put technologies to 
alternative uses.   
 In short, Williams believed that technologies were developed to fulfill social 
needs whereas social needs and purposes were transformed by the uses and further 
developments of technologies. In other words, in insisting on the social nature of 
technologies, he shows a dialectical relationship between the social and economic 
contexts and the effects of technologies on societies. His approach also points out the 
contingent nature of technological development, while also acknowledging how such a 
development largely reflects the interests of the hegemonic groups.  
Williams’ reading shows the difficulty of walking a fine line between 
technological and sociological determinism. His redefinition of determination as limits 
and pressures posed by the existing economic and social structures and his focus on the 
reciprocal influence of social needs and the impact of the uses of technologies goes closer 
to Bruno Latour’s new materialist approach to technical mediation where he replaces 
determination with translation. Therefore, Latour’s new materialism, which he calls a 
sociology of translation/associations, is an attempt to avoid social and materialist 
determinisms by taking into account agentive roles of not only humans and ideologies, 
but also that of non-human agents like technologies and other material artifacts. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, while not discounting the role of macro forces like ideologies, 
economic structures, culture, etc., he at the same time sees them not as homogeneous 
systems, but as an amalgam of a multitude of participants contributing to the durability or 
change of the existing system. In that sense, technologies are neither the sole determiners 
nor mere tools. They cannot be thought of as having fixed effects or meanings as their 
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meanings are the functions of a host of (f)actors working in complex relations with each 
other in varying situations. In all their complexities, Williams’ critique of determinist 
thought and Latour’s notion of translation help us better understand the issue of modality 
and technology in writing.  
Mediation and Modality in Composition: Materialist and (Post)Critical Perspectives 
The discussion of the relationship between technology, multimodality, and 
composition began to appear increasingly since the late 1980s and early 90s, with a 
proliferation of works in this area after the turn of the century. The primary focus of this 
scholarship has been the idea that “new” technologies (new media) have completely 
changed the nature of writing and therefore, composition should shift its attention from 
the teaching of writing as a monomodal practice to multimodal composition/visual 
literacy/new genres of writing. Multimodal scholars challenge the dominance of the 
monomodal nature of writing and communication. Gunther Kress, Cynthia Selfe, Anne 
Wysocki, Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis, and several others have shown us how dismissal 
of modes other than print writing is problematic as it excludes the potentials of meaning 
making using a whole range of available modes. However, even in our discussions of 
multimodality, we still tend to follow the logic of monomodality in some form, especially 
due to the tendency of reifying the notion of mode. Similarly, our discussion of 
technology, whether it is in terms of the uses of modes or media, whether talking about 
the technologies of speaking and writing, or in terms of the affordances of digital 
technologies like Facebook, Twitter, or Flicker, tends to either focus on the affordances 
based on the material/formal properties of those technologies or in terms of larger social 
forces like ideology, culture, or society. Both these tendencies show us the difficulty of 
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working against the paradigms from within those paradigms themselves. In other words, 
whether it is from what Latour calls materialist or critical perspectives, we tend to 
abstract technologies from the complex web of relations and meanings, thereby leaving 
dominant assumptions unchallenged. In what follows, I discuss the residual materialist 
tendencies in the discussion of multimodality in composition and literacy studies on the 
one hand and the reifying of multimodal practices by reducing technologies to mere 
symptoms of the dominant ideologies on the other. 
There have been different kinds of arguments about the need to address the effects 
of diverse forms of digital technologies in writing practices. The two major tendencies 
that appear in different forms, sometimes overlapping each other or expressed in 
combined forms, often critiquing the instrumentalist notion, are materialist and critical. 
While being very different from each other, especially in terms of the need for promoting 
multimodality and the use of digital technologies for teaching learning practices, they do 
share one fundamental problem: that is, abstracting the notion of technology and 
modality from practices and assigning a fixed value or meaning to them. Despite the 
critique of the dominance of monomodal ideology, many multimodal theorists leave 
unchallenged existing notion of specific modes, especially in advocating additive models 
of multimodality. What Selber calls a postcritical approach goes beyond the critical 
approach’s complete dismissal of the issue of technologies and modalities in composition 
and urges us to use technology and deal with it, but with critical reflection.  
 The questions we should begin with are how do we define modality or mode?  
How do we assign certain values to certain modes? Do modes and technologies have 
specific properties and functions/effects? What mode is writing? Is it a single mode or is 
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it always already multimodal? Why do we see or value only one modal aspect of what we 
call writing? The answers to these questions will determine how we think of 
multimodality as an alternative to writing or any other assumed modes like speech, 
moving images, still images, audio, etc.   
Materialist Approach 
The materialist approach to multimodality shows some remnants of the theory of 
technology I discussed in relation to Marshall McLuhan. Whether it is in the notion of 
multiliteracies in  the New London Group article or in Kress’s notion of multimodality, 
literacies and modalities are often taken as separate and fixed, with some inherent 
properties of their own. And those material properties are often associated with fixed 
functions. Here, I’ll focus specifically on Gunther Kress’s theory of multimodality, 
especially because that notion has remained perhaps the most influential in the treatment 
of modality in composition.  
 Gunther Kress calls our attention to the effects of new media, especially the 
significance of visual representations, and the need to address the challenges and 
opportunities brought about by the shift in communication landscapes. He contends that 
“the semiotic changes are vast enough to warrant the term ‘revolution’, of two kinds: of 
the modes of representation on the one hand, from the centrality of writing to the 
increasing significance of image; and of the media of dissemination on the other, from 
the centrality of the medium of the book to the medium of the screen” (“Gains and 
Losses” 6). This is similar to what Kathleen Blake Yancey says about the transformations 
brought about by new media: “Literacy today is in the midst of a tectonic change” 
(“Made Not Only with Words” 298). Such claims about “revolution”, “tectonic change” 
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etc. abound in the literature on the relationship between literacy and technology, in some 
way echoing McLuhan’s claim about the effects of new technologies on every aspect of 
social and personal life. The changes in the semiotic practices they demonstrate are of 
course real and significant. But it is also equally important to interrogate the implications 
of such claims of “newness” and “revolution.” The risk of such claims is to ignore not 
only the intersections and overlap between the “new” and the “old,” but also to limit them 
to fixed and definite meanings. In other words, we need to be wary about, as Anne 
Wysocki and Paul Prior remind us, limiting or constraining the roles and meanings of 
technologies and modalities to certain fixed functions, which has led many in 
composition to forward an additive model of multimodality. Gunther Kress’s theory of 
multimodality reflects that tendency. 
Kress has developed a sophisticated theory of multimodality and the affordances 
of various modes. The major tenet of his theory, as he claims, is an attempt to go away 
from the traditional tendency of abstraction in linguistic representations and advocate 
image-based representations for their clarity and transparency: “In an attempt to gain new 
insight into possibilities for representing, multimodal descriptions—and multimodal 
semiotics in particular—have turned away from the enchantment of linguistics with 
abstraction that had dominated the 20th century…. By contrast, the emphasis in 
multimodal work is very much on the materiality of the resources for representation” 
(“Gains and Losses” 12). He thus contrasts his social semiotic theory of multimodality 
with structuralist theories of linguistics where the focus is more on competence than on 
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performance, more on the abstracted conventions than on actual practices29. A 
multimodal approach, on the other hand, as he claims, emphasizes the specificity of the 
material nature of different modes of communication/representation: 
Central assumptions of multimodal approach to representation and 
communication are (a) that communication is always and inevitably 
multimodal; and (b) that each of the modes available for representation in 
a culture provides specific potentials and limitations for communication 
…. The first assumption requires us to attend to all modes that are active 
in an instance of communication; the second requires us to attend to the 
specific meanings carried by the different modes in communicational 
ensembles…. (“Gains and Losses” 5) 
 
His emphasis on the multimodal nature of every communication and his focus on the 
specific materialities of the modes of communication do help us see the potentials and 
limitations of communicative practices. But, at the same time, his highly generalized 
notion of culture and society and his materialist or “modalist” approach to 
communication make him fall victim to another form of abstraction: abstracting the 
notion of the social and that of technology and modalities from practices (Lillis, 
Sociolinguistics of Writing 21). In particular, Kress’s notion of affordances of various 
semiotic modes and his association of materialities with fixed affordances pushes his 
theory towards what Lillis calls a modalist approach or what Brian Street calls the  
“autonomous model of multimodality” (32).  
Kress theorizes new media and the potential transformation of the shift from the 
old forms of modes and media to the new ones in term of the materialities and 
affordances that new modes and media have. Kress’s major point is that different modes 
have their distinct materialities with vastly different affordances. He contends: 
                                                
29 It is true that Chomskian grammar and structuralist theories ignore practices and promote abstraction 
(convention, structure, rules, grammar). However, despite Kress’s emphasis on specificity, he does not 
focus on practices. 
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One of the present tasks of a social semiotic approach to multimodality is 
to describe the potentials and limitations for meaning which inhere [italics 
mine] in different modes. For that, it is essential to consider the materiality 
of modes. Speech uses the material of (human) sound; writing uses the 
material of graphic substance. There are things you can do with sound that 
you cannot do with graphic substance, either easily or at all; not even 
imitate all that successfully graphically.  (“Reading Images” 112) 
 
In other words, what he says is that writing and image have their own unique affordances 
based on their materialities, however, by reducing the speech act to sound (for example, 
ignoring the role of gesture and facial expression), and of writing to only “graphic 
substance,” ignoring the full material process of writing. Therefore, it is necessary for us 
to think about what specific goals or functions these different modes can accomplish.  
 The primary difference, according to Kress, between speech and writing is that 
the former uses “sound” where as the latter uses “words.” However, both of these 
traditional modes have some fundamental similarities: that they happen in time, “one 
sound, one word, one sentence follows another. The logic of temporal sequence is the 
major principle of ordering of languages such as English” (“Reading Images”112). And 
this affordance of writing/speech, the organization through temporal sequence, often 
implies causality. So, traditional writing or speech makes us understand reality in terms 
of events and actions occurring in a certain temporal order. But visual representation, as it 
uses image in place of words, offers a distinct way of understanding. Kress says that 
image works by the logic of simultaneity rather than by that of temporal order:  
The logic of space works differently: In the message entity (the image), all 
elements are simultaneously present—even though they were, of course, 
in many forms of image—in drawing or in painting, though not in 
photography—placed there in time and even though the viewer traverses 
the image-elements in time. So, it is the viewer’s action that orders the 
simultaneous present elements in relation to her or his interest. In spatially 
organized representation, the elements that are chosen for representation 
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are simultaneously present, and it is their spatial arrangement that is used 
to make (one kind of) meaning. (“Reading Images”13).  
 
So, in visual representation, the affordances of the spatial are used, for instance, color, 
size, placement, and composition. In contrast to the dominance of narratives in 
writing/speech, the new culture of the visuals is dominated by the logic of “display” 
(Kress, “Gains and Losses” 14). In image-dominated representation, the most important 
factors are the simultaneous positions (salience) and the relations between those things in 
different positions.  
 For Kress, another important aspect of the difference between writing and image-
based representation is that “words are highly conventionalized entities, and only exist in 
that manner” whereas images are open. Therefore, Kress believes that words are “always 
general and, therefore, vague,” often empty of meaning, whereas images have “infinitely 
large potential of depictions—precise, specific, and full of meaning” (“Gains and Losses” 
15). He further contends: “The former [words] tends to occur in the fixed order of syntax, 
line, page, text; the latter tend to occur in an open order fixed by the reader and/or 
viewer’s interest. This leads to the paradox of speech and writing as having a finite 
number of open, relatively vague elements in fixed order, and image or depiction having 
a possibility of infinitely many full, specific elements in an open order. (“Gains and 
Losses” (16). In these ways, writing and visual representations have distinct meaning 
potentials and different ways of representing the world, one focusing on causality and 
order and the other focusing on space and relations, often leading to very different 
understandings of the world.  
 Kress’s theory of affordances is very useful to think about what functions 
different texts can perform and how we can make better choices about representation and 
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construction of meaning. In this context, we need also to acknowledge, as Kress calls for, 
the ubiquitous nature of multimodality and rethink writing and representation in terms of 
the affordances of different modes used in them. However, there are a few problems in 
Kress’s theorization of these different forms of representation in terms of their 
affordances. The major problem with Kress is that he operates through binary logic. As 
Paul Prior says, “he proposes a series of strong binaries of mutually exclusive 
affordances—each of which is associated with a particular mode” (24). While Kress 
views affordances as properties of the specific modes, determined by culture and 
history30, fixed and stable, many others believe that it is relational and emergent. James 
Gibson, while defining affordance originally, cautioned us that it was meant to “imply the 
complementarity of the animal and the environment” (127). Gibson also highlights, as 
Prior’s analysis shows, the “fuzziness of categories, noting that objects such as hammers 
may afford—with relative ease or difficulty—a great many kinds of action. Kress, on the 
other hand, proposes a set of hard binary dictions between words and images. Words in 
his account are finite, sequential, vague, conventional, authored, narrative and/or causal, 
and open to critique. Images are infinite, spatial, specific, natural and transparent, viewed, 
and available only for design” (26). The point here is that Kress takes images and words 
as mutually exclusive and assumes that affordances are the properties of the modes 
(environment in the theory of ecological psychologists), and in so doing, neglects the idea 
that it is relative, relative to the user, context of use, and the practices of which it is a part. 
With a slight revision to Gibson’s original definition, later psychologists such as A. 
Chemero and T. Stoffregen regard affordances as an “emergent” quality (Stofferegen 
124). This is how Chemero defines it: “I argue that affordances are not properties of the 
                                                
30 He mentions that only in mantra-like fashion and then goes on to describe modes in materialist way.  
  125 
environment; indeed, they are not even properties. Affordances, I argue, are relations 
between particular aspects of animals and particular aspects of situations” (184). He 
further says that “affordances are features of the whole situation” (185).  
 Here, the point that I’m trying to highlight is that affordances are not the inherent 
properties of an object or the environment. First, an affordance is relative to the perceiver 
and the practices of the perceiver in an act of perceiving. Second, it depends on the whole 
situation, where it includes not only the object (mode, medium, etc.) and the perceiver 
(readers/viewers), but also the overall situation where the action or the perception takes 
place. From this point of view, affordances of images or words depend not only on the 
material features of them, but also on the relations of them with other objects/things 
around them and the viewer/reader. As it is relative to the audience/readers/viewers, the 
affordance of something can be quite different at various situations. Just think about a 
book. Yes, it is in general to be read, often in a sequential order. But it can be used as a 
weapon, as a pillow, a support while leaning on a wall, as a form of office or home 
decoration, or as I remember from my childhood days, a thing to be exchanged for 
chatpate31 or ice-cream bar. Even when it is read, how it is read often depends on the 
disposition of the reader that has been developed through the sedimentation of his/her 
reading and writing practices, which, though, are likely to be diverse and fluid, even for 
individuals. We might read newspapers differently than academic journals, but 
sometimes we read each of these differently. Perhaps, this is why we often have the habit 
of reading images not only in spatial terms but also in sequence. And at the same time 
there are many images which are basically “sequential” in nature (Prior 27), for instance 
                                                
31 A kind of spicy snack that consists of bhuja, boiled potato, lemon juice, red chillies, and some spices. We 
used to exchange pages of books or notebooks for chatpate and the seller would use those pages as 
containers for selling chatpate. 
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“film…, print comics and process diagrams” (27).  Even if Kress makes a binary between 
images and words by making one “free and open-ended” and also “full of meaning” and 
“always specific” and the other always “vague” and “general,” we can find even the 
images being highly bound by long traditions and conventions on the one hand and the 
communicative practices of the users:  
In fact, to accept Kress’ argument that images are inherently filled with 
precise meaning would require that we ignore most practice in visual arts 
and design…. Rather than accept the binary model that Kress proposes, 
particular the notion of visual precision, we propose a third way. We 
believe that images simultaneously occupy both nodes, and that this is, in 
fact, their great power. Symbolic images have the capacity to 
simultaneously be precise and ambiguous. What is represented may be 
specific, but meaning requires interpretation. Images merge visual 
conventions with individual vocabularies; they fuse public discourse with 
personal subjectivities. (McDonagh, Goggin, and Squier 85)  
 
  McDonagh, Goggin, and Squier show how fixing function with form is very 
problematic and how detaching technologies from their use gives a false notion of their 
affordances.  
The binary logic also works in terms of Kress’s division between the medium of 
screen and that of print. He thinks of writing on a page and depiction on screen, words 
and images as operating by completely distinct logics. He ignores the fact that traditional 
modes of organization of meaning through words on pages affect how images and texts 
are organized and understood on screen. As Manovich says, the medium of screen, in 
many ways, follows the logic of the organization of text in books (66). In many respects, 
as Cope and Kalantzis also say, many of the texts in traditional mode could have been 
read in nonlinear ways, for instance, newspapers, magazines, dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
cook books, restaurant menus and so on. It would perhaps be better to see how these 
different modes have been affecting each other and producing in many case hybrid texts. 
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As P. Prior says, citing Bolter and Grusin, “computer screens borrow from texts and 
pages and texts borrow from computer screens,” in other words, “where Kress sees a one-
way sequence of unique semiotic objects, Bolter and Grusin see blurred, complex, and 
mutual relations” (26). 
Finally, Kress does say that modes are the “culturally and socially produced 
resources for representation” (“Gains and Losses” 7). He further claims,  
The same is true for the ‘grammar of visual design.’ Like linguistic 
structures, visual structures point to particular interpretations of 
experience and forms of social interaction …. Meanings belong to culture, 
rather than to specific semiotic modes. And the way meanings are mapped 
across different semiotic modes, the way some things can, for instance, be 
said either visually or verbally, other only visually, again others only 
verbally, is also culturally and historically specific” (Grammar of Visual 
Design 2).  
 
The above quotation demonstrates that Kress (and Leeuwen) clearly connects modes and 
their meanings with culture and society. But when he does so, first, he sees the 
relationship between culture and modes or technologies as unidirectional, culture 
determining meanings of modes. Second, he views cultures as stable, homogeneous 
things though they do acknowledge that semiotic practices and their meanings in different 
cultures are different. That is why he claims that the grammar of visual design he, in 
collaboration with Van Leeuwen, develop applies to the Western culture. Therefore, his 
argument goes like, different cultures shape modes differently and that is why, he claims 
that a universal grammar of visual design cannot be developed. But , he claims, in the 
West, visuals and organization follow a certain grammar. Thus, he treats “the West” as a 
stable and internally uniform culture despite the evidences that show the contrary (see 
Appadurai). This at best mistakes what might be dominant practices and meanings for 
specific modes at a given time for the full range of these and their vulnerability to 
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change. Therefore, his social semiotic theory reflects the tendency of what Latour calls 
the “sociology of the social” (“Reassembling 9) or what Williams would call social 
determinism, as much as his discussion of affordances shows his theory to be closer to 
the autonomous model of multimodality. His logic of separateness and fixity of modal 
affordances and his conception of multimodality as a collection of various distinct modes 
make his theory similar to an additive model of multilingualism.  
Similar to McLuhan’s division between hot and cold media or Walter J Ong’s 
division between technologies of writing and orality, Gunther Kress’s division between 
speech and writing; book (print) and screen; or linguistics and multimodal representations 
in terms of their formal properties and specific functions or potentials places him closer 
to materialist determinism. However, he is also different from them in acknowledging the 
role of cultural and social contexts in the understanding of different modes. At the same 
time, his treatment of the social, similar to what Latour calls sociology of the social1, is 
itself also abstracted. Therefore, Kress displays the traces of both materialist and 
sociological determinisms though the former one is more pronounced. Overcoming these 
two problems, we should explore how other modal aspects have been silenced. Similarly, 
while it is true that materiality does matter, it does not necessarily determine its potential 
uses.  
(Post)Critical Approach to Technology and Modality 
I here need to make a distinction between what Stuart Selber calls critical and 
postcritical approaches. Critical theorists and scholars not only question instrumental 
views of technology but also completely dismiss technology as an important issue for 
discussion in writing classes. They take technologies merely as cultural or ideological 
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tools. Their dismissal of technology is understandable in the context of the dominance of 
instrumentalist views of technology in the academy and outside. But in their dismissal, 
they also uphold another determinist view, i.e., ideological determinism. Unlike 
materialist theorists like Kress and Van Leeuwen, whose focus was largely on developing 
a grammar of multimodal representations based on the unique affordances of specific 
modes and technologies for understanding the increasingly visual nature of 
communication, critical theorists’ major focus is on exposing the “prevailing myths” 
about computers and the pervasively present uncritical celebration of the democratic 
potentials of digital technologies (Selber 4). Their major purpose is to debunk 
instrumentalist views of technology. Postcritical theorists do share with critical theorists a 
critique of the ideological nature of technology and interface designs. But they focus on 
cautious and reflective use of technologies and available multimodal resources for the 
benefits of teachers and students. However, they also retain one major problem, that is, 
taking ideologies as largely stable. Besides, despite their major focus on critiquing 
ideological aspects of technologies, they also retain some materialist traits like Kress and 
others.  
First, a major target of postcritical theory is the instrumental view where any kind 
or form of technology is taken as an instrument to accomplish certain goals. As Hawisher 
and Selfe, and Selfe and Selfe say, such a perspective, while eulogizing the “deomcratic” 
potential of technology, ignores how it is embedded in social and ideological belief 
systems and can have the potential also to perpetuate oppresive beliefs (Selfe and Selfe 
63). As Stuart Selber claims, the dominant tendency in the academy has been completely 
instrumentalist, ignoring its human aspects: “Althogh institutions are investing in 
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technology infrastructure and support at an astonishing rate—so astonishing, in fact, that 
it is futile to cite growth statistics, which increase dramatically from year to year—these 
investments are often driven by logics that fail to make humanistic perspectives a central 
concern” (1).  
Multimodal theorists like Cynthia Selfe, Gail Hawisher, Richard Selfe, Bill Cope 
and Mary Kalantzis, along with many others, have also emphasized the need to shift our 
attention from a singular focus on print literacy to multimodal literacy. Most of them do 
critique instrumentalist views of technology. In doing so, they do point to the humanistic 
and social aspects of technology. Selfe and Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe, in “Rhetoric 
of Technology” and “The Politics of the Interface,” as in many other articles, have 
cautioned us about the potential consequences of uncritically eulogizing the democratic 
nature of digital technologies if we do not pay proper attention to the ideological 
influence of dominant culture on technology design.  
 Hawisher and Selfe critique a pervasive tendency that they call a “rhetoric of 
technology,” meaning the trend to “foreground positive benefits” of using computers 
“without acknowledging possible negative influences as well” (58). Selfe and Selfe also 
claim that the uncritical use of technology can perpetuate and support “monoculturalism, 
capitalism, and pathologic thinking” (486). In their discussion of technology, Selfe and 
Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe take technologies as “cultural artifacts embodying 
society’s values” (“Rhetoric of Technology” 55). In this way, like many other scholars in 
new media studies, such as Stuart Selber and Adam Banks, Selfe and Selfe caution us 
about the potential dangers of using technology in our classrooms without situating it in 
broader socio-political contexts.  
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 Similar to Selfe and Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe, Christina Haas, in her book 
Writing Technology and many other articles, also critiques instrumentalist and 
deterministic views of technology. She contends: “such an instrumentalist view sees 
technology as merely a tool—a natural and transparent means to produce written 
language, which is somehow imagined to exist independent of that means. The last 
decade of work in cultural studies of scientific and other discourses suggests that 
writing—also a technology—is not transparent, that it carries beliefs and value systems 
within it…. An instrumentalist view of technology carries with it all the dangers of an 
autonomous theory of language” (21). Haas equates autonomous/apolitical views of 
language with instrumentalist views of technology. 
 The problems of instrumentalist and materialist views of technology raised by 
critical literacy theorists are very real and significant. That taking technology merely as a 
neutral tool that in itself can liberate us can, as Cynthia Selfe says, “actually contribute to 
the ongoing problems of racism, sexism, poverty, and illiteracy” (referenced in Selber 
12). And at the same time, the issue of access to up to date technologies and reliable 
social and pedagogical support for the disadvantaged population, as Stuart Selber, 
Cynthia Selfe, and several others have said, is of vital importance, which often is 
overlooked by the instrumentalist view of technology. Similarly, technologies do have 
potentials to perpetuate dominant cultural values, thereby silencing other voices. 
However, it can be problematic to think of technology merely as cultural tools.  
 To question and go beyond instrumentalist views of technology, these cultural 
critics of technology often emphasize the role of a “critical perspective” or “critical 
reflection” (see Hawisher and Selfe, and Selfe and Selfe) or “metacognition” (see Cope 
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and Kalantzis) in order to demystify the ideological nature of computer interfaces and 
technological designs. These are very important aspects of mediation that we need to pay 
attention to as our awareness and material conditions do partially shape how technology 
operates and what roles its users/producers can play. However, we also need to equally 
see how, despite ideological designs and unequal distributions, technology in its use may 
lead to many unintended consequences and how users can improvise and accomplish 
certain functions unthought-of by the designers of technologies. In other words, we need 
to take technology as agent, or not merely as tools to accomplish a priorily determined 
goals, but having potentials to change or transform those goals. Similarly, we need to 
take users not merely as pawns in the hands of dominant ideology, but as both being 
shaped by and also shaping those ideological values in their work as improvisers.  
In other words, while analyzing uses of technologies, whether it is writing, a black 
board, a cell phone, or Facebook, we should be prepared to see beyond users, ideologies, 
and these technologies as mere neutral tools or cultural artifacts. Yes, their meanings and 
potentials are largely limited by dominant ideologies and the critical reflection of users, 
but it will be a mistake if we take them only in terms of how the dominant ideologies or 
discourses (or power) would want us to see in them. First, ideologies are not mysterious 
forces; they operate through, as Latour believes, observable materials (obvious and not so 
obvious), human and non-human. As Latour claims, “It is so important to maintain that 
power, like society, is the final result of a process and not a reservoir, a stock, or a capital 
that will automatically provide an explanation. Power and domination have to be 
produced, made up, composed” (64). And when power or ideology works through 
mediators, networks of technologies and human agents, it gets transformed in turn.  
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Hence, technologies, non-human aspects of mediation, do not simply carry and 
transfer dominant ideological values to the users. Not only that users work in different 
social contexts, but technologies also have other various dimensions (excess) that modify 
the intended meanings or messages. Therefore, when technologies go into the hands of 
users, based on the participation of users in a variety of networks of practices, both 
linguistic and others, some potentials of technologies unthought of and unrecognized 
become revealed. Just think about writing as a technology and how English writing from 
the British Empire was thought to create “civilized” middle men for them to be able to 
understand and control the colonized. That was one of the reasons why English literature 
was taught, especially to inculcate Western values. But, as Homi K. Bhabha says, even 
imitation/reiteration of those values produced mimicry, which actually transforms those 
values rather than creating passive followers. Many people did try to imitate Western 
style, e.g., wearing ties and suit, but, however, with other attire like a locally made cap 
(“topi”). Think how the meaning and value of a “tie” would change when it is used by a 
student in a local school in India or Bangladesh, coupled with indigenous dresses. It 
might perhaps show the economic status of his/her family, their knowledge of Western 
culture, etc. But, it also assumes several other meanings. The act of reiteration, using the 
tie, but in a different context, while being similar in the practice of wearing the tie in 
English culture, changes its meaning. That student can use the tie as a replacement for 
handkerchief to wipe his/her face or to clear his or her nose. It can sometimes potentially 
work as a way of resistance, knowingly or unknowingly.  
 An important aspect of a critical approach to technology is to see how US culture 
in general and teaching of composition (English) in particular has been dominated by 
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monomodal ideology. Similar to the multilingual/translingual approach’s call for paying 
attention to linguistic practices other than English, most of the multimodal theorists often 
argue for bringing back to focus modes silenced and delegitimized by the dominant 
ideology. US composition’s promotion of writing at the cost of other modes displays a 
deeply-seated belief that, as literacy theorists like Shirley Brice Heath have shown, 
privileges the literacies practiced by the dominant group.  
Diana George critiques the tendency in composition to relegate visuals to low 
status. Even when they were incorporated, she argues, they were merely taken as a 
“prompt for writing” (18). She urges us to incorporate visuals in composition teaching, 
not only as objects of analysis, but also as a part of the design process. In her class, she 
had her students compose arguments through the uses of images/visuals. She draws on 
the notion of design from the New London Group, similar to Kress’s claim about design 
in relation to new media, and contends that design, rather than analysis/critique, should 
be the focus of composition. Furthermore, critiquing Anthony Blair’s dismissal of visuals 
for their inability to make an argument, George claims that visuals can and do argue:  
“Visual arguments make a claim or ascertain and attempt to sway an audience by offering 
reasons to accept that claim” (29). She also claims that “students have a much richer 
imagination for how visuals might enter composition than our composition journals have 
yet to address” (28).  
Diana George’s emphasis on incorporating visuals and challenging the dominant 
ideology of monomodality comes in the line of The New London Group (NLG). The 
NLG’s influential piece “A Pedagogy of Multiliteracies,” as the group claims, develops a 
new approach to literacy pedagogy addressing the emerging globalized situation: 
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“Literacy pedagogy has traditionally meant teaching and learning to read and write in 
page-bound, official, standard forms of the national language, literacy pedagogy, in other 
words, has been a carefully restricted project—restricted to formalized, monolingual, 
monocultural, and rule-governed forms of language” (60-61).  
The NLG, like critical literacy theorists such as Brian Street and Shirley Brice 
Heath, do see literacy as deeply embedded in the politics of power and ideologies. 
However, the lack of attention to modes other than print or alphabetic literacy in the early 
critical literacy theorists made them come forward with their idea of multiliteracies. The 
theory of multiliteracies differs from literacy as social practice in at least two ways: “The 
first argument engages with the multiplicity of communications channels and media; the 
second with the increasing salience of cultural and linguistic diversity” (Cope & 
Kalantzis 5). In other words, as Cope and Kalantzis state, this theory “focuses on modes 
of representation much broader than language alone” (5) and makes its central focus 
multimodality:  
We argue that literacy pedagogy now must account for the burgeoning 
variety of text forms associated with information and multimedia 
technologies. This includes understanding and competent control of 
representational forms that are becoming increasingly significant in the 
overall communications environment, such as visual design in desktop 
publishing or the interface of visual and linguistic meaning in multimedia. 
(NLG 61)  
 
That means literacy should be expanded to more than words. Cynthia Selfe also 
emphasizes the need to pay critical attention and allow multiple modes for composing 
practices. Selfe, in her “Aurality and Multimodality” and “Students Who Teach Us,” is 
very much concerned about the potential of the existing monomodal focus in composition 
teaching to exclude socially, ethnically, and linguistically marginalized student 
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populations. She argues that we should empower such students by recognizing their 
multimodal literacy competencies often ignored by our singular focus on print 
literacy/writing.   
For instance, in “Aurality and Multimodality,” she insists that “sound, although it 
remains of central importance both to students and to the population at large, is often 
undervalued as a compositional mode,” (617) and that, “the history of writing in US 
composition instruction … functions to limit our professional understanding of 
composing as a multimodal rhetorical activity and deprive students of valuable semiotic 
resources for making meaning” (617). Selfe argues that such a tendency puts many 
marginalized communities, such as American Indians, African Americans and 
Hispanic/Latino Americans at a disadvantage by not recognizing the long history of their 
use of aurality as a compositional mode for preserving their stories and working towards 
resistance towards racial and ethnic oppressions. Similarly, in “Students Who Teach Us,” 
Selfe urges composition teachers to appreciate literacy experiences and competencies 
students bring with them, especially their new media literacies, and use new media 
technologies “systematically in their classrooms to teach about new literacies” (45). She 
gives an example of an African American student, David John Damon, who had 
developed great competencies in digital literacies, but failed in his composition course, 
and eventually had to drop out:  
Although his computer skills had improved by leaps and bounds, his skills 
in communicating in Standard English remained seriously 
underdeveloped—and his teachers in the English Department were very 
concerned about his ability to organize to write sentences that were 
grammatically correct according to conventional standards, and his 
problems with development and logical argumentation. (50) 
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This is a great example of not only how failure on the part of the teachers and the system 
as a whole to recognize the literacies that students have developed and are comparable to 
those legitimized by the academy ruins the lives of many historically underprivileged 
students, but also how false notions of language can block many from attaining higher 
education.  
Selfe is not making an either/or argument about writing and aurality or writing 
and new media literacies. Rather, she urges composition teachers to “encourage students 
to deploy multiple modalities in skillful ways—written, aural, visual” and to “respect” 
and understand “various roles each modality can play in human expression” (“Aurality” 
625). This is an ongoing problem not only in the US, but also all around the world.  
 The critical/cultural theorists’ critique of the binaries between writing and other 
modes (aurality, visual, etc.) is of paramount importance both to do justice to students 
who tend to struggle in mainstream literacy practices and to enrich the literacy 
experiences of other students and teachers. I agree that it is important to expand 
composition to a range of modes of composition, valuing modes like aurality and 
visuality that have historically been sidelined due to various social and ideological 
reasons. And it is true that such extension might offer greater potentials for meaning 
making for our students. However, I also think that we need to be careful in making such 
an argument not to actually validate dominant and ideological versions of composition, 
rather than looking at practices and problematizing such ideological versions. 
First, when we see composition and communication practices, we find that 
modalities are not discrete entities. Here, my own experience making a website for the 
first time for a visual communication course will, I believe, show how a numerical or 
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additive model of modality and materialist/formalist notion of remediation can be 
problematic. The assignment was a very common one in a visual communication 
(multimodal composition) class. We were required to choose a topic and make an 
argument about it in “writing.” Then we were supposed to remediate that to a website and 
an avatar on the Second Life, besides making a video on the same topic. When I was 
making a website, I found it very hard. I was thinking of it in terms of making an 
argument and other textual strategies used to argue, e.g., juxtaposition, parallelism. But 
the focus on the class was on making the website “show” the information, not “tell” or 
“argue” in a linear way. It was extremely hard for me, very frustrating. It was definitely 
primarily because of my lack of familiarity with designing a website, making a “visual” 
argument. But I now also think that it was also because of my long experience in writing 
that shaped my composing habitus. I think both myself (more so) and the instructor failed 
to explore the main reason behind the problem, that the major reason behind the problem 
was we saw writing and website design as discrete. The assignment was based on the 
notion of remediation. But it was thought of in a very formalistic and materialistic sense. 
It was thought in terms of what happens when we remediate one medium through another 
medium. But we should think not in terms of remediation as mediation of one by another, 
but mediation of one kind of practice by another. Doing so keeps both the technical 
aspect and technological aspect of technology, both the social and technical aspects of 
mediation together. We are not like machines capable of separating the past from the 
present, social from the material, we’re rather remediated partly by practice. Therefore, it 
is important, as Selfe and George argue, to learn from students’ composing practices, but 
without using our truncated notion of writing or any other single mode.  
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Similarly, when we critique the dominant ideology of monomodality, we should 
not conflate the ideology of monomodality with the practice of an assumed mode, e.g., 
writing, taking it as monomodal. When we do so, we end up making an argument either 
for “either/or” or for “addition” to, thus speaking from the same framework that we try to 
challenge. It is true that privileging of writing has relegated other modes to the margin 
and cultural sideline. But it is also mainly because of unwittingly accepting a limited 
notion of writing, and similarly, that of other modes. The divisions are handy tools, 
generalized representations to reduce the complexities and messiness of practices. They 
are often useful for certain purposes. But the problem arises when such representations 
assume immutable reality, more real than what we actually see in practice. For instance, 
see how we generally understand “composition” in the academy. As many composition 
scholars point out, it is often understood only as academic writing. Based on such and 
similar understanding of writing, many have started arguing for abolishing composition 
because the skills taught in composition courses do not transfer to writing tasks in other 
disciplines. Furthermore, writing to be taught in a composition class is customarily 
assumed to be academic arguments, both by those who take composition as a skills or as 
a tool for an entry into the discourse of the academic community32: both asocial and 
social views of composing process. That tendency takes away from composition what 
other meanings users/composers make of it or what other forms they practice, both within 
and outside the academy.  
The problem with, similar to what Wysocki says about mode, limiting writing 
with one or a few fixed qualities or features, e.g., making an argument (often opposed to 
                                                
32 The tendency of taking teaching of composition as enculturation or as the tendency of advocating an 
alternative discourses fall victim to the same tendency. 
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displaying information in visual mode) is reflected in Diana George’s defense of visual 
design as composition on the ground that it makes an argument like writing. I’m not here 
disagreeing at all with George’s claim that visual design should be considered 
composing. Rather, I’m just showing the potential problem if we argue that something 
should be considered composing similar to writing because it does what writing is 
supposed to do in dominant understanding. We do not need to accept the truncated 
meaning and value of writing that it should make an argument, argument that is direct, 
linear, and “logical.” And that visuals also make an argument, and therefore, it should be 
counted as legitimate form of composing. In other words, similar to Bruce Horner’s 
argument about the literacy scholars’ focus on promoting alternative literacies where 
those scholars tend to “buy into the ideological framework responsible for that 
denigration in the first place,” George is defending visual design in terms that retain 
the notion of argument as inherently valuable—that is, visual design is deemed valuable 
insofar as it does work that composition is traditionally thought to do (“Ideologies of 
Literacy” 6).  Therefore, George is accepting in advance the terms of value that had 
originally been used to dismiss visual design as lacking value.  So if literacy is assumed 
to mean academic literacy, then visual design is defended as literacy insofar as it 
conforms to conventional notions of academic writing (.e.g., making an argument). What 
George calls the visual mode (though writing itself is visual in many ways and it does 
have several other modal dimensions) does much more than make an argument, just as 
writing does many more things than merely making one kind of argument.  
Let me give an example outside of composition. It is like thinking of the value of 
gardening only in terms of how much money you save. For instance, I plant a few 
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vegetable plants like peppers and tomatoes in my patio. Sometimes I do not get more than 
a few chilies. But not only that they tend to taste (not only in the sense of simple taste) 
different, so better. Playing with them, with the squirrel that come to destroy them, 
watering them, looking at them every couple hours to check if they have new buds, all 
these values mean much more than whether I can save as much or more than I spend on 
growing these plants. There are countless other ways they influence me, sometimes 
relieving me of the stress of writing my dissertation or going through the terrible 
experience of a job search. In similar ways, there are values that we do not see in writing 
that students will take from it, sometimes predictable, sometimes unpredictable. So, we 
do not need to replace writing with something else or only add something to writing. 
Rather, it is also important to see writing and other modes in a much broader way and see 
how their meanings manifest through students’ uses of them and appreciate the beauty in 
such variations. Thus, as James Slevin says, composition should be “about the encounter 
of different ways of reading and writing; our discipline arises in acts of interpretation and 
composing, different ways of reading and thinking and persuading brought into our 
classrooms by students. Our disciplinary work in all its forms, including research, arises 
from the need and the desirability of promoting and enriching the dialog, already 
underway” (44).  
 When we are following an additive logic, there is a danger of looking for 
monomodal or monolingual competence, competence in separate modes or languages. 
And that makes the job of students even harder, especially so because they are supposed 
to achieve the competence in designing a composition by fulfilling the norms that 
actually do not exist. This reminds us of Parakrama’s example about language 
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distinctions and his entrapment into the same logic that he was trying to dismantle. 
Parakrama talks of the difficulty of writing his dissertation in non-standard English 
because he was raised and educated in the Western education system and therefore had 
internalized its rules. But the main problem with such an argument is that it assumes 
separate competencies in different varieties of English as if they are fixed and stable. 
When such competence is sought for, such an attempt is bound to fail. Similarly, in the 
case of David Damon in Selfe’s study too, shifting from writing to “new media” literacy 
and judging his composing practices based on the discrete rules of the visual grammar 
can equally be challenging, as it is challenging to students who try to maintain the 
separateness of two linguistic practices. Yes, he is successful in the world outside his 
composition class, especially in designing websites and adapting to new media literacies 
pertinent to the student organizations he is involved in and other clients. But if his 
composition is judged in terms of the strict principles/grammar of visual design, he would 
again find it somewhat challenging because, despite separation of writing from other 
modes or technologies, issue of language conventions will pop up in academic settings. 
Therefore, while it is important to acknowledge David’s literacy strength and encourage 
him to experiment and explore more possibilities, it is equally important to interrogate the 
assumptions about writing as merely argument (or monomodal) and language as 
“standard” English.  
Finally, as with some translingual and plurilingual theories, multimodal studies 
also takes modes as “resources,” whether in a materialist or in a critical/cultural 
approach, similar to Bourdieu’s notion of capital. One fundamental problem in defining 
technologies (modes and media are technologies) as resources, as I argued in terms of 
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language theories in Chapter Three, and as Jay Jordan also contends in his recent article, 
drawing on Rickert and other new materialists, is to reinforce “exclusively human 
languaging agency” (366). First, it is true that human agents do use and utilize resources, 
but it is equally true that they are also used by the resources. Second, when resources are 
used, they are mediated by and mediate practices. For instance, when I made a website 
for a visual communication course, I tried to utilize resources from my writing experience 
and images and image manipulation based on my cultural imaginary. While I was able to 
make a website of a sort, those of the resources used did change what I wanted to show, 
very different from my original intention or purpose. That is partly so also because our 
acts of reading and writing are shaped not only by the obvious, salient aspects, but also 
things we often ignore, things taken for granted.  
Conclusion: Modality in Practice 
 To sum up, it is important to locate modality and its meaning not in materiality or 
in ideology exclusively because doing so abstracts modes and media from the complex 
ecology of practice, which incorporates both the social and technical aspects of our social 
life, including our literacy practices. From this perspective, writing is and always has 
multimodal potentials even if one or only a few modal aspects of writing become 
manifest in specific uses. In other words, as Theresa Lillis argues, in specific instances of 
semiotic practice, “it is important to take account of the potential significance of different 
modal dimensions whilst at the same time avoiding adopting what we might describe as a 
‘modalist’ analytical bias in our approach to writing, akin to the common ‘textualist’ bias 
evident in many approaches to writing” (38). As Anne Wysocki contends, while it is 
necessary to pay attention to all the available potentials and mediating factors (or what 
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NLG call available designs), it is equally or perhaps more important to keep our eyes, 
ears, and other senses open to seemingly “unavailable designs” (55), “rendered 
unavailable by naturalized, unquestioned practice” (57). In other words, in Rickert’s 
terms, we need to avoid taking the salient aspect of any communicative practice as 
necessarily significant to all situations. Our acts of writing and communication are 
mediated as much by the salient as by the ambient aspects.  
Furthermore, there are several dimensions in any semiotic practice, not only more 
than writing and speech or verbal and visual or temporal and spatial. And all of these are 
nested in social practice. However, what we call social is, as Latour says, not a stable 
condition or homogeneous worldview, determining the nature and function of 
technologies we develop and use, especially in this age of globalization. Therefore, 
notions of multimodal affordances should be placed in everyday practice in its complex 
and heterogeneous ecology where the relationship across all mediators, human and non-
human, mediate/translate goals and purposes behind our semiotic practices. When we 
take mediation of a complex act of composing practice as translation by both seemingly 
salient and ambient aspects of the specific situation, our humanist notions of modal or 
linguistic resources need to be interrogated. The consequences of our uses of 
technologies are not determined only by our careful (or careless) and deliberate 
utilization of a stock or toolbox of resources, but also by the agency of the items in the 
toolbox.
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CHAPTER 5 
RELATIONS BETWEEN MULTIMODALITY AND TRANSLINGUALITY: 
PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
In the previous two chapters, I tried to examine studies of language relations and 
those of multimodality and the potential alternative ways to deal with them, especially in 
terms of how language and modality have been conceived. I want to conclude by 
summarizing main points of overlaps and disjuncture, and suggest ways to integrate the 
issues of modality and language relations in some productive ways. In their recent 
publication, “Translinguality, Transmodality, and Difference,” Bruce Horner, Cynthia 
Selfe, and Timothy Lockridge have actually explored these issues in their complexities 
and offered some important ways to work across languages and modalities. I think the 
new materialist theory of practice33 provides some grounds to further expand and 
complicate the issue of mediation and modality. After such exploration of convergences 
and divergences and ways to bridge the gap, I will end with a brief discussion of the 
implications to pedagogy.  As Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge article demonstrates, there 
are many similarities between multimodal and translingual theories, but with some
                                                
33 I think new materialist theory of practice does represent the major theoretical ground that Horner and 
Selfe often utilize in their discussion of the issues of modality and language relations. When they come to a 
sort of a consensus, I feel like they are actually moving towards new materialist understanding, with a 
practice theory touch (and cultural materialism), despite some inconsistencies in their way towards 
resolving the seemingly conflicting perspectives.  
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significant differences, which, as the Horner and Selfe dialog shows, can be narrowed. 
Both these two fields attempt to challenge ideologies that delegitimize practices that are 
different from what are assumed to be appropriate, both within the academy and outside, 
that is, ideologies of monolingualism and of monomodality. They point out the rich 
multilingual and multimodal practices on the ground, especially in recent times, as a 
result of increasing intersections between cultures and semiotic (both linguistic and other 
semiotic) practices in a globalized context. Similarly, in most of the multimodal and 
translingual studies in composition, the major focus has remained on critique of gate-
keeping practices in the academy that have barred many students from racially, culturally, 
and economically underprivileged backgrounds from entering the academy and achieving 
academic success and the potential contributions they could make to empower their 
communities and enrich our understandings of communicative practices.  
On the other hand, the major similarities lie in their focus on additive models, 
both in dominant notions of multilingualism and multimodality. Despite these 
similarities, they have some difference, especially in terms of the later translingual 
theorists’ emphasis on questioning such boundaries and focusing on intersections across 
linguistic practices and multimodal theorists’ attention to the role materiality plays in 
communicative activities.  
This shows that studies of language relations and that of modalities can learn from 
each other. From recent developments like translingualism, especially in its focus on the 
porous nature of linguistic practices (see Horner et al.’s “Towards a Translingual 
Approach; Horner, NeCamp, and Donahue’s “From English Only to Translingual Norm,” 
Canagarajah’s Translingual Practice, etc.), multimodal studies can rethink the divisions 
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between different modes in terms of their functions and focus on their fluid natures and 
unpredictable consequences. At the same time translingual studies can learn from 
multimodal studies in terms of how going beyond discursive aspects to consider material 
aspects of language negotiations can provide a more concrete picture of the challenges 
and opportunities facing language negotiations. However, such a material focus should 
avoid materialist or modalist perspective in understanding the role of materials in 
semiotic practices. What the materialities of technology allow is not completely limited 
by material nature; the dominant representations of technology tend to limit what is 
available and what is not. We should consider why other possibilities are not seen.  
I think the following quotation from Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge’s (HSL) recent 
piece helps me demonstrate both the points of tension and possibilities for bridging the 
gap:  
Despite the different trajectories and limited perspectives of our own 
labors, we all sense a need for a more expansive view and practice of 
composition, whether in terms of modalities or languages of expression, 
and a sense that we can stimulate and support efforts towards that goal by 
identifying overlaps and parallels in work towards it from questions about 
both language and modality. 
 
I completely agree with Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge’s   point that we need to adopt a 
“more expansive view and practice of composition.” I here see both the tension and a 
route towards resolution of the tension between a cultural materialist and materialist 
position, between Horner and Selfe playing out in this quotation and throughout this text. 
Actually, in my perception, this dialogue shows the blindspots of both—Horner’s 
acknowledgement of the role of materiality (not only in cultural materialist sense) and 
Selfe’s acknowledgement of the need to see beyond dominant understandings of 
modality. In a sense, this dialog and the sort of consensus they arrive at points towards 
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the need to adopt a new materialist theory of practice to rethink about mediation. For that, 
we need to do a few things on theoretical fronts about techno-linguistic mediation.  
Reassembling the Notion of the Social  
As discussed in the previous chapters, some of the major problems in our 
conceptualizations of languages and modalities are directly linked to the limited notion of 
mediation where the focus is largely on one or the other aspects below or a combination 
of them:  
a) Social as homogeneous: In many accounts, such as critical perspective 
on technology, social is taken not as a material social reality but as 
representation of the social as homogeneous and stable entity either in 
terms of economic, cultural, or other similar macro forces. This is 
manifested in the tendencies of taking semiotic acts as by-products of 
social/cultural/economic/linguistic structures/ideologies/hegemony.  
b) Technology as determining social relations and meanings: Reversing 
the social and humanist treatment of technologies, this materialist 
determinism considers the materiality of technologies as largely 
determining social relations and thought processes. As discussed in the 
fourth chapter, this tendency is prevalent in multimodal studies where 
modes are associated with certain functions or affordances.  
c) Individual as free-floating agent: In some 
multilingual/plurilingual/translingual theories, we find the pendulum tilt 
more towards individual agency, especially as a response to structural 
theories of language. A somewhat similar tendency can also be found in 
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multimodal scholarship in its emphasis on semiotic acts as “motivated” 
and their problematic notion of resources.  
In all these three tendencies, the relationships between semiotic practices and 
society/culture/ideology/individual intention or agency are vertical, often suggesting the 
relationships in terms of determination rather than translation. Instead, it is necessary to 
see all of these, including semiotic practices like writing, as parts of the ecology of 
mediation, without reducing them to any single larger force. In order to do so, as Latour 
contends, the first thing we need to do is to disassemble the “social,” but to reassemble it 
to attend to the complexity and dynamism of the relationships in any given instance of 
semiotic activity:  
In the alternative view, ‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything 
including what the other glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by 
many other type of connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, 
socio-linguistists, social psyschologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the 
given that could send some light on residual aspects of economics, 
linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on 
the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by 
the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, 
law, management, etc. (Reassembling 5)  
 
This gives a clear sense how the new materialism/ANT (Actor Network Theory) of 
Latour does not discard the notion of the social for emphasizing the role of the material. 
Rather, what we normally call social has to be redefined, not as a glue that can fix 
everything (context, often highly generalized, used to explain textual features), something 
to explain away regularities and/or peculiarities in language and other semiotic practices, 
but as a collective, a bundle of constantly shifting associations. In other words, he is 
trying to avoid the assumptions of homogeneity and stability in the existing view of the 
social. When we think of the social as a bundle of associations, not as a homogeneous 
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whole, we resist limiting “in advance the shape, size, heterogeneity, and combination of 
associations” (Reassembling 11). This focus on heterogeneities is important in today’s 
globalized world, especially because “in situations where innovations proliferate, where 
group boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account 
fluctuates, the sociology of the social is no longer able to trace actors’ new associations” 
(Reassembling 11).  
The reassembling of the social helps us move beyond linear and limited notions of 
mediation to a more expansive and ecological conceptualization of mediation as 
multilateral. In such an expansive view, we do not depend on only discursive notions of 
the social, we get an opportunity to consider the roles of things often reduced to mere 
effects of larger forces like the social or to mere tools or objects for use by human agents. 
When we consider any linguistic situation, we do not think of its mediation only in terms 
of a “socio”linguistic perspective, but in terms of all available connectors. When we do 
not depend on only a discursive notion of the social, we get an opportunity to consider 
the role of things often reduced to effects of larger forces or to mere objects/tools.  
Second, while one implication of dissembling the social is to try to account for all 
possible connectors and see how they mediate our actions and their consequences, the 
other important implication is to pay attention to the “missing masses” and their roles not 
merely as tools for perpetuating ideologies (therefore not acknowledged), nor as 
determining the nature and consequences of human actions, but as transforming, while 
also perpetuating, such ideologies, though such transformations might not, at times, look 
like any significant change. In other words, taking that to mediation of semiotic practices, 
the materiality of various modes and technologies does matter, but how that matters is not 
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dependent completely on their ostensibly inherent material qualities, but on the 
relationship between their materialities and the user’s semiotic practices. Similarly, the 
materiality of modalities and technologies should not be limited to their formal features. 
That should include their connection with the material world around them that shape how 
they contribute to the production or reception of meanings. That is partly what Jay Jordan 
also means when he talks about the need for translingual analysis to include material 
aspects of language negotiations. Here, let me give an example of my own experience 
with job interviews and the roles different technologies of communication played. First, 
in a materialist way, I thought a Skype interview was better than phone interviews 
because it is a richer form of communication than phone, what McLuhan might term as a 
“hotter” medium than the telephone. And it was true that I could make better sense of the 
interviewers’ questions and their implications by looking at material aspects more than 
their accents, tempo, and stress patterns, including how they are sitting, their facial 
gestures, their bodily orientation, movements of their eyes, legs, hands, and the way they 
dressed up. But at the same time there were other material aspects that came to my 
attention that equally affected the interviews, like the way I had to be dressed up, sit, and 
perform before the camera. Moreover, sometimes the lights getting through the blinders, 
the ambient noise (or lack of such noise), etc. tended to affect me, sometimes positively 
sometimes negatively. Later I actually liked phone interviews more than Skype at times 
because I found myself more comfortable when I was lying on my bed. The coziness of 
my bedroom, the relaxation and the feeling of such relaxation that I got from lying on the 
bed tended to make me feel as if I were talking informally to my friends about something 
else than giving an interview. The other “insignificant” material objects like a pen I could 
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play with, and innumerable things that I cannot account for, are part of the ecology of 
mediation that helped or hindered my performance in those interviews. The point I’m 
making here is, yes the materialities of technologies and modes play significant roles. But 
there are more aspects of their materialities and the surrounding (ambience) that we often 
tend to forget when we focus on the abstracted affordances of such technologies. 
Therefore, we should be careful not to limit the potentials of the materiality of any 
technologies to what has so far been seen as their functions or affordances.  
Let us take as an example the argument about the relationship between 
multilingualism and digital technologies (multimodality) that we often see in recent 
composition scholarship. The common argument is that digital technologies and the 
multimodality they afford promote multilingualism and help students resist 
monolingualism. For instance, Amanda Athon argues that new technologies like Web 2.0 
empower multilingual students by promoting their local cultures and languages:  
Traditional print texts highly value linear communication and thus, a 
sameness that is also found in standard academic English. The similarities 
between the rise of homogenous, linear texts in the classroom likely 
coincides with the emergence of standard academic English as the most 
valued dialect and the language that permeates our college composition 
classrooms. We can distance our students from the notion that standard 
academic English—an inherently linear language that focuses on 
sameness—is the only correct dialect. With the rise of new technologies 
and Web 2.0, we should adjust our pedagogical practices to embrace 
nonlinear texts in our pedagogy. Having our students engage in acts of 
multimodal composing, such as using visuals to create literacy narratives, 
or by having students read or view recordings of authors who write in 
dialects, allows our students to embrace their language and cultural 
histories. 
 
I do largely agree with many of her points, especially her concern about the potential 
danger of promoting the ideal notion of standard academic English. But her claim about 
“academic English” being inherently linear and new technologies, especially visual and 
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aural, as inherently non-linear, and therefore, promoting multilingualism has many gaps 
and fissures to be explored and interrogated. First, by making a binary between writing 
and visual and assigning linear and non-linear arguments to them, she equates material 
form with function. Second, she repeats the same mistake that instrumentalist notions of 
technology make by taking technology as a tool for promoting linguistic and cultural 
diversity. Third, such a conception reinforces the false notion that there is such a thing 
called linear standard Academic English; what is rather true is that there is a strong 
presence of such an ideology about standard English in the teaching of composition. 
Therefore, focusing only on the materiality of technologies and then limiting the 
materiality with certain functions limits writing in English (standard or non-standard) to 
linear arguments or similar thinking. But the accompanying material existence and the 
practices that what is called the standard language has been part of have made us think 
that writing does not allow multilingualism, and therefore, the argument goes, 
multimodality comes as an escape from a monolingual trend in composition.  
 I’m not denying the fact that digital technologies, coupled with global trends of 
migration and international trade, have brought language intersections and multilingual 
realities to the surface. But what I’m pointing out here is the need to focus more on what 
material social conditions, both seemingly significant and insignificant, besides dominant  
understandings of the materiality of technologies (including languages) create an 
atmosphere more productive for appreciation and uses of multilingual and multimodal 
potentials.  
 Furthermore, it might be equally or even more interesting to look into whether or 
how people decide to change how they use their language repertoire depending on 
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whether they are composing on digital spaces or on paper, but paying equal attention to 
(f)actors beyond technologies.  
 Lastly, we also need to redefine agency when we include things into the ecology 
of mediation. As discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, with regard to 
plurilingualism/multilingualism and multimodality, the dominant definition of agency in 
the discussion of language ability and multimodal use in composition scholarship is 
human centric. That is often reflected in the emphasis on the creativity of multilingual 
participants in deliberately and strategically utilizing multilingual resources. As Jordan 
contends: “Crucial to Canagarajah’s articulation of translingual practice is (re)focusing 
on ‘the work of creative and active social agents’ who ‘employ the disparate and 
conflictual elements of a language or cognitive system’” (375). In an attempt to counter 
monolingual hegemony, this tendency replaces the traditional notion of the competent 
native speaker with the fully conscious and competent multilingual composer. We can 
find a similar tendency in multimodal scholarship, especially in terms of their focus on 
the multimodal subject as “motivated” and communicative modes as “resources” (see 
Kress’s Grammar of Visual Design).   
 Min-Zhan Lu and Bruce Horner try to complicate translingual agency by 
conceptualizing it in terms of the translingual composer’s ability to negotiate the “‘micro’ 
and ‘macro’ in light of the specificity of relations, concerns, motives, and purposes 
demanding meaningful response in individual writers’ past, present, and future lives” 
(591). Drawing on Pennycook’s notion of language as a mesopolitical practice and 
Butler’s notion of reiteration as recontextualization, Lu and Horner emphasize how such 
recontextualization generates potential conditions for transformation. This definition of 
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agency in terms of practice tries to avoid the human centric rhetoric reflected in many 
translingual and plurilingual theoretical accounts. Here creativity does not reside only in 
conscious and deliberate breaks from the conventions, but also in acts of mimicry or 
reiteration. However, even in this account, they do not go that far to account for agency 
beyond humans: “A translingual  approach thus defines agency operating in terms of the 
need and ability of individual writers to map and order, remap and reorder conditions and 
relations surrounding their practices, as they address the potential discrepancies between 
the official and practical, rather than focusing merely on what the dominant has defined 
as exigent, feasible, appropriate, and stable ‘context’” (591).  
Here, they do acknowledge the role of context, but fall short of recognizing the 
heterogeneities within the alternative context that they think translingual composers need 
to pay attention to. Therefore, the new materialist theory of practice would take this 
notion of agency one step further by reminding us that not only the materials do exert 
agency, more than “simply [being] the hapless bearers of symbolic projection” (Latour 
Reassembling 10), but also that we are “ambient subjects” (Rickert 91).   
In all of these accounts of agency, what we see is a tension, tension resulting from 
the need to go beyond the division between humanism and anti-humanism, the focus on 
individual agency and social shaping. An alternative to, and perhaps an extension of, 
these conceptualizations that might provide us a more productive way of redefining 
agency is to not replace one context with another or one kind of agents with others, but 
by diversifying what we call context so that we can count on the role of all actors that 
make a difference in human actions. Let us attend to things “beyond ‘language’ and 
‘languaging’ to include attention to” the things and technologies that surround us, “the 
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air, sweat, plastic, memories, twitchiness, cheeses, skin, color that are materially co-
present, co-evolving with language” (Jordan 380), but without losing sight of the 
differences with which certain elements of the context get greater light whereas others 
remain mostly in the dark.  
Reconceptualizing the Relations between Language and Modality 
When we go beyond limited views of mediation where we only think of language 
and culture(s) or modality/technology and culture/ideology and consider it as a result of a 
complex set of relations and co-influence of a multitude of (f)actors shaping semiotic 
acts, whether multimodal or multilingual, it paves our way, at least theoretically, for 
bridging the gap between issues of multimodality and multilingualsm. The first move we 
need to make is to consider composing as a socio-material practice where social and 
material aspects interact and shape the uses and consequences of our semiotic acts, which 
transform social and material aspects in turn. When we focus on a broader notion of 
practice as consisting of not only the interactions between the individual and the social 
(structure), and when we see practice in its concrete form, as a repeated activity in a 
constantly changing ecology of mediation, we cannot and should not separate modality 
from language, and both from material and social aspects surrounding them. It is 
important to see beyond the narrow division between language and modality or speech 
and writing as evidenced in sociolinguistics and composition (see Lillis’s Sociolinguistics 
of Writing) and see them as parts of the broader ecology of mediation. In other words, we 
go beyond studying language or modality against the backdrop of a force considered to 
be determining the nature of such acts, thus taking everything else as insignificant or 
irrelevant. Rather, we need to both broaden what modality and language mean and how 
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the choices composers/users make are partially affected not only by their intention or 
their position in the social structure, but by their understanding of what they assume 
“language” or “modality” does, thus making these as (f)actors mediating semiotic 
activities in specific situations.  
 Calvet rightly points out the problem of separating language (assumed as one 
mode) and other modes (visual assumed as images or audio or other modal appearances) 
when he develops an ecological approach where he calls our attention to the need to pay 
attention to the whole range of semiotic technologies/modes and the intersections 
between network of practices and representations:  
In the name of what theory should we separate out, in this sequence of 
actions, the one which is communicated by the emitting of sounds? The 
answer generally is that, on the one hand, there is the oral instrument of 
communication, namely language, and on the other there are facts that 
have to do with ‘non-verbal’ communication, or semiology. And this 
affirmation is characteristic of the trap into which the theory of language 
as an isolatable object, an instrument, has led us. (22) 
 
When we see any linguistic or other semiotic practice, we instantly see how it is 
intricately linked with modes and technologies assumed to be separate. Therefore, it is 
important to look for a multitude of connections and meaning potentials in any given 
semiotic practice: “the notion of language is a model, simultaneously useful and 
reductive, and we must take care not to allow ourselves to be imprisoned by the models 
that we use…it [language] does not exist in isolation from social life; language (or at 
least what I continue, for the sake of convenience, to call language) is a social practice 
within social life, one practice among others, inseparable from its environment” (Calvet 
22). Therefore, the notions of language and modality need to be rethought on at least two 
fronts: one, going beyond limiting them in terms of narrow ideas of their materiality and 
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their functions, often reduced to stable categories in dominant representations; two, 
resisting conceptualizations of them in terms of larger categories like 
ideologies/power/culture (social-shaping) or focusing on the unique resources of 
multilingual or multimodal users/students (human-centric).  
Furthermore, though we often see language being separated from multimodality, 
in reality, not only are languages always already multimodal, they are, in their specific 
instances of use, part of the multimodality that operates in most of our communicative 
practices. As Horner says in Horner, Selfe and Lockridge piece, “it no longer makes 
sense to treat language, whether as writing, or speech, or both, as apart from the 
multimodal”:  
Following Olson’s warning… it seems ultimately problematic to 
distinguish between language and modality. Dominant conceptions of 
language offer a highly attenuated, restricted sense of all that goes on in 
the activity of ‘language acts’ (a.k.a. communicative acts). Kress (2000) 
acknowledges this in calling language multimodal (p.186), vs. thinking of 
language as itself discrete mode. Conversely, it seems appropriate to 
recognize modalities as a feature of language. From this, it no longer 
makes sense to treat language, whether as writing or speech or both, as 
apart from the ‘multimodal’. 
 
What Horner says here is important because in discussions of multimodality, it is taken as 
different from linguistic practice. Therefore, multimodal composition is often used, as 
separate from language (writing in its narrow sense), to refer to compositions like audio 
essay, photo essay, video, or a website (all of which contain elements of linguistic 
practice). The problem in such accounts is a very limited understanding of modality. That 
is why the dominant conception of both language and modality need to be rethought. As 
Lillis says, even what we call writing involves modes and material existence far broader 
than what is often described as verbal: 
  159 
Much has been claimed about what writing is and does, on the basis of 
assumptions about particular modal-material dimensions, notably, its 
verbal nature and its object like (or material-permanence) existence. 
However [. . .], whilst it is important to discuss writing as a verbal-object, 
there are other important modal dimensions to consider, as well as a need 
to explore the meanings attached to these different dimensions by users, 
writers (producers) and readers (lookers, readers, consumers). (Lillis 21)  
 
Lillis points out that it is important to understand writing as “verbal-object” as much as it 
is to explore how readers/viewers take writing, both in verbal and in other modal 
dimensions, or as a multimodal text. However, this should not be taken as a denial of how 
the visuality of traditional writing is different from the visuality of images or video. But 
the point is that based on such differences, we should not reify language (writing) and 
“multimodal” as inherently different, especially in terms of fixed functions.  
From the perspective of a new materialist theory of practice, it might be more 
useful to conceive of what we call language and modality as examples and instances of 
larger technological practices where, in researching and analyzing composing practice, 
we do not separate language and modality either from each other or from other 
technologies of remediation. However, when doing so, it is important to conceive of 
technology in a sense broader than mere ‘technique’ or ‘tool,’ as we saw in materialist 
and instrumentalist definitions. The use of technique is a part of the definition of 
technology, but technology is not only the tool, but also how it is used, the “systematic 
treatment of an art, craft, or technique” (“Online Etymology”), where we take system not 
as internally self-sufficient and self-regulating, but as patterns of use developed through 
practice. In that way, we can adopt a more “expansive view and practice” of composing 
where composing does not get limited to one or a few specific kinds of writing that are 
assumed to serve certain interests in society. And that expansive view can incorporate not 
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only the semiotic practices in their complex relationships, but also the ways they are 
variously used by composers across geo-political and cultural locations.   
In that light, language itself is a technology with varying modal possibilities. 
Other semiotic materials like images, sound, gestures, etc. are also technologies that can 
be and have been used for communicative purposes, often in conjunction with and 
complementing writing. At the same time, these technologies are remediated through 
print or digital technologies. And as they are remediated, their meanings are largely 
shaped by the habitus of the users, material dimensions (both in terms of their own 
material existence and their relations with the material surrounding) and social location. 
In other words, their meanings and roles are constituted by the practices in their material 
social relations and the beliefs about them. Considerations of language and modality and 
their relations in terms of the complex relations between dispositions and practices help 
us understand the durability and transformations of semiotic practices and ideologies 
about them.  
Dispositions and Practices 
Given the mutually co-constitutive relations between practices and 
representations/dispositions and the possibilities of discrepancy between the two, how 
can we understand both the durability and shifts in language beliefs and practices? First, 
it is important to distinguish between belief about language and modal relations and the 
actual semiotic practices where what we’ve been calling multimodality and multilingual 
practices mingle, shape and thereby transform meanings both for the composers and 
readers/viewers. But it is at the same time true that practices and beliefs shape and co-
construct each other. That looks like a paradox, but this is what helps us go beyond 
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simple determinism, whether it is ideology determining the nature of semiotic practices 
or the materiality of modes determining meanings and patterns of thought. As Latour 
contends, “belief is not a state of mind but a result of relationships” and as the 
relationships across elements in material social practice change, the existing beliefs also 
begin to be questioned and doubted, creating a ground for change in dispositions (MC 2). 
The direction and the nature of changes depend on a variety of things. Often times, 
transformation in disposition might not immediately follow change in practices because 
despite such changes, the users/producers themselves fail to see the contradictions 
between the practices and ideologies, while, at the same time, such changes are not 
recognized positively by the dominant institutions, including academia. Moreover, 
dispositions are forms of sedimentations resulting from long and repetitive uses (of 
various semiotic practices). Similarly, this is so also because notions of what counts as 
appropriate are intricately linked to existing power relations and the reproductions of 
such power relations through academic institutions, language policies, the linguistic 
marketplace, and geopolitical relations. 
 For instance, Bal Krishna Sharma’s recent study of how multilingual Nepalese 
diaspora use online technologies, YouTube in particular, and what role that plays in terms 
of their language use shows the discrepancy between their language beliefs and their 
semiotic practices. The study was specifically centered on a UN speech by a Nepalese 
minister posted on YouTube and the comments on the video, especially those related to 
her “‘bad’ English” (19). His analysis showed that 
YouTube brings superdiverse participants together with their multiple 
subjectivities, identities and attitudes, and their demonstrated language 
competence is characterized by varied forms of linguistic repertoires in 
English and in Nepali. Ideologically the comments seem to reproduce the 
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modernist view of language as a bounded system, but linguistic resources 
used to construct these comments show a number of linguistic peculiarities 
and heteroglossic uses that challenge the writers’ own conscious 
conceptualization of language. (19)  
 
Despite their multilingual practices, their comments reflected monolingual belief. Though 
it is true that YouTube (or any other social networking sites) “brings superdiverse 
participants together,” we should not overlook the dangerously uniform belief beneath 
apparent diversity. The participants in that online discussion utilized their “varied forms 
of linguistic repertoires in English and Nepali,” but their language disposition seemed to 
remain largely unaffected.34 There could be a host of reasons. One important reason that 
we should not forget is that all languages, as Calvet contends in his recent book, Toward 
an Ecology of World Languages, are not equal, and that inequality, as ingrained in 
language policies and their assumed values for economic and social progress, tend to 
make us continually hold language beliefs that contradict ground reality: 
Even if to the linguist’s eye all languages are equal…, the world’s 
languages are fundamentally unequal. … But the fact remains that a 
discourse which would represent English and Breton, or French and Bobo 
as socially equivalent would be both unrealistic and ideological: all 
languages do not have the same value, and their inequality is at the heart 
of the way they are organized across the world. (4)  
 
Here, two things are important to mark. First, the value of languages is tied to socio-
economic and geo-political relations in general and to the specific uses and purposes 
individuals put them to. Second, languages that are valued more than the others (and 
those valued less than others) continually undergo transformation due to their interactions 
                                                
34 In the study, many participants thought that the minister should have used Nepali language with 
translation. But many went far beyond the issue of language to comment that it was a shame for Nepal to 
appoint someone like her to the post of minister. Such comments do show variations in their beliefs, some 
swept away by the ideology of English monolingualism (in the sense of English only in certain forums or 
for certain purposes), whereas some considered it important to use native language if it was hard for her to 
use English. But, at the same time, all the participants did hold, as the researcher mentions, monolingual 
belief in the sense of taking languages as separate and bounded.  
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with other language practices. But, despite active roles of the users in transforming 
language practices, it does take time and opportunities for them to reflect on the 
discrepancy between language beliefs and practices.  
In the same way, we also should not conflate ideological representations of 
modalities and languages with what they are and what potentials they could have in 
material social practices. For instance, in terms of modality, writing has traditionally been 
tied to, as in the classic case of Walter Ong or in the general understanding, making 
rational arguments and “analytically sequential, linear organization of thought,” where as 
other modes like orality and visual representations have been associated with the opposite 
mental operations like “rhapsodizing” (Ong 16) and non-linear thinking (Kress and Van 
Leeuwen 218). Here, we should be careful not to take writing in terms of the limited 
ideological notion of it. Like stereotypes, such representations of modal aspects are not 
completely false, but very limited. The same tendency can be found in terms of the values 
of language varieties. For instance, in some discussions in composition and in general 
understanding outside the academy, certain language varieties/languages are assumed to 
perform certain functions or purposes, e.g., native language/dialect as more appropriate 
for early drafts of writing or for self-exploration (expressivist/accomodationist) whereas 
standard variety as appropriate for final, official draft/version, publications, or the notion 
that English is a language of science and technology, of progress, and of advancement. 
These beliefs, while inherently problematic for their reification of languages from 
language practices, are still very dominant because of which many students are 
discouraged from tapping into the semiotic repertoire that they have developed through 
their participation in diverse linguistic practices or in linguistic practice that is already 
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diverse. Similarly, even those students who practice multilingualism or multimodality 
find it hard to resist SL/MN (Single/Standard Language and Modality) ideology.  
 In concluding this section, it is also important to mark that communicative 
practices in most cases today are always already multimodal, and issues of linguistic 
diversity need to be adequately addressed to help our students not only become 
successful communicators in a globalized world, but also to facilitate development of 
translingual/transmodal dispositions. While increasing intersections of diverse linguistic 
practices and the ease with which audio and visual elements can be incorporated into the 
composing practices have created a more favorable atmosphere for the development of 
translingual and transmodal dispositions, our attention to diverse socio-material 
dimensions in the ecology of mediation can provide us ways to recognize the value of 
differences in student writing/composing. As Cynthia Selfe contends in “Translinguality, 
Transmodality,” it is equally important to “encourage more teachers not only to recognize 
or ‘acknowledge the legitimacy of the transmodal position,’ but also to 
encourage/experiment with/try more transmodal production, to experiment with different 
semiotic ways of composing meaning—and to help students do so as well.”   
Pedagogical Implications  
“It makes me sick—That’s how I feel. And that’s why a lot of people are 
not interested. I-am-not [states each word slowly]. What am I saying?—
Everybody knows what ‘I’m not’ means. It’s like trying to segregate, you 
know, you’ve got like a boundary that sets, you know, you apart from 
other people. Why?” (Lillis Student Writing, 85) 
 
“Despite these accomplishments, however, the year was not going well for 
David. Although his computer skills had improved by leaps and bounds, 
his skills in communicating in Standard English remained seriously 
underdeveloped—and his teachers in the English Department were very 
concerned about his ability to organize and write formal essays, his 
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inattention to standard spelling, his inability to write sentences that were 
grammatically correct according to conventional standards, and his 
problems with development and logical argumentation” (Selfe, “Students 
Who Teach Us” 49).  
I think all of us feel sick about why David in Selfe’s study or the student in Lillis’s study 
had to suffer, where their literacy knowledge and skills should actually have been 
encouraged and promoted. These are only two representative cases. I myself know of 
many such cases, especially in Nepal where thousands of students fail, not once but 
several times, in their School Leaving Certificate examinations (and many other) because 
their English is “bad.” We all know the potential consequences of policies that promote 
monolingual ideology. With the publication of the result of the examinations come news 
of several suicides and mental breakdowns every year. However, such policies are still 
dominant in the US and across the world. 
Both the quotations above reflect the frustration that many non-mainstream 
students go through in situations where writing is conceived only in monolingual and 
monomodal terms. The purposes of teaching composition under such ideological models, 
as discussed by various scholars in composition, are teaching abstracted notions of 
writing and language, often focusing on quantifiable outcomes. Such an emphasis 
assumes what Paul Matsuda calls the “myth of linguistic homogeneity” and what 
multimodal scholars would call a uniform notion of literacy. As a result, their focus 
remains on promoting a transmission model of pedagogy, which “extends to the demand 
for a ‘truth in advertising’ of course descriptions whereby teachers must tell the student 
consumers what those enrolling will be getting, and, of course, teachers must then deliver 
what’s promised, and students are assumed to know what they want and will need” 
  166 
(Horner, “Rewriting Composition” 457). In such a model, students are supposed to learn 
fixed skills of language and writing. Peruse the major goals or outcomes statements of 
any US composition program, and you will find such a goal highlighted in the very 
beginning. Even the “WPA Outcomes Statement for First Year Composition” mentions a 
similar goal for FYC courses. It says, “By the end of first-year composition, students 
should control such surface features as syntax, grammar, punctuation, and spelling,” 
assuming there are fixed conventions that students can and should “master” (Council of 
Writing Program Administration 2008). This language of mastery and the 
characterization of those features as surface features mask how they are, in reality, the 
results of sedimentations of language practices in specific socio-historical contexts. This 
dominant tendency towards language conventions promotes the masking of the politics of 
language “standardization.” And this is where what I’ve called a mesodiscursive 
approach sees the need to change how we approach language conventions, shifting our 
focus from the masking of politics to historicizing such tendencies in FYC curriculum.  
  When the guiding principle in curriculum design assumes difference in language 
use as deviation/error, it not only upholds the myth of discreteness and stability of a 
language “system”35 (Horner, Lu, Royster, and Trimbur 2011; Pennycook 2010), but it 
also frustrates many students in ways similar to the one we see in the above quotation 
from Lillis. In many cases, the direct impact of such language beliefs would be students 
getting a lower grade, the consequences of which can be devastating (loss of scholarship, 
ineligibility for admission, etc.). Besides the false theoretical assumption, the real 
                                                
35 It’s not only the dominant monolingual policy/ideology that assumes language fixity. Other language 
theories that acknowledge diversity also end up holding the same belief, emphasizing either on ELF or on 
separate varieties of World Englishes. Therefore, these theories would not help us overcome the problem of 
overcoming monolingual ideology in curriculum design.  
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practical problem is that most of non-mainstream students are systematically placed at a 
disadvantage because the norm often comes from the idealized notions of language 
practices of the dominant class. Many students who use English differently go through 
serious frustration and heavy pressure due to the fact that teachers always mark their 
writing as “incorrect,” requiring them to master the dominant variety. For instance, in the 
quote above, the student feels as if she is “segregat[ed]” simply because she uses “I’m” in 
place of “I am”. Theresa Lillis rightly points out the political ramifications of such 
practice: “Example 1 helps the researcher learn about the significance of a particular 
textual feature—I’m—to the writer. The writer doesn’t see full versus contracted forms 
as a question about neutral conventions but rather as having the potential to exclude 
people, including herself, from engaging in academia” (Student Writing 360). Such 
students also often go through psychological struggle due to the fact that they feel 
insecure about their future prospects. In other words, in such models, difference is 
punished rather than, as Selfe says, making it an instance for learning, learning for both 
students and teachers (“Students Who Teach Us”). 
In place of a pedagogy that promotes what Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge call 
SLMN ideology, we should promote translingual and transmodal pedagogies that not 
only recognize the legitimacy of different ways of meaning making, but also encourage 
students and teachers to utilize their literacy potentials and experiment with literacy 
practices different from the dominant notions of proper literacy. Similarly, as Selfe, 
James Slevin, and many translingual theorists have argued, such experiments and 
students’ unique literacy practices should be taken as sources of learning for teachers.  
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So, the goal of teaching composition should be to develop understandings across 
differences. Such a focus becomes even more important in today’s world where 
intersections of people and cultures facilitated by digital technologies have brought 
diverse semiotic practices together. This is an extension of what Slevin says in a slightly 
different context about the disciplinarity of composition:  
Composition is a discipline, an educational practice in the older sense I 
have sketched, that cannot know itself because we have lost our power to 
name what we do. Our discipline is about the encounter of different ways 
of reading and writing; our discipline arises in acts of interpretation and 
composing, different ways of reading and thinking and persuading brought 
into our classrooms by students. Our disciplinary work in all its forms, 
including research, arises from the need and the desirability of promoting 
and enriching the dialog, already underway. (44)  
 
As Slevin says, the work of composition should concentrate on promoting and enriching 
the dialog in engaging the encounter of different ways of reading and writing conceived 
in a much broader sense. We should reimagine composition as an activity of learning; it 
is learning new way of thinking and interpreting, learning new ways of using language 
and other semiotic systems.  
 However, when we emphasize making difference the center of our focus in 
teaching (and research), we should try to go beyond additive notions of literacies, 
whether multilingualism or multimodality and pay attention to the everyday practice in its 
complex socio-material complexity. That means, as I discussed in the third chapter while 
talking about Arjuna Parakrama and Neha, assumptions of separateness are not only 
unrealistic, they make language negotiations even more difficult and frustrating for many 
students. In other words, those who do not seem to use a particular language or variety in 
its pure form (mastery, which is never possible) will suffer. 
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 Similarly, we should resist the temptation to fetishize some practices as creative 
and separate them from everyday practice. Such a tendency, as in the popular notion of 
code-meshing or celebration of a dominant notion of multimodality, “threatens to render 
it [code-meshing] a species of exotica to be marveled at rather than a feature of everyday 
practice” (Horner in Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge, “Transmodality and 
Trans/Multimodality”). Furthermore, the notion of multilingual/multimodal agency as 
composers’ deliberate, active, and strategic uses of language or modal resources, seen in 
many translingual/plurilingual/multilingual accounts, and their focus on metalinguistic or 
metadiscursive awareness can sometimes do a disservice to many students because such 
an emphasis ignores their struggle and difficulties negotiating differences.  
 At the same time, such an emphasis ignores creative uses of language/modality 
that look repetitive. For instance, when one of my students in a FYC class was asked to 
remediate her research paper into a different format that explicitly uses a variety of 
modes, she made a flyer with the uses of different fonts and sizes, experimenting with 
various compositional possibilities in terms of the arrangement of different blocks of 
texts and white space, creating a clearly visual representation of her written text in a form 
of a flyer. It looked appealing and creative. But that visual text was itself “written.” It 
would be a mistake to just require her to use images as visuals in her flyer or to consider 
her flyer a verbal mode. While encouraging students to experiment with a variety of 
modes and linguistic possibilities, we at the same time should not forget that our singular 
focus on mixing of modes (as understood in an additive sense) might not only curb her 
creative potential, but take away the possibility of providing clear instances of the fluidity 
of assumed technologies or modes.  
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 Furthermore, students’ semiotic practices should be considered in their material 
ecology where we consider not only the materiality of modes and socio-political 
conditions, but also seemingly insignificant material surroundings, from furniture, 
lighting, black/white boards and trashcans to the location of a classroom and the way the 
room is structured. Similarly, we should show our willingness to understand students’ 
own material conditions. Considering such ecology, broader, more complex, and diverse 
than our common understanding of cultural ecology, helps us develop our teaching 
strategies accordingly and see students in their specificity. When we do so, we can 
perhaps appreciate not only deliberate and obvious instances of code-meshing, but also 
those that do not look diverse/multilingual. That way, we see diversity not only based on 
the differences between “native” and “non-native” students, but among what we call 
“monolingual” students. We can see how the code-meshing of the Malaysian student in 
Lu’s study and that of Buthaina in Canagarajah’s study are different and that both should 
be considered creative despite the fact that the Malaysian student decides to reiterate so 
called standard use, whereas Buthaina uses Arabic script with English, emoticons with 
alphabetic texts.  
 Therefore, when we read and respond to student writings, with our focus on 
difference as the norm and ecologies of writing as broader and more complex than handy 
categorizations, we should approach difference not in terms of broad categories like 
identity markers (ESL, non-native, etc.) but in terms of what Stephanie Kerschbaum calls 
“markers of difference”: “It will be useful to re-emphasize the distinction between 
markers of difference and identity markers more generally. Markers of difference are 
always situated, negotiable, and part of individual interactions…. Thus, markers of 
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difference do not provide cross-contextual understanding of the meaning associated with 
any particular identity marker” (109). In other words, we should discard the static notion 
of difference and use what Kerschbaum calls “a dynamic, relational, and emergent 
construct” (116). This is what Helen Fox says when she talks about the importance of not 
generalizing the problems of ESL students: “It would not be a good idea to assume that 
anyone who comes from abroad, or worse, anyone whose last name is Wong or Das 
Gupta or Hernandez must have a particular writing or thinking style, or must be affected 
by cultural differences to the same degree or in the same way as other world majority 
students, or even at all” (110-111). In other words, when we see difference in student’s 
composing practice, it’s better to follow the traces of every agent than to assign the 
source of such difference to any a priorily known or assumed reason/force.  
 Finally, though there is a general misconception that translingual/transmodal 
approaches are useful only for non-traditional/non-mainstream students, partly due to the 
focus on additive notions of language and modal difference in the academy, we should 
show how it is perhaps more useful to seemingly monolingual students and teachers 
alike. This is particularly so because translingual/transmodal approaches need to focus as 
much on material practices as on dispositions. Students tend to suffer a lot not only 
because they are not capable of navigating across linguistic and modal diversities (which 
is hard), but because they are accustomed to think about writing in a way that makes it 
hard for them to appreciate the strength of their unique practices. Similarly, given current 
geopolitical and cultural realities, so-called monolingual students also find themselves in 
many situations, both within the academy and outside, that demand ability to understand 
and appreciate semiotic practices that look quite different from their own. And, since 
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dispositions and practices are co-constitutive, encouraging both teachers and students to 
experiment and take risk in translingual and transmodal composing practices (since they 
are inextricably linked), while helping them to see the limitations of existing notions of 
language and modality will be central to teaching-learning practices. Constant exposure 
and continuous experimentations help teachers and students develop dispositions that can 
see the value of things that looked inappropriate to them in the past.  
 As most of us have been trained in monolingual and monomodal educational 
systems, we tend to ignore productive differences in student texts. For instance, when I 
was working in a writing center, one student showed a comment on her paper from her 
instructor. It read like “Your paper is very difficult to read because your sentences 
wander around.” Due to our monolingual training, we still ignore sentences that “wander 
around”; we don’t have tolerance towards ambiguities and complexities that differences 
in composing could generate, at least if they are written by students. This applies not only 
to teachers outside the English department, but also to those who teach FYC. This 
pervasive ideology of English monolingualism and monomodality of writing still governs 
how teachers think about language despite semiotic practices going through constant 
transformations in varying socio-political contexts. What it says is that writing programs 
need to work continuously towards changing the dispositions of such teachers because, as 
Patricia Friedrich says, they cannot be changed and “implemented overnight” (26). Some 
ways towards changing such disposition can be by encouraging teachers (including 
graduate teaching assistants (GTAs) and adjuncts, who form the majority of those who 
teach FYC), as Patricia Friedrich says, to learn from recent scholarship on language 
learning and modal relations: 
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I recommend that both WPAs and faculty read and discuss works in 
sociolinguistics and particularly in world Englishes. When instructors 
become aware of the magnitude, the scope, and the many different 
functions of English around the world, their perceptions of the language 
tend to change completely, and their sensitivity to issues facing users of 
the language who are different from themselves seems to grow 
accordingly.  
 
This applies to promoting transmodal disposition and practices too. The focus on 
experimenting and taking risk at using different semiotic practices is equally important, 
especially because many of us think that we do not know much about use of “new” media 
and modalities. Cynthia Selfe points out such resistance and the need to equally focus on 
experimenting:  
At the same time, I also see another complicating tension: on one hand, a 
celebratory recognition of multimodality/transmodality and, on the other 
hand, a push-to-the-background/resistance to teaching certain forms 
of/environments for multimodality/transmodality production: like some 
English teachers' resistance to teaching/recognizing anything but 
conventional print-based word papers (which, granted, are themselves 
multimodal, but not in the same ways as texts created in digital 
environments can be). (Selfe in Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge, 
“Translinguality, Transmodality”)  
 
Here, it is important to remind those who resist new literacy practices not only that we 
are more and more surrounded by texts that utilize the resources of a variety of 
technologies and modalities, but also that they themselves practice such literacies in 
many seemingly monomodal texts. Second, we can utilize, as Wendy Hesford et al. 
advocate, the resources that a diverse group of teachers can bring, especially from their 
experiences of teaching or learning linguistic and other multimodal practices that are 
different from our mainstream tradition. However, it would be a mistake to assume that 
non-native or multilingual GTAs/faculty are free from monolingual bias, particularly 
because the teaching of English is equally (sometimes even more) governed by 
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monolingual ideology outside the United States and other English-speaking countries. 
The sharing of these diverse experiences, by both native and non-native teachers, can 
help promote greater awareness about language politics and discursive practices.  
 It is also important not to separate the issue of language diversity from modality 
in teaching as they are, in most situations, inextricably connected. For instance, let me 
take the case of David in Cynthia Selfe’s study. In his case, monolingualism is as much 
of the source of the problem as the monomodal focus in US composition teaching, 
besides many other aspects of material-social relations that went undetected. It is perhaps 
partly true that David could have done well in his composition class had the teachers 
been cognizant of his alternative literacy skills and recognized the value of them. But, it 
is equally possible that he would have suffered because the ghost of monolingual belief 
follows even in what we often call new media literacy practices. We all know that most 
multimodal assignments include a ”writing” component, often in the form of reflection, 
that needs to fulfill the same requirements of a traditional essay. It is definitely better than 
limiting students to essayistic writing. But if we do not address the issue of language 
diversity in conjunction with modalities and literacies considered different from writing, 
we expect the same thing from what we call multimodal composition or new literacy 
practices, repeating the same problem, but in a different form.   
Conclusion 
 With increasing diversity in the student population and proliferation and 
intersections of diverse semiotic practices, it has become a necessity for us to address 
challenges our students are facing and the opportunities that such developments have 
created both for us as teachers and our students. While it is important to be cognizant of 
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and learn from students’ composing practices within and outside the academy, especially 
in terms of how they, as what Steven Fraiberg calls knotworkers participating in a variety 
of networks, produce texts outside the academy and how that affects their 
writing/composition within, it is equally necessary to see how such practices are 
transforming or/and perpetuating problematic assumptions about language relations and 
its relation to other semiotic modes. In examining such composing practices, we should 
resist the temptation to separate languages from other semiotic practices as they are part 
of the same material-social ecology and are inextricably linked with each other.
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  New Cultural and Media Studies (Aaron Jaffe) 
  New Media and Composition Pedagogy (Bronwyn Williams) 
  Revision: Theory and Practice (Min-Zhan Lu) 
  Writing in the Disciplines (Joanna Wolfe) 
  Teaching College Composition (Joanna Wolfe) 
  Work in English (Bruce Horner) 
American Authors 1900-Present: Postmodern Literature and Culture 
(Thomas Byers) 
  The Work of Ethnography (Debra Journet) 
Watson Seminar on Language and Literacy (Min-Zhan Lu, Brian Street, 
Ralph Cintron, and Suresh Canagarajah) 
 
MA in Professional Communication, Clemson University 
 
Theories of Rhetoric and Professional Communication (Martin Jacobi) 
Teaching Professional Writing (Summer Smith Taylor) 
Professional Writing (Shannon Walters) 
Advanced Technical and Business Writing (Jan Holmevik) 
Theories and Practices of Workplace Communication (Sean D. Williams) 
Visual Communication (Jan Holmevik) 
Empirical Research Methods (Tharon Howard) 
Composition Theory  and Teaching Practicum (Cynthia Haynes)  
 
MA in English, Tribhuvan University, Nepal 
 
British and American Poetry, Drama, Fiction, Literary Theory, History of 
English Literature, Linguistics and Literature, Creative Writing, Non-
Western Studies, Intellectual History 
 
Language Proficiency 
  
 English (high proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing) 
 Nepali (high proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing) 
 Hindi (good proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing)  
 
Professional Membership  
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Member   :  STC (2008-2010) 
 Member   :  CCCC (2010-Present) 
 Member   :  MLA (2013-Present) 
 
 
